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This thesis is an economic appraisal on the primary education sector of 
England.  The research is undertaken on all state primary schools in the 
country for the period 2002 – 2014.  The period is noteworthy with regard to 
observed trends in primary education spending as well as for major policy 
reform associated with the Academies Act 2010.  The study provides economic 
insights on educational attainment at the school level in these two different 
contexts.   
First, the aspect of efficiency in resource utilisation is examined against the 
backdrop of the economic recession with imminent and actual cuts on 
education spending – the second largest area of public spending.  An 
econometric estimation of the production frontier, defined by the most 
efficient schools, is undertaken using data on school inputs and test-score 
output for the period 2002 – 2010.  The empirical evidence suggests 
considerable scope for improving efficiency in state schooling in England. 
Mean-efficiency levels vary between 0.5 and 0.95 on both inter-school and 
intra-school variations in pupil attainment and progress.  Schools are seen to 
be capitalising on pupils with higher learning aptitude, with prior attainment 
being the single most dominant factor that has a positive effect on efficiency 
based on test-score measures.  The frontier schools are evidently more 
judicious in the employment of school resources in maximising the 
educational output.  In terms of school finance, the ‘best-practice’ schools are 
able to translate every percentage increase in per pupil real expenditure in to 
a 0.1 percent rise in english and maths test results, unlike the average school. 
The latter part of the thesis is a policy evaluation on the Academies Act 2010.  
The 2010 Act heralded the ongoing academisation process of English primary 
schools, whereby schools converting to academy status gained autonomy from 
local education authority control.  As a contextual prelude to the empirical 
research, a chapter of the thesis documents the changes brought about by the 




institutional restructuring on academic achievement and school composition 
is then examined through a comparative analysis of academy schools vis-à-vis 
maintained schools.  The school level analysis over the years 2002 – 2014, 
adopts the standard difference-in-differences model for a time (period) and 
yearly event estimation of the academy effect in this sector.  The average test 
performance of pupils in academy schools is observed to have increased by 
almost a unit, in the post-academisation years, for standardised tests in 
english reading and maths, over that of maintained schools.  The estimates 
indicate intake quality enhancing changes in academy schools in the post-
reform period relative to maintained schools, which is accompanied by 
increasing pupil numbers in these schools. 
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The primary education sector caters to the largest number of pupils in 
compulsory education in the UK.  The vast majority of primary school pupils, 
that is over 93 per cent (around 4.7 million pupils), are educated in state 
schools with the remaining 7 per cent attending independent schools.  State 
schools are non-fee paying schools, which are funded by the central 
government either through the local education authority or directly.  
Currently, a third of public spending in education1 goes to the state primary 
school sector (Bolton, 2020).  Improving school performance and pupil 
outcomes in state primary schools has received priority under successive 
governments.  In recent years, there have also been growing concerns over the 
persistence of a long tail of underachievers in the state school sector.  Policy 
reforms and programmes, including priority spending for disadvantaged 
students, intended to improve schools, have been implemented with varying 
degrees of success overtime.  This thesis, ‘An Economic Appraisal on 
Efficiency, Institutional Restructuring and Reform in English State Primary 
Schools’, looks at two important aspects in the economics of schooling in 
England, within this context, that have to do with efficiency in the utilisation 
of school resources and the implications of ‘market-oriented’ policy reforms 
involving institutional changes in state primary schools.   
The aspect of efficiency is an under researched area in the economic literature 
on English schools.  The most commonly used criteria for evaluating school 
performance is pupil achievement, measured mainly by test scores.  Education 
policy, in the UK, has also been centred on improving pupil performance in 
standardised tests and increasing the numbers of pupils attaining expected 
levels of attainment by the end of each phase of schooling.  The school league 
                                                        
1  “Education spending is the second-largest element of public service spending in the UK 
behind health, representing about £95 billion in 2019–20 in today’s prices or about 4.2% of 




tables, published since 1992, also rank schools on the basis of standardised 
test results/pupil attainment.  School performance measures again form the 
main criteria on which failing schools are identified by the schools’ inspections 
authority, the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills 
(Ofsted).  This emphasis on high-stake performance indicators can, however, 
be counter-productive and result in sub-optimal outcomes.  Schools are 
known to game the system for their benefit through practices, such as, 
selective intake and streamlining.  Schools may compete to attract pupils with 
higher aptitude in learning and prioritise improving their rankings in the 
school league tables by ‘teaching to test’ and focusing on potential borderline 
pupils so as to improve test results within short time-frames.  Measures based 
on school efficiency – on how well schools utilise their resources in achieving 
desired outcomes – may be offered as a meaningful alternative to ‘test-
centred’ performance indicators.  Efficiency measures enable greater 
accountability and transparency within the system of state schooling and also 
provide an incentive for schools to improve standards at minimum costs.   
An efficiency analysis is undertaken as part of this research, using data on 
school inputs and test-score output.  The empirical estimation of school-level 
efficiency uses the econometric approach, known as the stochastic production 
frontier methodology, to identify the frontier, comprised by the most efficient 
schools in the dataset.  In other words, the production frontier function depicts 
the maximum attainable educational outcome with the minimal use of school 
resources.  The empirical evidence from this research shows the most efficient 
schools to be more effective in the utilisation of school inputs compared to the 
average school.  It identifies some of the idiosyncratic factors, with respect to 
school inputs, in the education production process of the best practice schools.  
The analysis undertaken analyses efficiency both with respect to inter-school 
variations in pupil performance as well as intra-school variations in 
educational outcomes.  The findings throw light on the scope for school 
improvement by optimising the use of valuable resources and through the 
emulation of best-practice. 
The latter part of this thesis is a policy evaluation on the Academy Act 2010.  




primary school sector through the introduction of academy schools.  Academy 
schools are non-fee paying autonomous schools, funded directly by the central 
government.  Academies epitomise the influence of neo-liberal thinking on 
education policy reforms over the last quarter of a century.  They are an 
extension of the quasi-market in the state education sector, where both public 
and private agents meet in the efficient delivery of public services.  A critical 
review of the academy reforms is undertaken in this study, tracing the path to 
academisation of state primary schools and the later expansion of the 
programme.  The review undertaken examines the legislative and 
organisation features of the new system of schooling and elaborates on the 
implications of the school restructuring exercise.  This is followed by a policy 
evaluation on the impact of the 2010 reform in the state school sector, through 
the empirical estimation of the ‘academy effect’.  The analysis is undertaken 
by specifying a difference-in-differences model that compares between 
academy schools and a comparable control group of maintained schools on 
school test results and intake quality.  The estimates from the so specified 
period and yearly event models show a significant and positive ‘academy 
effect’ on maths and english test scores in the post-academisation period.  The 
results on school intake quality are, however, not as vivid, but indicate 
performance enhancing changes in the intake composition of academy schools 



























1.1 Introduction  
  
The allocation of resources to schools and within schools is central in 
education decision-making. In allocating resources and in the design and 
implementation of education policy, schools and state agencies, as rational 
agents, are engaged in optimising behaviour. Such optimising behaviour 
involves making choices, the nature of which is crucial in determining the 
effectiveness of resources and of education policy, per se. The interplay of 
political and behavioural choices made by the state, schools and households 
(parents and students), as optimising agents in the education production 
process results in differing outcomes. Assuming a common educational 
objective, analysing the variation in outcomes would enable the identification 
and emulation of ‘best-practice’ within the sector.  This forms the core of an 
efficiency analysis in education as is undertaken in the current study.    
Specifically the study examines relative efficiency in primary education in 
England for the period 2002-2010 using pupil-level data from the National 
Pupil Database (NPD) that has been aggregated to the school-level for the 
purpose of the analysis. Efficiency, as used here, refers to the aspect of 




unit to increase its output without increasing the use of its resources2.  In the 
context of primary education, it reflects the ability of a school to maximise its 
educational output (where, measured by test scores) with the minimal use of 
its resources.  Thus within the framework of education production function 
analysis, the study aims to quantify where inefficiencies in resource allocation 
are originating, through the identification of best practice within the primary 
school sector. The hypothesis is that relative inefficiencies exist in resource 
use and allocation between schools and there exists the scope of maximizing 
output further (that is, the educational output/s or desired educational 
outcome) by learning from best practice and through the judicious allocation 
of resources.    
The identification of best practice and measurement of efficiency is made 
possible using the production frontier methodology.  The study exploits the 
developments in the econometric approach to efficiency measurement to 
obtain efficiency scores for individual schools based on the data on inputs 
(covering various school and pupil characteristics) and `test-scores’ output.  
Adopting the stochastic production frontier methodology, developed by 
Aigner et al (1977), a time-varying fixed effects model is specified that allows 
for both cross-sectional as well as temporal variation in efficiency levels a la 
Cornwell et al (1990).  Two different specifications of the production frontier 
are used.  One examines efficiency in terms of test-score production, while the 
second specification is based on measures of variance in test scores.  The study 
further identifies the determinants of teaching efficiency in primary 
education, on how schools differ with regard to the inputs that go into the 
education production process.    
                                                        
2 The term ‘efficiency’ is used interchangeably with ‘technical efficiency’ in the study.  It may 
be noted that technical efficiency is just one component of overall economic efficiency.  The 
other component of economic efficiency is allocative efficiency, which refers to the ability and 
willingness of an economic unit to equate its specific marginal value product with its marginal 
cost.  Taken together, overall economic efficiency is defined as the ability of an economic unit 
to allocate resources in such a way as to derive maximum returns against the minimum 
sacrifice.  Farell (1957) provides a clear distinction between these three different measures 
of efficiency. In the absence of data on input prices, the current study focuses on the technical 
aspect of economic efficiency alone.  Moreover, the measurement of technical efficiency 
assumes greater significance, given the higher probability that where technical inefficiency 
exists, it is likely to exert an influence on allocative efficiency, thereby, resulting in a 




This study puts into perspective the link between efficiency in resource use 
and educational achievement in the context of resource availability and 
between school variations in school expenditure patterns. An efficiency study 
of this nature is particularly warranted in the UK context in light of the 
observed sharp increase in the overall spending on education3 as well as on 
schools, particularly after the late-nineties, prior to the onset of the recession 
circa 2008.  The overall increase in the recurrent expenditure by the central 
and local government on schools in England in real terms for the ten year 
period since 1997/98 has been to the tune of 34 per cent, with spending on 
under 5s, primary and secondary schools increasing by 59 per cent, 25 per 
cent and 29 per cent, respectively.  Whether the increase in resources has 
translated in terms of improved performance and whether more resources 
mean better outcomes can be effectively addressed through an efficiency 
analysis of schools, which is unprecedented.  An analysis on how effectively 
schools have employed resources in improving performance during this 
relevant period would also shed light on the possible implications of the 
austerity measures that have ensued.  The specification of a time-varying 
efficiency model enables one to undertake a trend analysis of the relative-
efficiency of schools and observe how these have responded to exogenous 
changes in public spending on schools and changes in education policy per se.    
The economic aspect of school performance in terms of efficiency in resource 
use and the judicious allocation of resources have received little attention to 
date. A common criterion used for judging school performance, in the 
education literature, has been pupil achievement measured mainly through 
test scores (Hanushek, 1986; Gibbons, 2011).   Much of educational policy, in 
the UK, has also been centred on the objective of improving performance and 
increasing the numbers of those attaining the expected levels of achievement 
at the end of their school year.  This has been a main criterion in ranking 
                                                        
3 Public spending on education constitutes about 5 per cent of the National Income in the UK 
(OECD, 2004), with spending on school education accounting for the largest proportion of 
total education spending (Sibieta et al, 2008).  The main elements in overall education 





schools in the School League tables as well4.  The success of education policy 
and the success of schools are, thus, mainly judged on the criteria of 
performance measured in terms of test scores/attainment levels as different 
from attaining the maximum outcome through the optimal utilisation of 
resources. The Schools’ White Paper – The Importance of Teaching, published 
in November 2010, officially recognises the importance of efficiency in 
improving the effectiveness of schooling in the UK. Learning from best practice 
and the judicious allocation of resources are spelt out as important factors in 
a bid to improving the efficiency of the system.  In the absence of any 
comprehensive study on efficiency in resource use in schooling in the UK, this 
study aims to fill the void in the existing literature through a systematic 
evaluation of relative efficiency in primary schooling in England.   Comparing 
school performance in terms of optimizing resource use would contribute to 
a better understanding of the economic aspect of performance in schooling.  
Moreover, identification of the idiosyncratic factors in the education 
production process of the best performing schools enables the emulation of 
`best-practice’ and thereby the more effective utilization of resources in the 
primary school sector.  
The contribution of school resources to pupils’ performance is an issue that is 
widely contended upon (Hanushek, 1986; Vignoles et al, 2000; Hanushek, 
2003; Hageland et al, 2005). Studies examining the link between school 
resources and performance, in the UK context, observe a small but positive 
association between educational expenditure and performance (Gibbons et al, 
2011a; Nicoletti et al, 2012).  The analysis in these studies has been mainly 
undertaken following the traditional production function approach through 
OLS estimation.  The current study deviates from this trend, examining the link 
between resource allocation and performance from a production frontier 
framework.  Through the econometric estimation of the production frontier, 
the parameters of which reflect the association between school inputs and the 
school output for the best performing schools, the deviations from the 
                                                        
4 The School League tables have been published since 1992 as an informative source catering 




estimated frontier are quantified to arrive at measures of efficiency 
(inefficiency) for those schools below the frontier.  The parameters of the 
estimated frontier are also compared with that of the average production 
function estimated via OLS to gain a better understanding of differences 
between the best practice and average school.  The findings clearly exhibit the 
frontier schools as having a greater effect on performance compared to the 
average school, besides being more effective in the use of its resources.  The 
estimated efficiency scores vary between 0.3 and 1, between the least efficient 
(0.3) and most efficient (1) schools in the dataset. Primary schools in England, 
in the state school sector, could, thus, improve their efficiency by up to 70% 
by using resources more effectively. 
This study, further, examines how schools compare in terms of intra-school 
variations in test results in the context of efficiency.  Tincani (2017) 
establishes that the variance of peer types can have a negative effect on 
performance depending on the ability of students, with a differential impact 
observed across subjects.   By specifying the variance in test scores as an 
outcome variable, this study looks into the association between efficiency and 
intra-school variation in test-scores:  Higher variance in test results being 
indicative of greater ‘intra-school’ inequality in performance and hence 
undesirable5. The patterns of association between the different factor inputs 
and variance in test-scores is also closely examined. There is observed to be 
little consonance between inter-school variations in performance and intra-
school variation in test results with regard to technical efficiency, implying a 
trade-off between the two when it comes to the efficient utilisation of 
resources.   
The estimated production frontier model also controls for inequities 
stemming from location-specific and school-specific factors as well as 
temporal factors determining the school/pupil profile, through a school-by-
year fixed effects estimation of the production frontier.   Besides this, the 
                                                        
5 Inequality in UK primary education has been a major area of concern, particularly in recent 
years, with evidence of widening disparity and poor performance of some schools.  According 
to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) Report ‘How Fair is Britain’ (2010), 
children are being failed by Britain's schools because of inequalities relating to gender, race 




education production function has been specified to include variables that 
control for the differences in the pupil profile and neighbourhood 
characteristics. These control variables include the ethnicity of pupils, free 
school meal status, mother tongue, special educational needs and gender.  
Again, relevant in this context are the inequalities stemming from the nature 
of differential funding to schools based on location-specific characteristics.  
Under the current system of funding, schools in disadvantaged areas receive 
more funding through a system of compensatory resource allocation to and 
from local authorities. This allowance in the current funding formulae has led 
to discrepancies in school funding as neighbouring schools with similar socio-
economic profiles receive different levels of funding, on grounds of falling 
under the jurisdiction of different local authorities (Gibbons, 2011a).  As to 
how the non-random allocation of pupils and funding to schools impact upon 
variations in efficiency-levels further expands the analytical scope of this 
study.   
Comparison of efficiency scores across schools is of considerable interest from 
a policy as well as academic perspective.  Efficiency studies on the education 
sector of the UK are relatively few and pertain mainly to secondary and higher 
education (Bates, 1997).  There is observed to be a dearth of efficiency studies 
at the primary or elementary school level in England, which accounts for the 
largest proportion of pupils in the education sector of the country. 
Furthermore, primary education being a crucial determinant of further 
educational attainment, a comprehensive study of efficiency in primary 
education, assumes importance.  This is particularly so considering the 
possible spill over effects of improved primary school performance on overall 
educational outcomes.    
The following sections of this paper are organised thus: Section 1.2 provides 
an overview of the institutional setting and of educational policies pertaining 
to UK primary education relevant to the period of study. Section 1.3 contains 
a critical review of the relevant literature.  The methodological framework and 
results of the current study from the empirical estimation of school technical 




outlines the policy implications, while Section 1.7 concludes on the main 
findings and policy recommendations that emerge from the study.  
  
 
1.2 Institutional Structure and Policy Environment  
  
Primary education in England accounts for the largest proportion of pupils in 
compulsory education in the country.  As per the latest School Census (2013), 
there are 24, 328 schools in England6.  These include schools in the state sector 
(maintained schools) as well as independent/private schools.  The private 
sector caters to the education of only around 6-7% of pupils in England, with 
maintained schools in the state sector containing the vast majority of the pupil 
population in the country7.  Maintained schools differ in the way they are 
governed, on who controls pupil admissions, and their religious affiliation 
(Gibbons et al, 2008).  Under the DfE classification, these schools are 
categorised as8: Academy schools, Community schools, Foundation schools, 
Voluntary Aided schools and Voluntary Controlled schools9. About 60% of 
Primary schools in England are classified as Community schools, with 15% 
comprised by Voluntary Controlled schools that are predominantly Faith 
schools.  Foundation schools account for about 2%, of which 86% are not 
connected to a particular faith, while Voluntary Aided schools account for 
about 23% of the state primary school sector, the majority of which are 
religiously affiliated (97%)10. The formation of Academy schools is a fairly 
                                                        
6  Schools, pupils and their characteristics, Academic Year 2020/21 – Explore education   
statistics – GOV.UK (explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk) 
7  As per the Statistical First Release (DfE), there were 4.3 million pupils in state-funded 
primary schools in England in 2013.   
8 Table A1.8 in the Appendix lists the main types of Primary Schools in the country and their 
fundamental characteristics.  
9 This list excludes Community Special schools and Foundation Special schools that cater to 
the education requirements of Special Needs (SEN) children and Pupil Referral Units (PRUs).  




recent phenomenon that came into effect with the Academies Act 201011.  An 
Academy school is a publicly funded independent school offering free 
education to pupils of all abilities, established by sponsors from business, faith 
or voluntary groups working in partnership with the central Government and 
local education partners12.  There has been the further addition of what are 
known as free schools and trust schools in recent years.  Similar to Academies 
and funded directly from the central government, these schools are to be set 
up by groups of parents, teachers, charities, trusts, religious and voluntary 
groups13.  
Maintained schools are mainly funded by the central government and follow a 
National Curriculum14.  The national curriculum is organised into blocks of 
years called ‘key stages’ (KS).  Key stages were introduced to the UK education 
system in 1988, to ensure that all children cover specific content during these 
particular stages of their school career.  For each subject, teachers guide their 
pupils through the requirements of the National Curriculum, in preparation 
for Standard Assessment Tests (SATs) at the end of Key Stages 1, 2 and 3. Thus, 
at the end of each key stage, pupils are formally assessed to measure progress.  
Primary schooling comprises of two key stages:  Key Stage 1 (KS1) and Key 
Stage 2 (KS2).  Key Stage 1 tasks and tests are taken at the end of the Key Stage 
1 program of study, normally in Year 2, when children are 7 years old.  The 
tests cover reading, writing and mathematics.  Key Stage 2 tests are taken at 
the end of the Key Stage 2 program of study, normally in Year 6, when children 
are 11 years old.  Children have to be assessed at working at level 3 or above 
to take Key Stage 2 tests.  The subjects covered in these tests are english and 
                                                        
11 The first schools converted to academy status in September 2010.  On 1 September 2015 a 
total of 3,420 schools had done so. The majority of converters (54%) were primary schools. 
The 1,861 primary academy converters were 11% of all state funded primary schools (Bolton, 
2015). 
12 Types of school: Academies - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) 
13 Latest figures released by the Department for Education show that almost nine-in-ten of the 
schools established by parents’ groups and charities received more applications than places 
for September, showing the growing popularity of the schools (Paton, 2013).  
14 The only exception to this are Academy schools and Free schools, which are publicly-funded 




mathematics.  Every year the government publishes data on attainment, 
progress and absence in all primary schools in the country based on the SAT 
tests results.    Media organisations use the information provided in compiling 
the School league tables as an informative source in widening choice and 
enhancing competition in state schooling.                              
   
1.2.1 School Funding and Governance 
  
All maintained schools, except Academies and Free schools, come under the 
jurisdiction of the local authority, which are mostly local government districts 
that organise schooling.  The local authorities act as intermediaries in the 
transfer of funds from the central government to schools, besides offering a 
number of educational services to schools under their jurisdiction.  In matters 
of school funding, the local authorities play a decisive role, determining the 
allocation of funding to schools.  Each local authority, has its own fair-funding 
formula for the schools they maintain, based on school characteristics.  The 
adoption of differing funding formulae across local authorities resulted in 
schools with similar characteristics receiving different levels of funding, being 
located in different local authorities.  In recent years, initiatives to rectify these 
discrepancies associated with school funding, have led to the development of 
a National Funding formulae for schools (Chowdry et al, 2011).   
Schools receive funding for three years at a time.  There are two major types 
of school funding:  revenue funding and capital funding15.    Revenue funding 
pays for the day-to-day running costs of the school:  staff salaries and 
heating/light bills.  The funding is received by the school from their local 
authority (LA) and is known as delegated budget.  The majority of funding for 
schools is provided by a central government grant to the local authority, 
known as the Dedicated Schools Grant (DSG).  The local authority can spend 
more than the DSG on schools, but may not spend less.  The DSG plus any 
funding the LA receives from the Learning and Skills Council is called the 
                                                        




Schools Budget.  The LA can retain part of the Schools Budget to fund central 
services, e.g. to fund pupil referral units and high cost special educational 
needs. It is the local schools forum (Governing Body), which decides how much 
of the Schools Budget can be retained centrally.  On average, local authorities 
retain about 13% of their Schools Budget for central services; while 10% of 
LAs retain less than 9% and 10% retain more than 17% of their schools 
budget 16 .  The remainder of the Schools Budget is delegated directly to 
individual schools through the local authority’s spending formula that 
distribute the majority of funds on the basis of the number of pupils in schools.  
More recently, local authorities have been constrained on how they set their 
formulae on school funding and have to adhere to rules such as the Central 
Expenditure Limit that restricts the growth in spending on central services 
and the Minimum Funding Guarantee (MFG) whereby, each school is 
guaranteed a minimum increase in funding per pupil each year (Chowdry et al 
2011).   
Overall, the most common aspects of the fair-funding formulae that 
determines the allocation of funding to schools are:  
 
• The number of pupils at each Key Stage;   
• Indicators of social deprivation, such as the number of pupils eligible for free 
school meals (FSM);   
• Individually Assigned Resources for pupils with a statement of special 
educational needs (SEN);  
• Number of pupils with SEN without a statement17;  
                                                        
16 Chowdry et al, 2011.  
17 A Statement is a document, which sets out a child’s SEN and any additional help that the 
child should receive. The aim of the Statement is to make sure that the child gets the right 
support to enable them to make progress in school. A Statement is normally made when all 
the educational provision required to meet a child’s needs cannot reasonably be met by the 
resources within a child’s school at School Action or School Action Plus after proper 




• Number of pupils with English as an additional language (EAL);  
• Site and school factors (the school’s business rates bill, an amount per square 
metre of the school’s site, and many other factors), technically referred to as 
the Area Cost Adjustment Index (ACA).  
 
The other major type of funding is capital funding, that is, money provided for 
spending on school buildings.  This funding may not be spent on the day-to-
day running costs of the school or on routine maintenance.  Every school 
receives a devolved formula capital allocation, calculated on a formulaic basis.  
In addition to formula capital, schools can also apply for other forms of capital 
funding.  
Schools may also receive grants for specific purposes.  These include the 
School Development Grant, received from the respective LEA, which may be 
used to support teaching and learning, and the School Standard Grant.  The 
School Standard Grant is calculated as an amount per primary school plus a 
per pupil amount and is allocated to schools at the same time as their 
delegated budget.  Schools have discretion on how to use the School Standard 
Grant, such as for funding community facilities to support the school’s 
extended services.    
The resources that a school has at its disposal vary between schools and are 
largely determined by the amount of funding received from the central 
government.  Schools also mobilise money from the local community, mainly 
through charitable gifts and donations, as well as from other sources such as 
school trips and school fairs.  Schools receiving delegated budgets from local 
authorities are subject to local authority auditing procedures.  Schools are 
subject to regular internal audits carried out on behalf of the local authority 
by their internal auditor.  They may also be subject to external audits as part 
of the Audit Commission review of the local authority18.    
The school has decisive power on how to spend its funds.  The bulk of the 
expenditure predominantly covers teacher pay that follows national pay 
                                                        




scales.  Besides this are the expenses mainly on support staff or other staff, 
building and maintenance and on learning resources/IT.  How well a school 
uses its resources and how these are linked to educational priorities is part of 
the inspection process undertaken by the Office for Standards in Education, 
Children’s services and Skills (Ofsted), the regulatory body that takes 
responsibility for the inspection of education in all schools in England19.  
 
1.2.2 Policy Initiatives: 1997-2010  
 
A child-centred and progressive system of education20 with better access and 
greater choice of provision are, currently, some of the prominent features of 
the state school sector in the UK.  Education policy reforms have played a 
crucial part in, thus, transforming school education in the country, overtime.  
In recent years, particularly since the late eighties21, these have centred on 
deregulating and modernising the UK education sector.  In this section, some 
of the major policy reforms relevant to English schools are reviewed for the 
period 1997-2010 on different aspects of schooling that include the 
curriculum, the structure of schooling, performance and spending. 
The aims, purposes and values of primary education, particularly in the latter 
half of the nineties, were set to raise pupil performance in the core subjects of 
literacy, numeracy and science.  A number of pilot schemes and interventionist 
programmes, starting with the formation of the National curriculum and its 
delivery, have since taken shape.  Among the noteworthy initiatives of the time 
                                                        
19 Ofsted inspectors work to government legislation and statutory guidance, which is based 
on the Department for Education's Safeguarding children and safer recruitment in education 
(www.ofsted.gov.uk) 
20 The two most noteworthy Acts in this context are the Elementary Education Act of 1880 
and that of 1891.  The former made school attendance compulsory and the latter made 
elementary education free.   
21 In 1988 the British parliament passed the Education Reform Act intended to bring about 
far-reaching changes in the education sector of the country by allowing the operation of a 
market economy in the provision of education.  These changes, however, contain only some 
elements of an internal market for education within the state education system (Glennerster, 
1991).  Hence the term quasi-market is used to refer to the still evolving market-oriented 




are the National Literacy Strategy and the setting up of national learning 
targets, the inclusion of a compulsory literacy and numeracy hour in primary 
schools, the wider use of non-qualified teachers to support classroom teaching 
and secure improved student outcomes and the reduction in the amount of 
compulsory content in the National Curriculum.  Policy evaluation studies 
highlight the importance of these programmes and reforms to improvements 
in schooling.  Machin et al (2004), examining the effectiveness of the 
compulsory literacy and numeracy hour in primary schools, observe reading 
scores to have risen by 0.09 of a standard deviation, as a result.  Johnson 
(2004) also credits the literacy and numeracy strategies in support of KS2 
performance with a significant part of the remarkable improvements in 
results between 1997 and 2001.  According to Johnson (2004), “these 
strategies set out very clear guidelines for teachers, with clearly structured 
lessons and daily ‘literacy hours’, in part responding to significant criticism of 
practices common in some primary schools.”  Similarly, Coughlan (2007) 
observes a sharp rise in the number of 11 year olds who reach the expected 
levels in English, Maths and Science between 1997 and 2006.    
Also noteworthy are programmes promoting educational inclusion.  Following 
the 1997 white paper Excellence in Schools, two major initiatives, addressing 
the persistent problem of a long tail of underachievers in UK education, were 
launched.  These were the Excellence in Cities (EiC) and Education Action 
Zones (EAZs). EAZs were set up in 1998 in inner city areas with 
underperforming schools.  They consisted of clusters of schools in deprived 
areas working together with government grants and sponsorship from local 
businesses, assuming some of the functions of the LEA22.  Eventually, in 1999, 
the most successful EAZs were merged into a new programme called 
Excellence in Cities.  This was a three-year programme aimed at improving the 
education of inner city children, to enable them to achieve better education 
and labour-market outcomes (Emmerson et al, 2005; Johnson, 2004).  An 
evaluation of the programme by Emmerson et al (2005) shows it to have had 
                                                        




the intended effect with a significant and positive EiC effect observed on the 
performance of inner city schools.   
Another direct policy intervention by the government, with the objective of 
improving the urban primary school, is the Improving Schools Programme 
(ISP), previously called the Intensive Support for Primary Schools Programme. 
Schools that made little progress in raising standards and with low 
achievement in literacy and mathematics were to receive support from local 
authority (LA) advisors or consultants as part of the ISP.  It involved a process 
of streamlining, whereby, these schools, helped by their advisers/consultants, 
were to select out the children in each class who can be supported to make 
‘accelerated progress’.  The initiative had the added advantage of enhancing 
the schools’ position in the league tables (Macguire, 2009).  More recently, 
there has been the introduction of a pupil premium, which is money provided 
to schools towards the support of disadvantaged children and meant to 
improve their educational outcomes.  
Performance enhancing policy initiatives, aimed at improving the quality of 
teaching, have also been pursued by successive governments. Under New 
Labour, head teachers were specifically ‘identified as in need of higher status 
and training as school leaders’ (Gunter, 2009).  A National College for School 
Leadership (NCSL) was established in 2000 in order to train and support 
aspiring and serving head teachers.  The National Professional Qualification 
for Head Teacher (NPQH), was, further, made mandatory from 1 April, 2009 
and the qualified teacher status (QTS) requirement to be a head teacher 
removed.  Subsequently, the Tory government, on similar lines, oversaw the 
setting up of ̀ Teaching Schools', whereby outstanding schools were to lead the 
training and professional development of teachers and head teachers.  In 
addition to this, ‘School Direct’, an initiative allowing schools to train top 
graduates as teachers in the subjects and phases they need has been set up. It 
has also been made compulsory for teacher trainers to pass literacy and 
numeracy tests before starting training.  Besides this, there have been new 
regulations on teacher appraisal. The Education (School Teachers’ Appraisal) 
(England) Regulations 2012 make the regulations on teacher appraisal 




schools and local authorities greater freedom to design appraisal policies that 
suit their own individual circumstances. This policy initiative has been 
followed by a more recent move to relate teachers’ performance to pay, based 
on the recommendations of the School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB).  The 
initiative equips head teachers with the freedom to decide pay and is intended 
to reward good staff.  The scheme also helps schools in disadvantaged areas 
recruit and keep the best teachers (Walker, 2013).   
In the area of institutional reform, the deregulation and modernisation of the 
UK education sector received much headway with the enactment of the 
Education Act 2002.  Following the proposals of the white paper ‘Schools – 
Achieving Success,’ the legislation relegated the role of Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) in the provision of education while encouraging greater 
private sector participation.  There has since been greater diversity in the 
provision of educational services in the country as seen in the establishment 
of trust schools, academies and free schools.   These initiatives on greater 
school autonomy and the diversification of schooling has received further 
impetus with the Academies Act 2010.  The implications of the market 
oriented changes have been evaluated in different contexts, portraying the 
opportunities and challenges embedded in the new system of schooling 
(Chevalier, 2005; Wilson, 2011).  
Public policy measures on school finance have particular relevance in the 
current context.  The efficient and fair allocation of funding to schools has 
received priority in school funding reforms in recent years.  Among the 
noteworthy policy initiatives in this direction have been the introduction of 
the Central Expenditure Limit and the Minimum Funding Guarantee (MFG).  
While the latter restricts the growth in spending on central services, the MFG 
ensures each school a minimum increase in funding per pupil each year.   In 
addition to this, major reforms towards the formulation of a National Funding 
formula that ensures school funding is fair and flexible to changing needs have 
taken root (Chowdry et al, 2011).  The period 1997-2008 also witnessed a 




The above review on the policy environment throws light on the various 
aspects of school reforms that shape the character of the public provision of 
schooling in the UK, on which the current study focuses.   
  
1.3 Education Production Function Analysis:  A 
Review  
 
A proper appreciation of the input-output relations prevalent in education 
becomes pertinent in the context of an efficiency analysis on schools.  There 
has been a plethora of studies, mainly of an empirical nature, that examine the 
input-output relations in education in various dimensions and contexts 
(Scheerens et al, 1989; Hanushek, 2003; Vignoles et al, 2000).  The empirical 
research, however, remains equivocal in determining the factors critical to 
‘school effectiveness’; the generalisation of findings is also made difficult given 
the different methodological approaches in these studies (Vignoles et al, 
2000).  Empirical research in this subject area has also been greatly limited by 
the lack of adequate theoretical models and the unavailability of reliable data 
(Scheerens et al, 1989; Vignoles et al, 2000; Levacic et al, 2002).  Taking note 
of this, the empirical and theoretical underpinnings in the literature on the 
effectiveness of school resources, specifically in the context of primary 
education in the UK, is examined in this section.   
A pioneering study on the effectiveness of school resources on pupil outcomes 
is the Coleman Congressional Report of 1966.  The report highlighted the role 
of family circumstances, ability and socioeconomic background in 
determining pupil outcomes over and above that of school resources. The 
publication of the Coleman report initiated a flow of studies focusing on the 
link between school resources and performance.  However, there has been 
little consensus regarding the school’s contribution to pupil outcomes 
(Hanushek, 1997; Scheerens et al, 1989; Vignoles et al, 2000; Hanushek, 2003; 
Haegeland et al, 2005, 2008; Das et al, 2011; Gibbons et al, 2011a; Nicoletti et 
al, 2012; Cobb-Clark, 2013).  For instance, Grissmer et al (1994) focusing on 




show that black students performed better overtime compared to white 
students, despite unfavourable family factors.   Unlike Coleman, they 
therefore, conclude that schools matter, attributing the better performance 
among black students to improvements in schooling.  Though, there have been 
efforts to map educational inputs to attainment through major surveys, 
involving meta-analysis and vote counting, on the empirical literature, the 
evidence drawn remains inconclusive (Hanushek, 1986; Hedges et al, 1994).  
While Hedges et al (1994) point to a significant relationship between various 
factor inputs and achievement, according to Hanushek (2003) resources in 
general contribute little to student achievement and what matters more are 
incentive policies designed to make improvements. Vignoles et al (2000), 
examining the relevance of meta-analysis on the literature on school 
effectiveness, sums up that “the 'positive' results of some meta-studies can at 
best be taken as indicative, rather than conclusive."    
From a theoretical lens, school effectiveness23 is generally perceived in terms 
of input-output relations and refers to the processes that lead to the 
realisation of educational outcomes/goals.  Though the education production 
process involves the multi-level generation of multiple outputs, standardised 
tests/examination results are the most commonly used measures of output in 
empirical research (Gibbons, 2011a; Hanushek, 1986).   Of these, measures on 
value-added or pupil progress are being increasingly relied on in education 
production function studies, since their introduction (Hanushek, 1971).  
Value-added measures are particularly useful in accounting for non-
randomness in the nature of allocation of pupils to schools - a typical feature 
of schooling systems around the world (Vignoles et al, 2000; Gibbons, 2008, 
2013).  School inputs, on the other hand, refer to school-specific features that 
may affect educational outcomes.  Coleman (1966) placed emphasis on 
compositional factors, identifying family circumstances, individual ability and 
socio-economic background as important determinants of educational 
                                                        
23  See Vignoles, 2002 for an elaborate discussion on the distinction between school 
effectiveness research and education production function studies.  In the current context, 
however, the term school effectiveness is used very broadly as in Hanushek (1979; 1981; 




outcomes.  The decomposition of school inputs so as to provide a more holistic 
approach in incorporating various determinants of educational outcomes in 
education production function analysis has since ensued.  Some of the factors 
used in the empirical research are total expenditure/expenditure per pupil, 
class-size/pupil-teacher ratio and the qualifications and experience of 
teaching staff.  Variables defining school composition include the free school 
meal status of pupils taken as a proxy for the socio-economic background, 
ethnicity, the education of parents and innate ability/aptitude measured by 
pupil performance in the early years of schooling.  The analysis that follows 
models the education production function on some of these output and school 
input measures commonly found in the literature. 
 
1.3.1 Empirical Studies on English Primary Schools 
 
The empirical evidence on English primary schools is reviewed here from the 
literature on the effectiveness of school resources, the class-size debate and 
policy evaluations24.  
Gibbons et al (2011a), exploiting differences in funding patterns between local 
education authorities arising from differences in the Area Cost Adjustment 
index (ACA)25, investigate the causal link between educational expenditure 
and pupil outcomes at the end of primary schooling in England.  Using a 
regression discontinuity approach with Area Cost adjustment differences 
taken as an appropriate source of exogenous variation in funding between 
schools, the study shows large effects of expenditure on attainment.  An 
additional expenditure of £1,000 per student in urban schools was estimated 
to raise student test scores at the end of primary school by around 0.25 
standard deviations.  Nicoletti et al (2012) adopting a production function 
approach, also find a positive effect of school finance on pupil outcomes.   They 
estimate that a £1,000 increase in annual spending per pupil in schools would 
                                                        
24 Machin et al (2005) provide a comprehensive review of some of these studies.      




increase the average of the test scores in Mathematics, English and Science by 
about 1%, 0.75% and 0.5%, respectively.   
The contribution of factors, other than school finance, to school quality, has 
also been examined. Gibbons et al (2007) consider the effect of pupil mobility 
on performance.  They establish that immobile pupils who experience high 
pupil entry rates in their year groups progress less well academically between 
ages 7 and 11 than pupils who experience low mobility in the same school.  
Gibbons et al (2008), on the other hand, examine the association between 
competition and school performance.  The performance gains from greater 
school competition is shown to be limited, with a positive causal link observed 
only in the case of Voluntary Aided schools.  Here, autonomy in administrative 
and admission practices is noted as an important factor where competition 
has an effect on schooling outcomes.  In another study, Gibbons et al (2011b) 
provide insights on the role of institutional factors on school performance.   
Estimating the causal effect of attending a state Faith school on attainment in 
English primary schools, the authors show that pupils who attend Faith 
schools progress faster compared to their counterparts in other state schools.  
Among other aspects examined in the literature are school size and teaching 
quality.  Chevalier et al (2005) highlight the importance of teaching quality 
and effort on pupil outcomes, with the pupil-teacher ratio observed to have 
only a limited impact.    Analysis on the class-size indicator from other sources 
also show any effects it has on pupil attainment to be small and declining 
overtime (The Department for Education, 2012).  The report ‘Class Size and 
Education in England’ (DofE, 2012), thereby, concludes that class size 
reduction policies need to be assessed against other factors, such as, teacher 
effectiveness when it comes to improving school quality.     
An understanding of the economics of schooling in the UK is also got through 
evaluation studies on targeted programmes and policy reforms in English 
schools.  Machin et al (2004) undertake an evaluation on the National Literacy 
Project (NLP) that covered about 400 primary schools in England in 1997 and 
1998.  They observe that reading scores rose by around 0.09 of a standard 
deviation following the introduction of the literacy hour.  In a review of the 




point to the need for “a policy approach that takes account of ‘political, social 
and economic contexts’ in working towards a better way of ‘doing school’ in 
the urban setting “(characterised by ‘challenging’ schools). Johnson (2004) 
reviews education policy reforms in England and also notes significant 
improvements in KS2 results attained between 1997 and 2001 since the 
introduction of the literacy and numeracy strategies in support of KS2 
performance.  According to the author, "these very big increases in 
performance suggest substantial initial levels of inefficiency in converting 
resources into the particular outcome – success at KS2 tests – and a significant 
failure of information or incentives within the school sector itself.”  These 
observations are relevant in the current context and highlight the scope of an 
efficiency analysis on schools in informing policy as well as contributing to the 
discourse on improving school effectiveness. 
 
 
1.4 Methodological Framework and Data Analysis 
 
The conceptualisation and measurement of efficiency using the production 
frontier methodology stems from neo-classical production function analysis.  
Theoretically, the concept of a production frontier corresponds to the neo-
classical notion of a production function as the maximum possible output 
attainable with any given set of inputs.  Any deviation from the frontier, thus, 
indicates the extent of an economic unit’s inability to produce the maximum 
output using its available inputs.  The extent of (in) efficiency is given by an 
index, which is the ratio between the actual and potential output.  Whereas the 
conventional production function approach assumes all economic units to be 
efficient and thus, operating on the frontier, efficiency analysis using the 
production frontier deviates from the conventional notion in recognising the 
existence of relative inefficiencies in production.   
The conventional production function may be seen as an average function, 
statistically estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as 




production frontier methodology, the maximum possible output/production 
frontier, not being observable, must be estimated.  Empirically, the production 
frontier is estimated from the observation of inputs and outputs of a number 
of economic units. There are two competing paradigms on how to estimate 
production frontiers under this methodology.  One uses mathematical 
programming techniques (deterministic) while the other employs statistical 
methods (stochastic).     
In the deterministic approach to efficiency measurement all variation in 
performance is attributed to variations in efficiency alone.  The deterministic 
approach consists of parametric and non-parametric techniques.  In the 
nonparametric programming technique the frontier is constructed as a free 
disposal convex hull based on the input-output ratios through linear 
programming techniques (Farrell, 1957).  The method consists of linear 
segments connecting the best technically efficient economic units against 
which the actual output of each sample observation is measured.  The 
advantage of this approach is that no functional form needs to be imposed on 
the data.  However, the approach suffers from the limitation that the frontier 
is computed from a supporting subset of observations from the sample, and is 
therefore particularly susceptible to extreme observations and measurement 
error (Forsund et al, 1980).  It also doesn’t make allowance for statistical noise 
or measurement error.    
Aigner et al (1968), following Farrell’s suggestion, specified a homogeneous 
Cobb-Douglas production frontier with all observations required to lie on or 
beneath the frontier.  Technical efficiency is, then, computed directly from the 
vector of residuals, using either the linear programming or quadratic 
programming technique with the error term in the specified functional form 
assumed to be one-sided (Forsund et al, 1980).  The difference in this 
approach with the non-parametric programming technique is that the 
parametric frontier is smooth, while its non-parametric counterpart is 
piecewise linear.  However, as with the non-parametric methodology, the 
‘estimated’ frontier in the parametric approach is sensitive to outliers.  Afriat 
(1972) further developed upon the deterministic models so as to make them 




distribution for the error term and proposed that the model be estimated 
using maximum likelihood method.  This method still suffers from the 
drawback that it does not take into consideration the influence of random 
events and statistical noise in estimating efficiency.  These drawbacks in the 
deterministic models are overcome in the stochastic production frontier 
methodology (econometric approach) to efficiency measurement.   
The stochastic frontier method being better amenable to statistical testing 
makes it a better choice over other models for the current analysis.  
Inefficiency is modelled by a ‘composed’ error term, under this approach, 
consisting of statistical noise and a one sided disturbance to allow for 
inefficiency.  In the stochastic production frontier framework developed by 
Aigner et al (1977), the best practice or frontier production function takes the 
following generic form:    
 
y=f(x) + u + v                                       (1.1)  
 
where, y is the observed outcome (test scores).  As is unique to the stochastic 
production frontier methodology, the error term is decomposed into two 
parts: u + v; where v captures the influence of other random factors, such as 
differences in location, institutional setting and measurement errors and is 
assumed to be normally distributed, i.e., v   ̴N[0,𝝈u²].  Technical (in) efficiency 
is captured by the one-sided component of the error term in the above 
equation, that is, ‘u’26.  The deterministic part f(x) and the stochastic part, `v’ 
together makes up the frontier for each observation (i.e., f(x) + v), unlike in the 
deterministic approach, where any deviation from the frontier is attributed 
solely to technical efficiency with no allowance made for statistical noise in the 
data (i.e., y=f(x) +u) 27.    
                                                        
26 Conventionally, the efficiency component of the error term (‘u’) can take either the form of 
a truncated normal distribution, a half-normal distribution, an exponential distribution of a 
gamma distribution.  
27 Figure A1.1 in the Appendix illustrates the difference between the three main approaches 
in the estimation of the production function – the average production function estimated via 




The above function (eq. 1.1) can be estimated empirically, through either 
maximum likelihood estimation, modified ordinary least squares (as used in 
the current study) or generalised method of moments.  Jondrow et al (1982) 
enabled the calculation of observation-specific (school-specific) efficiency 
levels, based on the strong distributional assumptions made on the 
components of the error term. Observation specific estimates of efficiency are 
obtained by considering the expected value of u, conditional on (v-u), by using 
either the mean or mode of the conditional distribution.  Where the technical 
efficiency component of the error term follows a half-normal distribution this 












       E[uit/it] = 
−𝜆(𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡)
𝜎






> 0;  = √σv2 +  σu2  > 0 ; 𝜙 (.) is the probability density function and 
𝜱 (.) is the cumulative distribution function. 
 
From the point estimates of u, thus, obtained, estimates of technical efficiency 
(TE) are derived as:  
 
 TE=exp(-û)             (1.4)  
 
In the extension of the above model to the panel-data case, Cornwall et al 
(1990) estimate technical efficiency, allowing for temporal variation without 
invoking strong distributional assumptions on the components of the error 
                                                        
estimated through the econometric approach, also known as stochastic production frontier 




term.  This is done by including in the production function a flexible function 
of time with parameters that vary over individual units.   
The basic model in the panel data case is specified as:  
 
  yit  =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥it + Υl + 𝑣it+𝑢i                 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;   𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                        (1.5) 
 
 
Defining 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝑢𝑖 gives the standard panel data model:  
 
   yit  =  𝛼i + 𝛽𝑥it+𝑣it                                                                                                        (1.6) 
 
It is assumed that v are independently and identically (i.i.d) distributed and 
uncorrelated with the inputs x.  This last assumptions is made for the 
consistency of the within and generalised estimators of the parameter vector 
𝛽, which are derived from the OLS estimation of equation 1.5 - a fixed effects 
model, where Υl is the parameter representing local authority fixed effects.  
Cornwell et al (1990) replace the firm effect (𝛼𝑖) in equation 1.5 above by a 
flexibly parameterised function of time.  A quadratic functional form is chosen, 
whereby:    
  
   𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖1 + 𝜃𝑖2𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖3𝑡                                                       (1.7) 
 
Defining W’it  =  [1, t, t2] and 𝛿I =  [𝜃𝑖1, 𝜃𝑖2, 𝜃𝑖3], eq. 1.6 is written as:  
  
   yit  =  X’it𝛽 + W’it𝛿I + 𝜈it                                                                                                                                             (1.8)  
 
The specification (1.8) implies that output levels vary both over firms and over 
time.  Efficiency measurement focuses on the cross-sectional variation and the 
model allows efficiency levels to vary over time (Cornwell et al, 1990).  Time 
varying productivity and efficiency levels for each observation are then 
derived from the residuals based on the within estimator.  Here, 𝛿I is estimated 
by regressing the residuals (yit – X’it𝛽 ) for observation I on Wit; on a constant, 




estimate of 𝛼it in eq. 1.7, which is consistent (for all i and t) as T → ∝.  The 
frontier intercept at time t and the firm-specific level of technical inefficiency 
of firm I at time t is then estimated as follows:  
 
𝛼 t = maxj (𝛼 jt)  and 𝑢 it  = 𝛼t - 𝛼 it                                               (1.9) 
  
Efficiency analysis on the UK education sector, using production frontier 
models, is very limited and is mainly on higher education (Iziad et al, 2002; 
Bates, 1997).  The deterministic production frontier methodology is more 
commonly used in these studies in the calculation of efficiency levels 
(Worthington, 2001).  The imposition of a functional form and the inability to 
account for ‘economies of scale’ in the econometric model, make it the less 
preferred option in conducting efficiency studies. Bates (1997) adopts both 
approaches in the context of English secondary schools.  The study concludes 
that there is much agreement between the deterministic and stochastic 
frontier results with high correlation observed on the relative estimates of 
efficiency obtained using both methods.   
 
1.4.1 Empirical Estimation 
 
The efficiency analysis is undertaken for all maintained primary schools in 
151 local educational authorities across all nine regions of England for the 
period 2002-2010.  Pupil level data on KS1 and KS2 performance and socio-
economic characteristics is collapsed to the school level to undertake the 
stochastic production frontier (SF) analysis.  The specified model allows for 
both cross-sectional and temporal variation in efficiency levels across schools, 
a la Cornwall et al (1990).  The estimates from the SF model are compared 
with the OLS estimates for varied specifications on the educational output and 
the differential effects of school inputs in the ‘best-practice’ and ‘average’ 






 1.4.2 The Data  
 
Data used for the empirical analysis is mainly from the National Pupil 
Database (NPD) made available by the Department for Education.  The data 
held in the NPD is collected from a range of sources including schools, Local 
Authorities and awarding bodies.  The data covers all maintained primary 
schools in England as well as independent and special schools that submit 
results on Standard Assessment Tests (SAT) taken at age 7 and 11 (Key Stages 
1 & 2, respectively).  It includes detailed information about pupils’ test and 
exam results, prior attainment and progression at each key stage.  The NPD 
also includes information about the characteristics of pupils such as their 
gender, ethnicity, first language, eligibility for free school meals, information 
about special educational needs and detailed information about any absences 
and exclusions.   
The study covers the period 2002-2010.  KS2 data on SAT (Standard 
Assessment Test) results for the relevant period (2002-2009) has been 
matched with KS1 data for the period 1998-2006 - the period for which 
cohorts who sat the KS2 tests between the years 2002-2010 had taken the KS1 
tests.  This is done to calculate the value-added score, measuring a pupil’s 
progress between the two key stages28.  The input measure for each pupil, in 
the computation of the value-added score, is the average point score achieved 
in the reading, writing and mathematics tests at KS1.  The output measure for 
each pupil is the average point score achieved in the english, mathematics and 
science KS2 tests.  A pupil's value added score is calculated by taking the 
difference between a pupil’s APS at the KS2 SAT tests (actual) and the median 
value of KS2 results of other pupils with the same, or similar, prior attainment 
at KS1 (expected).  A school's value added score is a simple average 
(arithmetic mean) of the value added measures for all pupils in the school and 
                                                        
28 The value-added accounts for differences in innate ability and the influence of the socio-
economic environment and family background on a pupil’s achievement and is a useful 
measure to circumvent any selection bias in estimation where school and pupil allocation is 
non-random.  In other words, it captures the school’s effect on performance net of other 
effects that include innate ability and family background, capturing the contribution a school 





is taken as a measure centred on 100 29 .  The value-added score enables 
comparison between schools, where school and pupil allocation is non-
random. 
The NPD data comprises of performance data on all schools that take the KS1 
and KS2 SATs and census data from the Pupil-Level Annual School Census 
(PLASC) that covers all maintained and special schools (non-maintained) in 
England. This data has been merged with data of the Department for 
Education from other sources.  This includes the Annual School Census data of 
the LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) on 
school characteristics and school finance data from the Outrun Detailed tables.  
The merged dataset comprises of 145,987 observations that include all 
maintained schools in England as well as independent and special schools that 
take the SAT tests.  After imputing for missing values and 
inconsistent/implausible values through replacement with school-specific 
mean values of the respective variable, the outlier values on the class-size 
variable and all other relevant variables were identified and flagged 
using dummies that take the value of one where an observation is 
identified as an outlier and zero, otherwise30. The bottom five and top five 
percentile of observations on the class-size variable have then been deleted, 
thus eliminating the very small and very large schools in the dataset.  Schools 
with less than than three outliers (flags) on any of the selected variables are 
noted as having inconsistent data.  The flagged (outlier) values in each of these 
                                                        
29  The procedure followed in the calculation of the VA score has been adopted from the 
technical note on the calculation of a school’s value added on the Department of Education’s 
website: [ARCHIVED CONTENT] Value added technical information 
(nationalarchives.gov.uk). However, in the calculation of the value added score in this paper, 
the median value-added score in KS1 tests are based on the ability group to which a pupil 
belongs to within the same school the pupil attends.  In the official data, it is important to note, 
the ability group of a pupil is determined nationally. There could, thus, be some degree of 
measurement error in using the value-added or progress measure as calculated in this study, 
in the comparative analysis across schools using the so constructed progress measure. 
 In recent years, there have been significant changes in the methodology applied to calculate 
a school’s value added by accounting for the effect of school size on value-added through the 
incorporation of a ‘shrinkage factor’  in  the  formula used for calculating 
school value-added.  
 
30 The thus treated values have been accounted for in the estimation model with dummies that 
take the value of 1, indicating that the value has been imputed, and zero, otherwise. The effect 




cases are, therefore, replaced by the mean value of the respective variable for 
the school.  Given the large variation and discrepancies observed in the total 
real resources variable, within-school observations in the panel data with 
more than 3 outlier values on this variable have been dropped to minimise the 
effect of extreme observations on the data.  The list-wise deletion of missing 
data and outlier observations on class-size and total real resources, including 
the dropping of independent and special schools from the analysis account for 
24 per cent of the data. A complete case analysis is opted for on the thus 
treated panel dataset on 111, 289 maintained primary schools that covers the 
period 2002-2010, with data for all the nine years not being available for some 
of the schools (unbalanced panel).   
The summary statistics on the selected variables in the model are shown in 
Table 1.1 below. These include the different specifications on the outcome 
variable based on test scores and the variance in test scores:  the school value 
added score, the average percentage marks attained in english (reading and 
writing), the average percentage marks attained in maths (numerical ability 
and mental maths) and the average point score at Key Stage 231.  The latter 
three measure attainment, while the school value-added score shows the 
average progress pupils make between Key Stages 1 and 2.  Attainment, it may 
be clarified, is a static concept measuring performance at a single point of time, 
while progress is a dynamic concept that requires longitudinal data (Plewis, 
1977).   
The progress measure can be operationalised either by looking at attainment 
at the second occasion conditional on attainment at the first occasion or in 
terms of a difference score, referred to here as the value-added (VA) score.   
The value added score indicates the extent to which pupils exceed their 
expected level of progress or whether they fall short of the expected levels of 
progress.  Schools with VA scores above 100 are those where pupils on 
average make greater progress than their counterparts nationally and schools 
                                                        
31 The average point score is derived from the average of the point scores attained in the 
English and Maths SAT tests and teacher assessments.  The point scores are derived from the 
national curriculum levels pupils attain, given the percentage of marks they receive in the 
relevant tests.  Pupils in Key Stage 1 are assigned national curriculum levels between 1 and 




with scores below 100 are those where the average progress of pupils is 
lagging behind their equally able counterparts in other schools nationally32.    
The mean level of the value-added score in Table 1.1 is seen to be 99.55, 
indicating that the actual level of attainment at KS2 is almost equal to the 
predicted level of attainment based on KS1 results.  The maximum value-
added score among schools in the dataset is 106.75, implying that the average 
pupil in the school with the maximum value added score has progressed at 
least six terms ahead of other pupils in the same ability group for the same 
school. Conversely, the school with the minimum value added score of 79.7 
indicates the average pupil in the school is about twenty terms behind other 
pupils of equal ability (with the same average point score at key stage 1) in the 
same cohort of the school.    
On average schools seem to fare better and possibly more efficiently in maths 
compared to English.  The average attained marks in maths tests is 66% and 
for English tests 60%.  The extent of variation in Maths and English tests 
results across schools are not very different, indicating consistency in 
performance across these subjects in the average school.  This is in contrast to 
the within-school variation in maths test scores that shows greater variance 
(inequality) in maths test results for the average school compared to the 
within-school variation observed for English test results.  The variation 
around mean values for the value-added score and the average point score, on 
the other hand, is quite low, for schools in general.  
The maximum attainable point score at KS1 is 27, which is equivalent to level 
4+ and the expected level of attainment 2, with a minimum point score of 13.  
At Key Stage 2, the maximum attainable point score is 33, equivalent to level 
5. Pupils are expected to make at least two levels of progress between KS1 and 
KS2, with the majority expected to attain a level of 4 and above at the end of 
KS2. A requirement for sitting the KS2 SAT tests is that pupils are at least at 
                                                        
32 For KS1 to KS2 value added, a measure of 101 means that on average each of the school's 
pupils made one term's more progress between KS1 and KS2 than the median - or middle 
value - for pupils with similar KS1 attainment. Conversely, a score of 99 means that the 






level 3a33.  The mean and maximum values on both these indicators, as seen in 
Table 1.1, show a greater chance of attaining the maximum point score at key 
stage 2 than at key stage 1.  Comparing the variance of the APS at KS2 with 
that at KS1, further, shows both within and between school variations to be 
greater in the case of the former and could arise as result of a widening gap 
between high performing and low performing pupils over-time. 
The average cohort-size for the school leaving cohort is 35 with a maximum 
number of pupils of 168 and a minimum number of 1 among the largest and 
smallest schools34 in the dataset.  The proportion of boys and girls is almost 
equal in the average school while some schools in the dataset are all boys’ 
schools or all girls’ schools.   
The socio-economic characteristics of pupils in the school may now be 
examined through the indicators on free school meal status (FSM), ethnicity, 
mother tongue and special educational needs.   The free school meal indicator 
is normally taken as a proxy variable on socio-economic status (disadvantage) 
of pupils.  While all pupils qualify for free school meals under the Universal 
Infant Free School Meals programme, eligibility in later years of primary 
schooling is means-tested.   Pupils from low income backgrounds qualify for 
free school meals if they satisfy the criteria for eligibility (see Table A1.1).   The 
information on free school meals is readily available in school administrative 
datasets and has been widely used as an indicator capturing educational 
disadvantage among pupils.  The appropriateness of this indicator in 
accurately representing socio-economically disadvantaged pupils is, however, 
disputed (Kounali et al, 2008; Taylor, 2017; Couglan, 2017).  Kounali et al 
(2008) show that reliance on the free school meal indicator alone 
underestimates the pool of disadvantaged pupils considerably and results in a 
downward bias on the effect of socio-economic status (SES) in standard value-
                                                        
33 It may be noted that if any pupil is assessed to be working lower than level 3, they are 
disapplied from the test and only a teacher assessment level will be reported.  
34 The very small size of the school, despite dropping the lowest and highest five percentile of 
the data based on school size, maybe explained for as exceptional for some years for schools 
that otherwise fall above the lower five percentile and may be data suppressed for reasons of 




added analysis35.   Measurement error and selection bias associated with the 
use of the FSM indicator as the sole measure of socio-economic disadvantage 
may arise for a number of reasons.  The measurement of free school meal 
pupils being based on take up, rather than eligibility, results in underreporting 
on the numbers of economically disadvantaged pupils where parents are 
reluctant to claim free school meals for their children.  The indicator also fails 
to account for changes in the labour market and differences in the nature of 
work among low income earning parents (Couglan, 2017).  Moreover, where 
family income is at the upper threshold of the income cut-off levels, which 
determine whether a pupil qualifies for free school meals, the measure will not 
reflect the actual extent of deprivation among pupils within the dataset.  
Despite its limitations, the free school meal indicator is a useful proxy on 
socio-economic deprivation and as the only source of information on the 
income/wealth status of a pupil’s household provided by the NPD.  The 
summary statistics on the FSM indicator in Table 1.1 shows on average 16 per 
cent of pupils claim free school meals (FSM).  The variance on this indicator is 
observed to be considerably large indicating wide variation in the distribution 
of FSM pupils across schools.  In a small number of schools (6 schools), there 
are some cohort groups where all pupils are observed to be on free school 
meals. 
An examination of the` variables on ethnicity and mother tongue reveal the 
majority of students in a class to be whites and English speaking (87%).  On 
average, around 3 per cent and 5 per cent of the pupils are of African and Asian 
origin, respectively, while the average proportion of other ethnic minorities is 
5 per cent.  Pupils of Asian origin, thus, outnumber those from other ethnic 
                                                        
35  Specifically, the use of the FSM indicator is used as a proxy measure of economic 
disadvantage is associated with a large error in estimates at 10%. “It was also found to lead to 
underestimation of the proportion of children who consistently remain below the income 
thresholds implied by the FSM-eligibility criteria, by 50%.  The income cut-off imposed is seen 
to characterise a significant proportion (61%) of low-income families with low-capital assets 
as “non-disadvantaged”. The “non-disadvantaged” families which are close to the threshold 
will then be averaged with those from more privileged backgrounds, driving the mean test 
performance of the truly non disadvantaged towards lower values. The resulting comparisons 
between the groups formed in this way will lead to estimates of difference which are smaller” 




minority groups.  There is also observed to be greater variation in the 
proportions of pupils of Asian descent, compared to other ethnic minorities.   
On special education needs (SEN), the mean proportion of SEN pupils at 23% 
is close to the national average figures of pupils with SEN at 20% (2013).  
These include pupils who have been identified with some learning disability, 
irrespective of whether they have a statement of SEN or not.  A small number 
of schools (15) are seen to cater only to SEN pupils.  On closer inspection, it is 
seen that these are mostly very small schools with class sizes less than 1836.  
The composition with regard to some of the main categories of school staff 
shows that on average schools have at least 11 full–time qualified teachers, 4 
teaching assistants and at least 1 staff for admin/secretarial work with wide 
variation between schools on the number of staff employed, largely 
determined by school size.  
Wide variation is also observed in the distribution of school finance in the 
dataset with the average school receiving around £25,000 per pupil as 
revenue expenditure 37 .  The total financial resources of schools has been 
converted to real terms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the 
National Accounts Statistics with the year 2005 as the base year.  The 
minimum and maximum values on total real school finance per pupil is seen 
to vary widely between £3,183 and £352, 425.  These figures are noted to be 
much above the per pupil expenditure in official statistics since they are per 
pupil figures for the school leaving cohort, while the official records on the 





                                                        
36 This is again exceptional to some years for maintained schools without specialist status, in 
the absence of any special schools in the dataset.  
37  This comprises of expenditure under the following headings:  Opening pupil focused 
revenue balance, opening community focused extended school revenue balance, delegated 
funds (including pupil focused school standard grant and learning and skills council funding), 
SEN funding (including some Standards Fund), minority ethnic pupils funding, standards fund 
residue, other government grants, income generated by schools, pupil focused extended 




Table 1.1:  Summary Statistics on Key Variables 




Marks in English  
60.38  7.64  13  96.67  
Average Total 
Marks in Maths  
66.33  8.77  21  99.88  
Average Point 
Score (APS) – KS1  
15.22  1.33  2.75  19.62  
APS (KS2)  26.74  2.87  10  32.87  
School Value-
Added (VA) Score  
99.55  2.42  79.7  106.75  
Average Marks in 
English 
(Variance)  
3.10  1.06  0.5  25.5  
Average Marks in 
Maths (Variance)  
4.03  1.29  0.99  42.5  
Variance in APS 
(KS1)  
0.62  0.22  0.1  6.33  
Variance in APS 
(KS2)  
0.74  0.28  0.09  8.67  
Variance in 
School VA Score  
0.53  0.20  0.16  7.02  
Total Real 
Resources/Pupil  
25233.28  10362.51  3183.38  352425.1  
No. of Pupils  35.11  17.38  1  168  
% of Girls  49.14  10.16  0  100  
% FSM   16.41  16.22  0  100  
% Whites  86.62  21.02  0  100  
% African Origin  2.99  9.17  0  100  
% Asian  4.98  13.43  0  100  
% Indian  1.47  5.73  0  100  
% Chinese  0.26  1.04  0  28  
% Pakistani  2.82  10.55  0  100  
% Other Asians  0.43  1.70  0  60  
% Other 
Minorities  
5.33  8.41  0  100  
% Minorities  0.45  0.82  0  25  
% English as an 
Additional 
Language (EAL)  
7.15  16.58  0  100  





10.73  4.35  1  33  
Fte of Teaching 
Assistants (ta’s)  
4.08  3.24  0  33  
Fte of Admin 
Officers/Secretar
ies  
1.27  0.72  0  18  




1.4.3 Empirical Model  
 
A log linear Cobb-Douglas production function is specified here for the frontier 
and OLS analysis (eqs. 1.10 & 1.11).  This functional form is preferred over less 
restrictive and more flexible options, such as, the Translog production 
function, since it permits the simple decomposition of educational inputs and 
outputs that define the production function.  The Cobb-Douglas education 
production function is tested for constant returns to scale (CRS).  The F-test 
on the coefficients of the school factor inputs, however, fails to support the 
assumption of CRS (see Table A1.2). In other words, the input-output relation 
in the specified model may exhibit increasing or decreasing returns to scale.  
The interpretation of the results from the estimation of the average and 
frontier production functions, therefore, needs to be evaluated bearing this in 
mind. 
Additionally, the average production function (eq. 1.12) is tested to check the 
significance of within group (school) variation to between group variations.  
The results of the Wu-Hausman test are presented in Table A1.3.  The test 
validates fixed-effects estimation for all the outcome specifications, the 
variation in resources and pupil composition between schools not being 
systematic.  An F-test on the significance of the effect of year-specific factors 
on the outcome variable (time-fixed effects), further, supports the hypothesis 
that the relationship between the factor inputs and output do not remain 
constant overtime (Table A1.4).  The average production function and the 
frontier function models estimated, therefore, control for both school-specific 
and year-specific factors. 
Equation 1.10 below specifies the input-output relationship for frontier 
schools as modelled by Cornwall et al (1990).  The parameters in the specified 
function are obtained through Modified Ordinary Least Squares (MOLS) 
estimation.  The model controls for cross sectional as well as temporal 
variation in technical efficiency by allowing for heterogeneity in the slopes and 
intercepts. Equations 1.10 and 1.12 depict the Cornwell et al (1990) time-






ln yit = 𝛽𝑜𝑡 + ∑ β𝑛lnXnit
𝑁
𝑛=1  + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + + ∑ β𝑛lnXnit
𝑁
𝑛=1  + 𝑣𝑖𝑡          (1.10) 
 
In the above function βot indicates the common production frontier intercept 
to all cross-sectional productive units in period t and βit = βot – uit is the 
intercept of unit ‘i’ in period t; vit is the technical efficiency component of the 
error term, and uit the random component.  The intercept parameters for 
different cross-sectional school observations over different time periods, in 
the above specification (eq. 1.10), are modelled as a quadratic function in time 
as depicted in equation 1.7 above.  The time variables are associated to each 
observation’s specific parameters as in the logarithmic function below: 
  
log yit  =  𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 X’it+ W’it𝛿I + 𝜈it                                                                              (1.11)  
 
The input coefficients from the above frontier production function 
estimation are compared with that of the average production function, given 
by:   
 
            ln yit  =  𝛼 + 𝜇i+ 𝜏t + 𝛽 ln 𝑋it +it                                             (1.12)  
 
where,   
𝜇I is the fixed-effect term, capturing school-specific fixed effects;  
𝜏t indicates time fixed–effects, and  
it is the error term capturing statistical noise.  
The constitution of the output and input variables in both the above 
specifications are as follows:  
yit –the educational output is the log of the value-added score, the average 
marks obtained in english, the average marks obtained in maths and the 
average point score (APS) obtained at Key Stage 2, alternatively.  yit is also 
specified as the variance for each of the performance indicators, separately.   
xi – is an orthogonal matrix of various school and pupil characteristics:  the 
cohort-size; the average point score at KS1 to control for the innate ability of 




qualified teachers; the full-time equivalent of teaching assistants; the full-time 
equivalent of administrative officers and secretaries – all in logs, as well as 
controls on the percentage of girl pupils; the percentage of pupils claiming free 
school meals (FSM); the ethnicity of pupils; the percentage of pupils with 




1.5 Efficiency Estimates  
 
The results from the stochastic production frontier and OLS estimation clearly 
exhibit the distinction between the average school and the frontier school.  
The co-efficient estimates of both the average production function and the 
frontier function are shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 below, for the four 
alternative specifications of the outcome variable and the corresponding 
specifications in terms of their variance.   
The first two columns in the tables below show the coefficients and efficiency 
estimates for the value-added/progress measures for the frontier school and 
average school, respectively.  In the average school every percentage rise in 
real financial resources is associated with a 0.01 percent reduction in value-
added/progress. The OLS estimate on the co-efficient of the total real 
resources variable is both negative and significant at the 1 per cent level.  The 
corresponding figure for the frontier function is seen to be positive, though 
insignificant.  The class size (the cohort size) indicator is also seen to be 
negatively associated with the value-added score for the average school with 
every percentage increase in the number of pupils reducing pupils’ progress 
by 0.01 percent.  The co-efficient on the class-size variable is insignificant 
though positive for the most efficient schools under the value-added 
specification. The distinction between the best practice and average school is 
more vivid where the outcome variable measures the attainment level in 
english and maths tests.  Test scores in english and maths SAT tests fall by 0.1 




resources available to schools.  The most efficient schools, on the other hand, 
are able to translate every percentage increase in real resources to a 0.1 
percentage rise in attainment levels in english and maths.  Where the average 
point score (APS), is the outcome indicator, a percentage increase in real 
resources in the average school lowers the APS by 0.01 percent.  The co-
efficient estimate on the frontier function is positive and insignificant.  School-
size is found to be negatively associated with output for the measures on 
attainment in the average production function.  English and maths test scores 
fall by 0.1 percent with every percentage rise in the number of pupils, while 
the APS falls by 0.02 percent.  The frontier schools, however, function more 
effectively with every percentage increase in the number of pupils.  Test scores 
rise by 0.1 and 0.2 percent in the case of english and maths test results, 
respectively, for the most efficient schools, while the co-efficient on the APS 
specification is positive, but insignificant.    
Both the average school and the frontier school are seen to benefit 
considerably from the employment of more teaching assistants.  The effect of 
teaching assistants (TAs) on attainment is particularly high in english and 
maths with every percentage increase in the number of teaching assistants 
resulting in a 0.2 and 0.3 percent rise in english and maths test scores, 
respectively.  The VA score and APS at KS2 increases by 0.01 and 0.03 percent, 
respectively with every percentage rise in the employment of teaching 
assistants. These effects are seen to be higher for the frontier schools 
compared to the average school.  Schools in general are seen to benefit from 
the employment of teaching assistants. 
The effect other school support staff have on the education output is quite 
different.   An increase in the number of full-time equivalent of administrative 
officers and secretaries is observed to lower test scores in english and maths 
by 0.34 and 0.21 percent, respectively.  The negative effect is much higher in 
the case of the most efficient schools (-0.65 in english and -0.45 in maths).  In 
contrast the employment of additional administrative staff increases the 
value-added score and APS (KS2), by 0.01 per cent and 0.1 percent, 




Furthermore, the average school is observed to benefit from the employment 
of additional teachers who are fully qualified with test scores rising by 0.1 and 
0.03 percent in english and maths tests, respectively.  The same variable is, 
however, negatively associated with the education output for the frontier 
schools with test scores in english and maths declining by 0.02 and 0.1 percent 
with every percentage increase in the employment of qualified teachers; the 
estimate on english test scores being negative and insignificant for the frontier 
school.  A similar effect is seen on the value-added and average point score 
with the employment of fully qualified teachers.  Both the VA score and APS 
(KS2) drop by 0.01 and 0.1 percent with the additional employment of fully 
qualified teaching staff in the frontier schools.  The coefficient estimates on 
this factor input for the average school is found to be positive, but not 
significant.  
The effect of the indicators that define the socio-economic profile of pupils on 
the education output, in each of these cases, may now be examined.  Among 
these indicators, previous attainment that determines the innate ability of 
pupils is seen to have a dominant effect on all outcome measures on 
attainment.  The estimated effects are significant at the one per cent level and 
range from a 0.2 to 0.4 percent increase on each of the outcome variables on 
attainment.  Schools are very clearly capitalising on the ability/aptitude of 
pupils, determined by factors outside the control of the school, such as 
socioeconomic characteristics and family background.   
Other variables on the demographic composition of schools do not explain 
much on the observed variation in outcomes in both sets of schools.  Though 
significant, the effects of factors, such as, ethnicity, eligibility for free school 
meals, special educational needs (SEN), mother tongue and gender are very 
low.  The significant and positive sign on the variable showing the proportion 
of pupils with english as an additional language, under most of the 
specifications, prompted the analysis to be undertaken at a more decomposed 
level on the ethnicity variable.  Since the groups classified as whites and those 
of African origin are more homogeneous compared to those classifed as Asian, 
the ethnic composition of those within this latter group are taken separately.  




observed to have a significant positive effect on attainment by 0.1 percent in 
english and maths tests scores.  This conforms to the other similar findings in 
the literature showing that Chinese pupils are among the best performers in 
primary school tests.  The results from the frontier and OLS estimation also 
conform to the existing evidence that girls generally do not perform well in 
maths.  An increase in the proportion of girls is associated with a significant 
negative effect on maths test results by 0.1 percent for both the average and 
frontier schools.  Further, as is generally the case, attainment and progress are 
shown to be negatively associated with the proportion of pupils on free school 
meals and those with special educational needs in the current analysis as well.  
The coefficient estimates on these two variables are significant and consistent 
across all specifications of the education output.  The estimates project a 
minor decline in the attainment and progress measures with every percentage 
rise in the numbers of pupils on FSM and with SEN.  In line with similar 
analysis on the education sector, the results from this study also show 
systematic variation of efficiency in the utilisation of school inputs with the 
socio-economic factors that determine pupil composition (Ray, 1991; Deller 
et al, 1993, Bates, 1997).  
Table A1.5 in the appendix presents the standardised regression coefficients 
for each of the specifications of the education output, where the co-efficient 
estimates turn out significant at the one percent level for some of the factor 
inputs in the estimated model in either case (average or frontier production 
function).  As can be seen from the table a standard deviation (SD) unit change 
in total real resources results in a 0.2 SD change in value-added, a 0.5 SD 
change in both english and maths test results and a 0.1 SD change in the APS 
in the case of the average production function.  With regard to the frontier 
schools a SD unit change in total real resources is associated with a 0.62 SD 
change in English test results and 0.8 SD change in maths test results. These 
estimates for the average school are of the same magnitude as the estimates 
in Gibbons (2011a) on the effect of school expenditure on pupil test scores.  
The higher figures for frontier schools in the current analysis clearly indicates 
the scope of making efficiency improvements through the emulation of best 




a 0.2 SD change in value-added, a 0.4 SD change in English test results, a 0.04 
SD change in maths test results and a 0.1 SD change in the APS for the average 
school.  With regard to the frontier schools a SD unit change in the number of 
pupils is associated with a 0.4 SD change in english test results and a 0.5 SD 
change in maths test results.  The standardised regression coefficients 
clearly exhibit the frontier schools to be having a greater and positive 
effect on performance compared to the average school, besides being 
more effective in the use of its resources.  The importance of learning from 
best practice may be reiterated here through the more judicious 
allocation/utilisation of resources and by improving the efficiency of schools 
operating below the frontier.    
 
1.5.1 Intra-School Variation in Test Results and Efficiency  
  
The pattern of behaviour between the factor inputs and intra-school variation 
in performance may now be examined.  Table 1.3 shows the estimates of the 
frontier and average production function based on measures of variance in 
test scores.  The picture that emerges is quite different from the estimates in 
Table 1.2.  A rise in the variance indicator, in this case, projects greater levels 
of ‘intra-school’ inequality or variation in marks among students.  School size 
is observed to be negatively associated with the variance in test scores and the 
value-added in both the average school and the frontier school.  The effect is 
noticeably higher in the average production function, varying between 0.2 and 
0.3 percent for every percentage rise in the variance in test scores.  The 
association between total real resources and variance in the progress measure 
and test score measures is mixed. In the frontier as well as the average school, 
a percentage increase in total real resources reduces intra-school variation in 
the value-added score by 0.01 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively.  The 
estimate is negative and significant at the one per cent level for the average 
school, and negative, but insignificant for the frontier school.  The total real 
resources also have a negative effect on the variance in english test scores and 
that of the average point score (KS2) in the average school with the variances 




rise in total real resources, on the other hand, raises the variance in english 
and maths test scores for the frontier schools by 0.1 percent and the APS at 
key stage 2 by 0.02 percent.  The variance of average test scores in maths are 
also seen to be positively associated with total real resources for the average 
school.      
A varied effect is similarly observed for school staff on the ‘intra-school’ 
variance in progress/attainment.  Teaching assistants are seen to lower the 
variance in pupils’ progress for the average school and frontier schools, 
However, with regard to the variance in other test score measures, a 
percentage increase in the number of teaching assistants is associated with an 
increase of 0.2 percentage in the ‘intra-school’ variance in english test results 
and a 0.1 percentage increase in the variance in maths test results for both the 
average and the best-practice schools.  The coefficient estimates on the APS 
(KS2) also turn out positive for both production functions, though 
insignificant.  An increase in the number of administrative officers and 
secretaries is associated with a significant negative effect, ranging between 0.1 
and 0.3 percentage, on the variance in test score measures in english and 
maths, for both the average and frontier production functions. This contrasts 
with the negative association observed earlier (Table 1.2) between the 
number of office staff and test results in english and maths and is indicative of 
a trade-off between equity and performance in the employment of additional 
office staff.  The average production function and the frontier function project 
a negative association between the variance in marks with the employment of 
qualified teachers.  The same is the case with respect to the association 
between intra-school variation in pupils’ progress and the employment of 
qualified teachers for the most efficient schools on the frontier.  The variance 
in marks in english and maths display a 0.2 percent fall following a percentage 
rise in the numbers of full time equivalent (fte) of qualified teachers.  The 
variance in the APS (KS2), likewise, falls by 0.01 percentage for the frontier 
schools as the number of qualified teachers employed by the school increases 
by a percent.     
Innate ability is again observed to have a significant and notable impact on the 




correlated and the coefficient estimates vary between 0.2 and 0.4, a greater 
effect being observed in the case of the frontier schools.  The proportion of 
pupils on free school meals and with special education needs is associated 
with an almost negligible, but, significant positive effect on variance raising 
both intra-school variance in marks/progress measures.  The proportion of 
girls is also observed to have a positive effect on the variance in marks for 
maths in both the average and frontier school and a fall in the intra-school 
variation in value-added scores.   The impact of ethnicity on the intra-school 
variation in marks/progress measures differs with the proportion of pupils of 
African origin and those of Pakistani/Bangladeshi origin associated with a 
negative effect on the intra-school variation in progress and performance.  
Chinese students, in contrast, are seen to have a significant positive effect on 
the intra-school variation in English and maths marks for both the average and 
frontier school, while the proportion of Indian pupils has a significant positive 
effect on the within school variation in marks in maths and of the average 
point score (KS2) in the average school.  In general, the proportion of pupils 
with English as an additional language is associated with a negative impact on 
the variation in marks and the APS (KS2).  In the case of the variance of the VA 
score, the proportion of EAL pupils has a positive significant effect on the 
intra-school variance both for the average production function and the 
frontier function38.  
Furthermore, it may be noted that a greater degree of inter-school variation in 
the variance measures presented in Table 1.3 is explained by the technical 
efficiency component of the error term than by random variation.  This is 
compared to the extent of deviation from the frontier function, with regard to 
test scores as explained by the technical efficiency component of the error 
term, shown in Table 1.2.  There appears to be greater scope for reducing 
intra-school variation in marks between schools through the more efficient 
                                                        
38 Noteworthy in both table 1.2 and 1.3 are the estimates on the dummy variables for imputed 
values in the dataset, which turns out significant in most cases.  Undertaking the analysis by 
dropping observations with imputed values may throw more light on the actual extent to 





utilisation of resources compared to raising performance.  The correlation 
matrix on technical efficiency estimates (Table A1.6), it may further be noted, 
shows little correlation between the estimates based on test scores and those 
based on variance measures.  Better performance and lesser intra-school 
variation in marks/progress measures do not seem to move together when it 
comes to the efficient utilisation of resources.    
  
1.5.2 Mean Levels of Efficiency and Time-Trends   
  
The mean levels of efficiency are seen to be higher under the test-score 
measures compared to the measures on variance (see table A1.7).  On average, 
efficiency is seen to vary between 0.6 and 0.95, projecting the scope for the 
more efficient utilisation of resources.  The time-trends on efficiency (shown 
in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b) indicate efficiency levels to be higher in the mid-
2000s compared to the earlier period in the case of test-score measures.  For 
english test results, there is a steep rise in technical efficiency between 2002 
and 2007.  Thereafter, the level of technical efficiency increases gradually and 
is close to 70 percent by 2010. Though efficiency levels in maths are similar to 
those in english in the early period (2002), at slightly above 60 percent, the 
rise in technical efficiency is more gradual and there is a slight dip observed 
after 2009.  Technical efficiency levels are relatively much higher on the 
average point score (KS2) and the progress measure (VA score).  It rises 
steadily after 2003 for the APS (KS2), while it declines slightly in the progress 
measure post-2004.  With respect to the Value-Added score, the large majority 
of schools have efficiency levels close to 95 per cent and operate very close to 
the frontier.  Technical efficiency trends with respect to the variance on these 
measures are more homogenous.  The starting levels of efficiency, in 2002, are 
all between 0.5 and 0.6.  The levels of technical efficiency also appear to be 
consistent and steady over time with a slight dip observed after 2008, while 
the technical efficiency with respect to the variance in the VA score appears to 
be gradually falling overtime.  Overall, in agreement with the observations 
made in section 1.5.1 above, there appears to be greater potential for 




variation in performance and progress compared to inter-school variation in 
the same measures.  The gradual decline in technical efficiency levels during 
the period of study suggests greater dispersion (intra-school variation), in 
performance and progress measures, overtime, among pupils in general.  The 
higher levels of technical efficiency observed after mid-2000 on attainment 
levels and progress and the lower figures in terms of the variance in these 
measures around the same time are particularly noteworthy features in the 
trend analysis.  It suggests any improvements in pupil outcomes over this time 
period and any corresponding improvements in schools’ efficiency may be 
occurring at the cost of educational inclusion, such that, schools may be failing 
educationally disadvantaged students.  Looking back at the review in section 
1.2.2 on the policy framework, some of the relevant policy initiatives, around 
this time, that are potentially associated with the observed improvements in 
technical efficiency, may be identified.  The introduction of a compulsory 
literacy and numeracy hour in schools (1997/98), the Every Child a Reader 
programme (2001) and the Minimum Funding Guarantee and Central 
Expendiure Limit reforms (2004/2005) are some of the policy measures of 
the time, particularly noteworthy in this context.    Finally, the improvements 
in technical efficiency levels, observed here, are in line with the improvements 
in school performance outcomes observed in other studies over the same time 
period (Machin et al, 2004; Johnson, 2004; Couglan, 2007).  The findings from 
the trend analysis open the scope for further research exploring the 














Table 1.2:  Coefficients of the Production Function – OLS vis-à-vis Frontier  
 
    𝜎 v is the variance of the random component of the error term;  
    𝜎 u is the variance of the technical efficiency component of the error term  



























Table1.3:  Coefficients of the Production Function (Variance Measures) – OLS vis-à-vis Frontier 
 
           𝜎 v is the variance of the random component of the error term; 
           𝜎 u is the variance of the technical efficiency component of the error term 






1.6 Policy Implications   
  
The efficiency analysis on English primary schools undertaken, here, provides 
empirical evidence of resource-use inefficiency in primary schools in the 
country.   The mean levels of efficiency vary between 0.6 and 0.95 for the 
different specifications of the educational output (see table A1.7).  The 
efficiency estimates are observed to be sensitive to the specification of the 
educational output.  The degree of inter-school variation in the efficiency 
levels under the value-added specification is much lesser compared to the 
other outcome indicators and may be explained by the relatively low variation 
across schools on value added, in general (see table 1.1). Again, contrary to 
what has been observed for the average school (table 1.1), mean levels of 
efficiency are seen to be higher with respect to test scores obtained in english 
tests compared to maths.  The higher average test scores observed in maths, 
it may, therefore, be concluded does not seem to stem from the more effective 
utilisation of resources in this subject area.  Again, the variation in efficiency 
levels is slightly higher in maths compared to english, indicating a greater 
degree of dispersion in efficiency scores among schools in this subject area.    
The findings from this study carry important policy implications.  The 
estimated school efficiency levels vary between 0.3 and 1, showing 
considerable scope for improving efficiency in the primary school sector of 
England.  In light of the finding that frontier schools are able to use inputs 
more effectively in attaining higher output/test scores compared to the 
average school, English primary schools would be able to function more 
efficiently through the emulation of ‘best practice’.  The negative association 
observed between efficiency levels/performance and the proportion of SEN 
and FSM pupils and of girl pupils in maths may be addressed so as to help the 
most efficient schools to be further pushed up the education production 
frontier.   In line with previous studies (Coleman, 1966; Ray, 1991; Deller et al, 
1993; Bates, 1997) the importance of the socio-economic background/innate 
ability of pupils in determining performance is again made evident through 




the socio-economic background of pupils over schools in determining pupil 
performance.  The liaising of schools and families in improving pupil outcomes 
may be, put forward, as a policy solution for improving pupil outcomes and 
educational inclusion.   
Intra-school variations in efficiency for the average school and the frontier 
school are seen to be more similar.  Cohort size and prior attainment have a 
substantial negative effect on the variance in marks.  The number of full time 
qualified teachers is also associated with a negative effect on pupil 
performance for both sets of schools.  Again, a favourable negative effect is 
observed on the intra-school variation in maths test results with the 
employment of additional administrative and support staff.  Educational 
disadvantage experienced by FSM pupils, SEN pupils and of girls on 
performance in maths is also evident from the analysis, which shows intra-
school variance in marks and pupils’ progress to be positively associated with 
the numbers of educationally disadvantaged students. 
The significance of the coefficient estimates on prior attainment shows that 
schools are clearly capitalising on pupils with higher innate ability/aptitude, 
as determined by socio-economic factors and family background that are 
outside the control of the school.  The analysis further indicates that better 
performance and lesser intra-school variation in marks/progress measures 
do not move in the same direction when it comes to the efficient utilisation of 
resources.  Overall, there is observed to be greater scope in reducing intra-
school variation in marks through the more efficient utilisation of resources, 
compared to raising performance; the mean-levels of efficiency being lower 
on the variance measures compared to test scores.  The differential impact of 
factor resources on the efficiency of schools is a noteworthy feature of the 
production frontier analysis undertaken.  In a policy context, studying these 
differential effects is important for framing policies that are conducive to the 
more effective allocation and utilisation of resources in order to maximise the 





1.7 Conclusion  
  
This paper analyses school performance in terms of how efficient schools are 
in maximising educational output/s with their given resources.  The study 
identifies ‘best-practice’ or the ‘frontier schools’ that relatively maximise 
output with the minimal use of inputs.  The study applies the stochastic 
production frontier methodology in measuring school efficiency using data on 
school output/s and factor inputs.  A fixed-effects time-varying model, 
developed by Cornwell et al (1990), is specified for the estimation.  Any 
deviation from the so constructed production frontier of the ‘best-practice’ 
schools is quantified as school-specific estimates of efficiency that also show 
temporal variation.  
The study provides empirical evidence on the existence of considerable inter-
school variation in efficiency levels and the scope for improving schools 
through the judicious allocation of resources and by learning from best 
practice.  The efficiency estimates are observed to be sensitive to the 
specification of the education output/s with mean levels of efficiency being 
higher under the value-added specification compared to other output 
measures.  On average, efficiency levels are higher for test performance 
measures compared to indicators on intra-school dispersion in test results.  In 
line with other studies (Ray, 1991; Bates, 1997), there is observed to be 
systematic variation in the efficiency estimates with the socio-economic 
background of the pupils. Innate ability, as shown by prior attainment, is seen 
to be the most important contributory factor that determines school 
performance and the intra-school variation in marks as well as the relative 
efficiency of schools.  Policy initiatives targeted at improving the performance 
of disadvantaged pupils could, therefore, further push up the production 
frontier and enable schools to perform better.  The liaising between schools 
and families in improving school and pupil outcome/s, which has received 
much attention in recent years, could also potentially contribute to raising 
standards and improving efficiency.  Further, recognition of the differential 




marks/progress is important when designing policy measures that are 





























The Academisation Programme in England’s  




2.1 Introduction  
  
This chapter focuses on the transition of previously state-managed schools 
(maintained schools) to academy status.  Academy schools are publicly funded 
independent schools, free from local authority control.  The academy school 
model was introduced in the UK secondary school sector in 2002, under the 
New Labour government (1997-2010) and were designed to replace failing 
schools.  These were relaunched or new schools and, as per the provisions of 
the Learning and Skills Act 2000, were to be established in some of the most 
deprived areas of inner-city London, to improve performance.  Originally 
referred to as ‘city-academies’, they were renamed as ‘academies’ following 
the Education Act 2002, and the programme was further extended to rural 
areas as well (Gorard, 2005; Parkinson, 2005; Long, 2015).  Academy schools 
retain some of the organisational features of pre-existing autonomous 
institutions, that is, City Technology Colleges (CTCs) and grant-maintained 
schools.  Academies, likewise, are independent from local authority control 
and receive funds directly from the Central government.  In addition to this, 
academies, similar to CTCs, can be funded and run by external sponsors from 
among businesses, individuals, charities and the voluntary sector.  The idea 




and by involving the private sector in the efficient delivery of public education. 
Schools deemed as failing were mandatorily made academies under a willing 
sponsor.  The new ‘business-model’ of schooling won popular appeal and has, 
since, been continued and expanded under successive governments.  The 
appeal lay in its neoliberal character, a defining feature of education policy 
reforms in the last quarter of a century and reminiscent of a post-Keynesian 
era.  The new school system received impetus under the Conservative led 
Coalition government (2010-2015) with the enactment of the Academies Act 
2010, a sequel to the Learning and Skills Act 2000 and Education Act 2002.  
The new legislation makes provision for the academisation of all maintained 
schools and includes the primary school sector as well.   The pace of 
academisation in the country has considerably increased since the 
implementation of this bespoke reform.  As of February, 2018, 72% of 
secondary schools, including free schools, and 27% of primary schools are 
academies (NAO, 2018).  The numbers are set to increase even further with all 
schools being encouraged to become academies by the year 2022 (Long et al, 
2016).  The implications of this, unprecedented, large scale transition in the 
schooling system are far reaching (Maisuria, 2014; West et al, 2018).  The 
2010 reform, therefore, provides a vital platform for studying about ‘market-
oriented’ policy reform and the impact of associated institutional restructuring 
on the education sector. This is pursued here, with focus on the transition 
process in the primary school sector of the country.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows:    Section 2.2 traces the history 
of the reforms, leading to the formation of academies.  Section 2.3 provides a 
critical review of the academisation programme - its dominant features and 
the academisation experience to date.  Section 2.4 examines the pace and 
character of the reform process.  Section 2.5 concludes on the review 







2.2 The Path to School Autonomy and 
Academisation 
 
An overarching aim of education policy reforms in the UK has been on 
improving ‘standards’.  The transition from what was a national ‘state-
managed’ system to a locally managed ‘market-oriented’ one has accordingly 
witnessed a shift in focus from ‘standards and basics’39 to one on ‘standards 
and choices’.  The main policy changes associated with this transition, leading 
to the formation of academies are outlined here in the context of schools. 
Among the early pieces of legislation, the Education Reform Act 1944 40  is 
noteworthy for the formal changes it brought about to the institutional 
structure of schools.  The Board of Education was reconstituted as a new 
Ministry of Education.  Schools were nationalised and local education 
authorities (LEAs) given the responsibility to establish and maintain schools 
(Batteson, 1999; West et al, 2013; Blatchford, 2014).  Local education 
authorities were held responsible to the Minister of Education who was to 
provide direction and guidance to the LEAs and thereby ensure a more even 
standard of education throughout England and Wales (Blatchford, 2014). 
Three progressive stages were introduced in schooling:  primary, secondary 
and further education, replacing the previous classification between 
elementary and higher education.  In the secondary school sector, there was 
the further tripartite division of schools into grammar, secondary modern and 
technical schools and the school leaving age was raised from 14 to 15.  Schools 
were assigned professional responsibilities with considerable teacher 
autonomy and little accountability to parents. Local education authorities, on 
the other hand, looked after basic school operations and administered school 
                                                        
39 Beauvallet, 2015.   
40 The Education Reform Act 1944 is also referred to as the Butler Act, named after its chief 





finances, primarily through government grants and local property taxes 41 .  
Discontent with the functioning of local education authorities and concerns 
over falling standards in education42, however, steered the need for change.   
The Education Act 1980 and the Education Reform Act 1988 are two 
important pieces of legislation associated with subsequent overhaul of the 
existing educational set-up.  The role of local education authorities in the 
schools’ administration was considerably diminished.  Schools were made 
legal entities in their own right with decision-making powers over matters of 
finance and appointments (West et al, 2018).  The 1988 legislation was 
particularly noteworthy in its elision of traditional elements with new 
approaches.  It heralded neoliberal thinking in education policy making and 
has since set the scene for radical change in the education sector.  Greater 
choice, diversity, autonomy and accountability were some of the hallmarks of 
the new reforms.    Parents were granted the right to choose schools43 and 
representation in school governing bodies. The first autonomous public 
institutions also came to the fore in the form of City Technology Colleges 
(CTCs).  The school sector became more diversified with the establishment of 
specialised schools and grant maintained schools (West et al, 2013).    These 
institutions were to receive their funds directly from the central government 
while CTCs and specialised schools also required financial contributions from 
external sponsors (West et al, 2013).  Local management of schools became 
the norm, but schools were at the same time held accountable through a 
centralised steering system (Kauko et al, 2015).  The National Curriculum and 
                                                        
41 https://www.britannica.com/topic/education 
 
42 These concerns effectively gained attention through the publication of five Black Papers 
between 1969 and 1977, reflecting right-wing critique on the English education system and a 
related publication, the Crisis in Education, by one of its editors, Rhodes Boyson, in 1975 
(Beauvallet, 2015).  Also noteworthy at the time was the announcement of The Great 
Education Debate by Prime Minister James Callaghan at Ruskin College Oxford in 1976, 
expressing the Labour Government’s concerns “about progressive tendencies in education 
and of education’s poor performance in meeting the needs of industry” (Whitty et al, 1989; 
Marshall, 1997; Beauvallet, 2015).  There was also the concern that achievement had 
stagnated in English schools, particularly in the post-compulsory phase – the proportions 
succeeding in examinations at age 16 being stagnant from around 1970 to 1980 (Machin et al, 
2006). 
 
43 Parental choice, however, was limited within the catchment areas of schools as drawn by 




standardised assessment practices were introduced and made mandatory for 
all state schools.  A system of public accountability was also put in place with 
the publication of school league tables and the establishment of the Office for 
Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) in 1992.  The 
private sector was more involved in a newly created ‘quasi-market’ for 
education in the public sector, so called as it included only some elements of 
the market.   
Academies further extend the scope of the quasi-market in the UK education 
sector.  They emerged as part of the New Labour Government (1997–2010) 
initiatives to tackle the problem of persistent underachievement in English 
schools (Simkins, 2015; Gorard, 2005; Black et al, 2019).  The commitment to 
social inclusion was in consonance with international policy trends, around 
the same time period, towards greater inclusive education as contained in the 
Salamanca Declaration (UNESCO, 1994).   The 1997 White Paper Excellence in 
Schools led to the development of two well noted interventionist policy 
measures in this direction:  Education Action Zones (EAZs) and Excellence in 
Cities (EiC) 44 .  EAZs were set up in 1998 in inner city areas with 
underperforming schools.  Schools in Education Action Zones enjoyed higher 
rates of pay with freedom to change the curriculum and the staffing structure.  
In 1999, the most successful EAZs were merged into a new programme called 
Excellence in Cities.  The focus of this latter programme being on standards, to 
be pursued through varied schemes: learning mentors, learning support units, 
gifted and talent programme, city learning centres and beacon schools 
(Gunter, 2011). These developments eventually led to the re-launching of City 
Technology Colleges in the form of city academies.  The legislation (the 
Learning and Skills Act 2000) that introduced city academies was, in fact, an 
extension of the rubric on CTCs.  Subsequently, the Education Act 2002 
dropped the word ‘City’ and renamed these new schools as Academies with 
provision for the establishment of these schools outside of cities as well. 
                                                        
44  Other complementary programmes of the period that addressed the issue of social 
inequality in education include the City Challenge, Every Child Matters, the Improving Schools 




Similar to CTCs, academies are autonomous institutions that operate outside 
local authority control and receive funding directly from the central 
government.  However, unlike CTCs, city academies were not restricted to 
technology, but could specialise in any subject specified by order of the 
Secretary of State (Walford, 2014).  The scale of the academisation programme 
is also much bigger.  Of the 15 CTCs established before the onset of 
academisation, all but three, subsequently became academies (Curtis, 2008; 
West et al, 2013). The academy programme supposedly gained greater 
support among local education authorities compared to CTCs (Curtis, 2008).  
The 2010 reform further validates the operation of academies with its 
provision for the expansion of the new schooling system, in which school 
autonomy is central.  
The introduction of market mechanisms that include choice, competition and 
autonomy in education policy reforms is a radical approach that has been 
widely adopted in diverse settings.  The US has been among the forerunners 
in implementing market oriented education policy in the provision of public 
education.  A striking example lies in the formation of charter schools or 
magnet schools on which CTCs and academies have been partly modelled 
(Curtis, 2008).  Introduced in 1992, charter schools are autonomous schools 
that are publicly funded and set up by a legal ‘charter’.  They were ‘aimed at 
improving the quality of education and enabling greater choice’ (West et al, 
2013).  Similarly, Sweden has undertaken a massive programme in 
decentralising schooling in the early nineties.  New Zealand, South Korea and 
Australia are other countries where market oriented education policy reforms 
are being implemented with varying levels of success.  Common policy goals 
in these reforms include freedom of choice, providing quality education and 
achieving greater cost-effectiveness (West et al, 2013).  
In the UK, the 2010 White Paper spelt out the need for radical change in an 
education sector that is lagging behind45 so as to meet world standards.   The 
document recognises the initiatives taken by countries at the forefront of 
                                                        
45The OECD PISA survey in 2006 shows that the country had fallen from 4th in the world in 
the 2000 survey to 14th in science, 7th to 17th in literacy, and 8th to 24th in mathematics 




education: “improving teacher quality, granting greater autonomy to the front 
line, modernising curricula, making schools more accountable to their 
communities, harnessing detailed performance data and encouraging 
professional collaboration” (The White Paper 2010)46.  The 2010 legislation, 
thereby, aims for system-wide change that would raise standards and alleviate 
inequities in the education sector.  To this end, the 2010 reform extends the 
provision for the academisation of schools to include all maintained schools 
and the primary school sector as well.   
 
 
2.3 Deregulation and the Academy Model 
 
The Academy model employs the precepts of the neo-classical market model 
in the public provision of schooling.  It exemplifies neoliberal ideology47 and 
its emphasis on entrepreneurism and competitiveness for the efficient 
provision of public services (Ball, 2011; Maisuria, 2014).  Competition, 
consumerism and the domination of private interests permeate this ‘market-
state’ in education, where the role of the ‘welfare’ state is receded (Maisuria, 
2014; Ball, 2011; Gunter, 2011).  New public management (NPM) policies have 
come into play, underpinning the reforming structures (Maisuria, 2014; 
Hogan, 2014).  These policy reforms have to do with the deregulation of 
markets and the commodification and privatisation of state assets.  In 
                                                        
46 To quote the then Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, “These regions and nations 
– from Alberta to Singapore, Finland to Hong Kong, Harlem to South Korea – have been our 
inspiration. While each of these exemplars has their own unique and individual approach to 
aspects of education, their successful systems all share certain common features…It is only 
through such whole-system reform that education can be transformed to make a nation one 
of the world’s top performers” (The White Paper 2010). 
47  The political economic practice of neoliberalism originated in Chile in 1973 as an 
experiment by a group of economists, called the ‘Chicago Brothers’.  It since became the 
preface to the rapid restructuring of global economies, by taking capitalism to a new phase.   
In Britain, neoliberalism, as a political and economic ideology, took roots following the 
‘Washington Consensus’ between the prime minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher and 
U.S President Ronald Reagan.  The agreement paved the way for radical reforms initiated so 
as to revive the economies of the UK and USA from a state of severe recession and involved 





schooling, the process entails the deconstruction of previously state-managed 
institutions to allow for private partnerships in the organisation and delivery 
of learning in state schools.  It features, in particular, increasing school 
autonomy, dismantling bureaucratic control and enhancing managerial 
capacity at the school-level (Kauko, 2015).  The NPM policy design as 
embedded in the academy model purports to have ‘innovative approaches’ to 
one or more areas of schooling, as in governance, curriculum, staffing 
structures and pay, teaching and learning (Black et al, 2019). Edu-businesses 
play an important role as legitimate contributors in the new policy 
environment and are being used to shape and implement education policy 
(Ball, 2011; Hogan, 2014).  The organisational nature of schooling that ensues 
is best identified as heterarchical 48 , characterised by ‘polycentric’ and 
‘strategic’ governance structures, whereby, stakeholders, both public and 
private, collaborate and or compete in the policy process (Ball, 2011; Hogan, 
2014).   
In the pluralistic and complex setting shaped by NPM reforms and networked 
governance, school autonomy is paramount.  As with other public-sector 
enterprises in the ‘post-welfare’ state, academy schools are self-organising 
units (Kauko, 2015).  Schools that become academies are freed from local 
authority control and operate under the domain of the market.  The 
dissolution of local control, means that these schools enjoy a greater degree of 
freedom compared to local authority ‘maintained’ schools.  These freedoms 
mainly have to do with governance, finance, management of staff (pay and 
conditions), in the delivery of the curriculum, deciding the length of the school 
day and year and to a certain extent admissions.  It is perceived that schools 
entrusted with greater autonomy and decision-making power are better 
equipped to use their local know-how in meeting the needs of the local 
population. Besides, school autonomy is considered essential to enable 
innovative management and teaching practices, catered to raise educational 
standards.  Survey evidence on UK academy schools shows that schools have 
                                                        
48 “Heterarchy is an organisational form somewhere between hierarchy and network that 
draws upon diverse horizontal and vertical links that permit different elements of the policy 




utilised their autonomy to make various changes49 (Eyles et al, 2017; Neri et 
al, 2018; Black et al, 2019).  Academy schools that had been open for a longer 
period are observed to have made more changes (Black et al, 2019).     School 
autonomy forms the cornerstone of the academisation policy with freedom 
from local authority control and bureaucracy cited as the main reason for 
academy conversion (Cirin, 2014; Thornton, 2018; West et al, 2018).  
The English educational setting has changed in a major way with the 
introduction of academy schools.  The school restructuring programme posits 
to increase the diversity of supply in schooling and enhance choice of schools 
in a location (Curtis, 2008; Thornton, 2018).  Parental choice is the focus in the 
realisation of this objective, which rests on the presumption that “academies 
are significantly different and employ innovative approaches to particular 
aspects of schooling” (Curtis et al, 2008). The emphasis on parental choice is 
justified for reasons of promoting diversity, as a parental right, or as a means 
of increasing efficiency and accountability (Fiske et al, 2000).  Central to this 
argument is the notion that “public schools are inefficient local monopolies 
and that educational quality would improve dramatically if only parents were 
allowed to freely choose between schools” (Hsieh et al, 2003).  Following 
academisation, parents can exercise their right to choose schools outside the 
control of the local authority.  It is argued that “if individual schools can no 
longer treat parents and students as captive customers, teachers and school 
administrators will be forced to become responsive to the needs of their 
students, and they will deliver education that is both higher quality and more 
cost-effective” (Fiske et al, 2000).   
The introduction of private enterprise and the diversification of the state 
school sector propels competition among schools.  Self-management in 
academy schools means that they can no longer rely on the 
support/intervention of the local education authority.   These schools, 
therefore, need to be resourceful in order to survive and compete in the 
schooling market. Competition can be fierce and “thus should develop high 
                                                        
49 Common changes made in academy schools are: externally procuring services previously 
supplied by the local authorities (90% of academies); linking pay to performance (84%); and 




standards as each enterprise aims to provide a better product than the next to 
entice customers (parents) to choose their establishment within which to 
educate their children” (Thornton, 2018). Furthermore, individuals are given 
the freedom to propose the establishment of new schools in any one area and 
“as the doctrine of competition underpins academies, the best proposal is 
likely to be selected by the Local Authority” (Thornton, 2018). Competition 
also extends to providers of educational services, previously provided by the 
local education authority.  In brief, competition, as conceived in the academy 
model, is a non-zero sum game and mutually non-exclusive with all players 
benefiting in some way. 
While the establishment of academies and the service provided is driven by 
private entities, the state input still prevails as a steering mechanism to which 
academies are held accountable (Thornton, 2018).  In theory, the academy 
model incorporates the multifarious nature of accountability in education, by 
“using political processes to assure democratic accountability, introducing 
market-based reforms to increase accountability to parents and children, or 
developing peer-based accountability systems to increase the professional 
accountability of teachers” (Figlio et al, 2011).  However, in practice, academy 
freedoms are constrained by the national policy of steering by evaluation 
through inspection and testing, besides the managerial practices of sponsors 
(Kauko, 2015).  The former falls within the lines of accountability of 
centralised governance patterns within which the decentralised academy 
model sits.  Fiske et Ladd (2000), in the context of the Tomorrow’s Schools 
Programme in New Zealand, refer to a tight-loose-tight governance structure 
that best summarises the governance structure of the academy model, as one 
“in which the central authority tightly specifies schools’ missions and outcome 
standards, loosely allows schools to use whatever methods they choose to 








2.3.1 Legislative and Organisational Framework 
 
Academies are companies limited by guarantee, which have charitable status 
and are contracted by the government through a funding agreement between 
an ‘academy trust’ and the Secretary of State for Education (Wolfe, 2011; 
Bassett et al, 2012; West, 2019).  They are subject to company law50 and some 
statutory education law, and controlled and funded directly by the central 
government (Curtis, 2008; West et al, 2013).  
An Academy school can be set up through either of two processes:  (i) a 
competitive process as applies to the establishment of maintained schools 
(Section 7 of the Education and Inspections Act), or, (ii) through consultation 
by the Secretary of State with the concerned local authority51 (Section 482(3) 
of the Education Act 1996).  In the case of the former, The Local Authority 
selects from among the proposals submitted by persons interested in 
establishing a new school in the area.  If the Local Authority is itself a 
contender, the decision is made by an adjudicator. Governing bodies of schools 
applying for academy status are bound by a duty to consult potential 
stakeholders on the proposed conversion.  Where the Secretary of State is 
involved in the establishment of the school, the process is simplified with no 
statutory consultation or other procedures to follow (London Councils, 2011).    
An academy project begins with what is referred to as ‘expressions of interest’, 
or EOI.  The Department of Education (DfE) publishes guidance on completing 
an EOI form that provides important information on the proposed academy 
project.  Signatures from the sponsor, co-sponsor(s) and LA are mandatorily 
required on the final version of the EOI, before the project moves to the next 
phase, called the Feasibility Stage.  During the Feasibility Stage, a Local 
Authority may consult locally on the Academy proposal and study the EOI in 
                                                        
50 Academy schools are different from maintained schools, which are operated by governing 
bodies that are statutory corporations. 
51 Where a significant proportion of pupils at the school are likely to be resident within the 
area of another local education authority, it is required to involve that local authority in the 




greater detail52.  The EOI forms the basis on which Funding Agreements are 
finally made between an academy and the Secretary of State for Education.  
Since 2014, these powers vested with the Secretary of State have been 
delegated to eight Regional School Commissioners (RSCs), who were 
appointed as DfE civil servants (West et al, 2018).  These School 
Commissioners exercise significant powers and responsibility with respect to 
both academies and maintained schools.  
In order to qualify for academy status, schools had to meet the eligibility 
criteria.  The criteria governing conversion has changed overtime with more 
recent revisions allowing for the fast-track conversion of schools.  The process 
in the primary school sector has been notably different to that in the 
secondary school sector where initially only failing schools were made to 
convert with the help of a private sponsor.  At the outset of the 2010 reform 
(from September 2010), only primary schools judged ‘outstanding’, in their 
most recent inspection by Ofsted, were invited to assume academy status.  Not 
much later, in November 2010, all good schools with outstanding features 
were allowed to convert with provision made for schools to apply for academy 
status provided it joined an academy trust with an outstanding school or 
entered into an educational partnership with a school having a proven record 
of improvement.  In April 2011, schools considered as performing well, based 
on most recent test results, Ofsted rankings and financial management were 
included in the process (Eyles et al, 2017).   To facilitate the conversion of all 
schools to academy status, new academies are now being encouraged to 
“support at least one faltering or coasting school to improve”53.   
Academies are “sponsored” and run by businesses, individuals, churches or 
voluntary bodies and public sector organisations that include local authorities 
(only as co-sponsors), universities and schools.  Sponsors originally 
contributed to the capital costs of schools while revenue costs were met 
                                                        
52 Where academies replace existing maintained schools, as is generally the case, extensive 
statutory procedures involved in the ‘discontinuance’ of the maintained schools in question 
must be followed with the concerned Local Authority required to first consult and then 
publish formal proposals on which representations may be made, before considering whether 
to approve the proposals (Wolfe, 2011).  
 




directly by the central government and set at a comparable level to maintained 
schools in the area.  Sponsors are no longer required by law to make a £2 
million investment for new academies and since September 2011, 
sponsorship is not a pre-requisite for conversion (Gunter, 2011; West, 2019). 
The central government also provides additional funds to cover the cost of 
services for which the academy would be directly responsible once it was no 
longer “maintained” by the local authority (West, 2019).  The DfE provides 
funds to assist with the costs of conversion, when a maintained school 
becomes an academy. In 2016/17 the total value of funds amounted to £81 
million.  An estimated £745 million alone has been spend on conversions since 
2010/11 as one-off costs and includes conversion grants at a flat-rate of 
£25,000 to schools that converted, and larger grants to the bodies sponsoring 
new academies (West, 2019).  Schools, therefore, get a significant budget 
increase following conversion.  This is a dominant reason for becoming an 
academy school, particularly so, in the face of austerity measures facing 
schools during a period of economic recession at the time the 2010 reform was 
enacted (Bassett, 2012; Cirin, 2014).    
 
The Funding Agreement 
 
The funding agreement is a legal contract that sets out the requirements of 
academies.  These regulations vary between schools with flexibility given to 
individual academies to negotiate the terms and conditions of their contract.  
Any changes can be made only by agreement between the academy trust and 
the Secretary of State, or if overridden by statute (West et al, 2018)54.   
The flexibility given to academies in negotiating their funding agreement has 
given rise to considerable variation in schooling ‘standards’ across academies. 
Flexibility and the lack of consistency, further, carries implications for the 
                                                        
54  Instances of statutory overriding include new provisions on SEN and exclusions.  All pupils 
with a Statement of SEN or an Education, Health and Care (EHC) Plan have to be admitted to 
an academy if the school is named in the Statement or Plan.  Similarly, academy schools have 





quality of education that pupils receive in the absence of ‘standardisation’ 
(West et al, 2018; Thornton, 2018).  In recent years, attempts have been made 
by the Department of Education to create a Model Funding Agreement (Wolfe, 
2011; West et al, 2018; Thornton et al, 2018).  The aim was to eliminate 
inequality and create consistency across academies by providing an example 
that all academies can follow (Thornton, 2018).  However, frequent changes 
in the model funding agreement, due to litigation and political influences and 
the lack of retrospective effects (that is, the inability to make similar changes 
in existing contracts), renders it ineffective to the original purpose (Thornton, 
2018; West et al, 2018).   
The funding agreement provides the framework within which an academy 
school operates.  Its terms and conditions are distinct for the various freedoms 
that academy schools enjoy.  In general, academies are required to offer a 
“broad and balanced” curriculum and are not obliged to follow the national 
curriculum. Academies are also exempted from following the School Teachers 
National Pay and Conditions statutory guidance.  Teachers in academies are 
not required to have qualified teacher status in more recent funding 
agreements.  Academies are also responsible for their own admissions with 
freedom to select up to 10% of their student intake based on aptitude (West, 
2019). The freedoms that academy schools enjoy is still bound by general legal 
requirements such as the equality/discrimination law, the Human Rights Act 
and the Freedom of Information law, observance of which, though, is not 
strictly enforced as for schools directly under the jurisdiction of the Local 
Authority (Wolfe, 2011).  
 
Types of Academies and Academy Trusts 
 
Academies are broadly classified as sponsored academies and converter 
academies.  Converter academies comprise of schools with a strong record of 
performance who voluntarily opt to convert to an academy.  On the other 
hand, sponsored academies are generally underperforming schools, 
mandatorily made to convert under a sponsor (Coldron et al, 2014).  Sponsors 




universities, charities and faith bodies and hold responsibility for improving 
the performance of their respective schools. Sponsors play a large role in 
Academies and are a particularly distinctive aspect of the Academies 
programme (Curtis, 2008).  
Academies are run by academy trusts.  Academy trusts vary according to the 
structure of governance and are broadly classified as:  Single Academy Trust 
(SAT)/‘standalone’ academies with individual contracts and Multi-Academy 
Trust (MAT) with a number of academies under a single contract.  From both 
these groups, some academies have also grouped themselves into an ‘umbrella 
trust’, while some stand-alone academies enter into ‘collaborative 
partnerships’ with other trusts.  MATs, umbrella trusts and collaborative 
partnerships are also collectively referred to as a ‘chain’.  Most academies, 
particularly sponsored academies, are part of a chain, though some stand-
alone academies exist (Simkins, 2015; Thornton, 2018; West et al, 2018).    
 
2.3.2 Policy Evaluation 
 
The academy model of schooling has been offered as a panacea for the ills of a 
state-managed system.  It was intended to replicate the perceived success of 
CTCs and act as an engine for social mobility.  The programme has made much 
headway since its inception in the English primary school sector with the 
enactment of the Academy Act 2010.  The reforms being implemented touch 
upon almost every aspect of schooling, the implications of which are far 
reaching.  An evaluation is undertaken here on the academisation policy and 
on its effectiveness as a school improvement programme. 
An original aim of the academy programme has been to raise standards, 
particularly so in underperforming schools.  Over a decade since the reforms 
were initiated in the country’s primary schools, the association between 
school improvement and academisation, however, remains a contentious 
issue (Gunter, 2011; Thornton, 2018).  Eyles et al (2017) study the exogenous 
effects of academisation on primary school pupils by focusing on ‘legacy’ 
pupils, enrolled in the school prior to the decision to convert to academy 




conversion.  Their finding is consistent both for average test results in english 
(reading) and maths.  In a subsequent study, Neri et al (2018), using a 
grandfathering instrument, also referring to students enrolled in an academy 
school a year prior to conversion, examine the performance effects of 
academisation in English primary schools.  They estimate a significant positive 
effect on test results, both in english language and maths (by about 0.9 – 1% 
of the average), in the immediate period post-conversion for schools that come 
under a Multi-Academy Trust (MAT).  Single Academy Trust (SAT) schools, 
however, exhibit a negative effect on pupil performance, following academy 
conversion.   Their study suggests the importance of governance structures 
and associated changes, made upon conversion, for improvements in 
performance.  In general, comparisons between academies and mainstream 
schools show performance improvements in both groups of schools over time 
and hence the evidence is inconclusive with regard to the ‘relative’ 
effectiveness of academy schools (Gunter, 2011).   According to Curtis (2008), 
the absence of a uniform ‘academy effect’ may be explained by variations in 
attainment levels between academies that average figures mask. 
Another important point of evaluation concerns the impact that the 
academisation programme has had on the performance of those at the bottom 
end of the ability distribution.  The programme as implemented in the primary 
school sector, while remaining an inclusive education policy, widened its focus 
to ‘system-wide’ change, thus deviating from its sole focus on reviving failing 
schools, originally.  Initially, only schools judged ‘outstanding’ by Ofsted were 
allowed to become academies.  Not long after, provision was made for all 
schools to convert provided it joined an academy trust with an outstanding 
school or entered into an educational partnership with a school having a 
proven record of improvement. This defeats the original purpose of the 
academy policy, which was to raise standards in underperforming schools 
(Thornton, 2018).  It has also been observed that the existing gulf between 
schools has widened since the option for conversion was extended to all 
schools (Thorton, 2018).  The widening gap is conceivable when all schools 




Wilson (2011), in the context of secondary schools, further show that 
academisation has exacerbated “educational inequalities and schooling 
stratification along the lines of ability and social background.”  This is 
explained by “compositional changes that Academy schools have made” – a 
practice referred to as gaming55.  Black et al (2019) look at compositional 
changes with regard to special needs pupils in schools post-academisation. 
Sponsored academies are observed to be more likely to reduce the proportion 
of pupils with special needs and remove additional support to them. Schools 
changing the nature of their intake, through sleight-of-hand school 
improvement, to produce good test results raises concerns about creating 
socially imbalanced schools down the road (Fiske et al, 2000; Gorard, 2005; 
Curtis, 2008; Wilson, 2011).  Improved performance may be achieved at the 
expense of socially disadvantaged children, and children with disabilities, who 
may be directly or indirectly excluded from the new types of school (Black et 
al, 2019). 
Also of concern are the very high rates of exclusions and half-day unauthorised 
absences in academy schools.  Academies, in 2007, had a higher rate of half-
day unauthorised absences than the national average.  With regard to 
exclusions, the rate has been three times that of neighbouring schools.  The 
latter can have damaging effects on neighbouring schools if academy schools 
exclude more pupils than the number of excluded pupils they would take in 
from elsewhere in the local authority (Curtis, 2008). 
Machin et al (2017) examining the causal effect of academisation on 
performance, on the other hand, observe no changes to primary schools’ pupil 
composition following academisation.  There is also some evidence from the 
secondary school sector, which shows greater improvements among 
disadvantaged students in academy schools relative to those in local authority 
maintained schools (Gunter, 2011).  Academies, in general, remain “inclusive” 
with twice the national average of pupils eligible for Free School Meals (FSM), 
                                                        
55 “Sleight-of-hand school improvement involves schools changing the nature of their intake, 
often as an unintended outcome of a change in admission procedures, and then claiming that 





though overall the proportion of FSM pupils has fallen since the programme 
started by 16.36 percentage points (Curtis, 2008).  
The freedom that academy schools enjoy, has been brought under scrutiny.  As 
already seen, with respect to admission procedures, it could mean less social 
inclusion (Wilson, 2011; Black, 2019). Flexibility over how the curriculum is 
taught may be compromising on the standard, quality and content of the 
education pupils receive and their ability to compete nationally (Thornton, 
2018).  Teaching standards may be further jeopardised by the freedom given 
to academy schools to recruit teaching staff who do not possess qualified 
teacher status (QTS).  OECD (2011) highlights the importance of 
accountability in the context of school autonomy.  Though, autonomy is 
proven to raise student performance, schools, in countries that do not have 
proper accountability arrangements in place, tend to perform worse (OECD, 
2011).  In the UK, academy schools fall under the scrutiny of the school 
inspections authority, Ofsted, similar to maintained schools.  They are, 
however, exempt from inspection in the first few years of their inception as an 
academy school.  Questions are also raised on the appropriateness of 
subjecting academy schools to Ofsted inspections under the same set of 
guidelines as maintained schools.  For instance, the role of the sponsor 
continues to remain unchecked, though they play a very important part in the 
organisation of an academy school (Thornton, 2018).   It is also noted, from a 
different perspective, that the use of centralised steering mechanisms, such as, 
standardised tests and Ofsted inspections contradicts the fundamentals of the 
decentralised model for academy schools (Kauko, 2015).   
The hollowing out of local authority responsibility and the undue reliance 
placed on sponsors, who may be acting on their own self-interests; the 
undemocratic manner in which academy schools are being established 
through the evasion of proper consultation procedures; the lack of 
transparency and or opaqueness in the selection of sponsors and in financial 
operations; potential detrimental effects of academies on neighbourhood 
schools, such as, in admissions and staff retention56; the fragmented nature of 
                                                        
56 Academies are not bound by the National Teachers Pay and Conditions, which means they 




schooling, which the creation of academies has resulted in; the absence of 
provision for reversing the process once a school becomes an academy; the 
very loss of autonomy for schools managed by multi-academy trusts and the 
financial viability of academy schools, especially so when academy trusts 
function as not-for-profit companies (as different from the school 
decentralisation models adopted in the US and Sweden that operate for profit)  
are among other concerns raised about the operation of academy schools that 
deserve attention (Cirin, 2008; Gunter, 2011; Thornton, 2018; West, 2019).  
Nevertheless, academy schools are, generally, oversubscribed.  This is so both 
for sponsored and converter academies, which have reported a substantial 
increase in first-choice applications since becoming an academy, with the 
increase being greater in sponsored academies (Black et al, 2019). 
 
 
2.4 Expansion of the Academisation Programme 
 
Academies were introduced in early 2000, to replace underperforming 
schools in the secondary school sector, under the initiative of the 1997-2010 
Labour government.  The first three academies opened in 2002/2003 and 
their numbers gradually increased in the following years.  By 2008/09, the 
number of secondary school academies was 50 (Eyles et al, 2018).   The 
Academies Act 2010 paved the way for the rapid expansion of the programme 
by enabling all schools to become academies and extending the programme to 
include primary schools and specialist schools as well.  By 2017, 69% of 
secondary schools and over a fifth of primary schools were academies (West, 
2019). 
Academies currently constitute about 33 per cent of schools in the primary 
school sector of England57.  The proportion of academies in the primary school 
sector is notably less than half the proportion of secondary academies (see 
                                                        
schools.  As per the National Audit Office records, academy principals are paid on average 
between £18,000 and £32,000 more than those in the maintained sector (Cirin, 2008). 




Figure A2.1).  In absolute numbers, however, the number of primary 
academies is about twice their number in the secondary school sector, given 
the larger number of primary schools (16, 769) in the country compared to 
the secondary schools (3, 448)58.  Keddie (2017) explains for the disparity in 
the rate at which academisation has proceeded in both these phases of 
education: 
 
“This disparity between secondary and primary has been attributed in large part 
to the relative lack of material resources primary schools can draw on to 
effectively take up the responsibilities of academisation.  As generally small 
schools with a lack of leadership density, primary schools have tended not to see 
conversion as of benefit to them economically and managerial.  Given their 
limited resources and size, primary schools do not have the capacity to convert 
to sole academy status.  Rather, they would need to join an academy network or 
chain.  There is concern amongst primary school heads that such an 
arrangement would undermine the individual autonomy of their school (Hill et 
al. 2012).  For these reasons, many primary schools have opted to remain 
attached to the local authority.” (Keddie, 2017) 
 
The pace and character of the academisation programme varies across the 
country, a closer examination of which reveals noteworthy patterns.  Figures 
2.1 and 2.2, borrowed from Black et al (2019) shows the composition of 














Figure 2.1:  School Composition in the State School Sector (2011 – 2017) 
 
Source:  Black et al (2017) 
 
The figure above (Figure 2.1) shows the rate of change by school type:  
Maintained, Sponsored Academies, Converter Academies, Free schools and 
others, separately for primary schools, secondary schools, special schools and 
pupil referral units in England in 2011–2017.  The rate of change is notably 
steeper for secondary schools, where academisation proceeded at a faster 
rate, compared to primary schools.  The pattern of change for special schools 
and pupil referral units (PRUs), on the other hand, is seen to be similar to that 




Figure 2.2 exhibits the regional differences in academisation over the period 
2011 to 2017.  Regions/areas with relatively higher concentrations of 
academy schools are shown in darker shade.  The proportion of academies 
among primary schools is noticeably lower relative to that in the secondary 
school sector.  In the primary school sector, the five most academised local 
authorities in 2017 are Poole, North-East Lincolnshire, Bromley, 
Bournemouth and Darlington. 
 
Figure 2.2:  Percentage of Academies by Local Authority 
 
Source:  Black et al (2017) 
 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 corroborate the observations made above on the primary 
school sector.  Of the 16, 769 state-funded primary schools in the country, 5, 
802 schools became academies by the year 2019 (Table 2.1).  Of these 4,095 




schools.  The pace of academisation in the primary school sector has steadily 
risen after 2010/11, with the largest number of schools becoming academies 
in 2017. 
Table 2.2, shows the regional dispersion of open academies for the primary 
school sector.  The majority of academy converters are located in East-
Midlands and Humber (16.5%) and the South West (16.01%), while the lowest 
numbers are found in the North (6.46%).  
 
Table 2.1:  Pace of Academy Conversion for Primary Schools (2010 – 2019) 
Period of Conversion  Number of Converting 
Schools  
01.09.2010 – 01.12.2010  24  
01.01.2012 – 01.12.2011  319  
01.01.2013 – 01.12.2013  716  
01.01.2014 – 01.12.2014  660  
01.01.2015 – 01.12.2015  572  
01.01.2016 – 01.12.2016  729  
01.01.2017 – 01.12.2017  848  
01.01.2018 – 01.12.2018  836  
01.01.2019 – 01.12.2019  526  
Total  5802  
Source:  Department for Education data on Open Academies, Free Schools, 
















Table 2.2:  Academy Schools by Area of Regional School Commissioners, 2019  





Proportion of  
Academy  
Converters  
East Midlands & Humber  957  16.5%  
East of England & North 
East London  
819  14.12%  
Lancashire & West 
Yorkshire  
532  9.17%  
North  375  6.46%  
North West London & 
South Central  
652  11.24%  
South-East & South 
London  
769  13.3%  
South-West  929  16.01%  
West-Midlands  769  13.3%  
Source:  Department for Education data on Open Academies, Free Schools, 
UTCs and Academy Projects in Development, 2019  
 
Further comparison between academy concentration and school performance 
in the primary school sector shows some interesting patterns (Figure A2.2).  
Areas with low concentration of primary academies, the lighter shaded area, 
are where the average school performance levels are above the national 
average.  On the other hand, areas where the density of primary academies is 
the highest are those where the average levels of school performance are 
below the national average.  These figures are apparently driven by later 
conversions considering the fact that the criteria governing academy 
conversion in the primary school sector initially favoured only schools with 
outstanding performance and well performing schools.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The academisation programme, being undertaken in the UK state school 
sector, is one of the largest experiments in UK education policy.  It involves the 
reconfiguration of the governance structures of schools to allow for private 




accelerated the process of academisation in the country and this has far 
reaching implications.  The review undertaken in this chapter lays out the 
opportunities and challenges the programme poses to the UK education 
sector.  It portrays the policy processes where political, ideological and 
economic factors play a major role in shaping the provisions, enactment and 
implementation of the programme.  It identifies the gaps where policy and 
practice fail to meet and sometimes contradict each other.  The empirical 
evidence, reviewed, provides a mixed picture on the effectiveness of the 
academisation reforms in raising standards and improving school 
performance.  Concerns are raised about any performance gains in academies 
being at the cost of educational inclusion.  Other challenges include the 
rectification of a very fragmented system of operation, having appropriate 
accountability systems in place that ensures uniformity in the quality of 
teaching across academy schools and proper management practices, enabling 
schools under multi-academy trusts to function without compromising on 
their autonomous status and ensuring a financially viable system.  There are 
wide variations observed between academy schools with respect to 
performance, practices, type, location and composition, a proper 

























3.1 Introduction  
  
A central feature of Education Policy Reform in the UK, in recent years, has 
been the establishment of ‘quasi-autonomous’ institutions, commonly 
referred to as ‘academies’, within the system of state schooling.  Greater school 
autonomy, it is perceived, would positively impact upon performance and 
improve overall school effectiveness59.  To this end, under the Academies Act 
2010, the academisation programme initiated in secondary schools has been 
extended to include maintained primary as well as special schools60.  Of the 
16,766 primary schools in England, 2,440 now have academy status, which 
                                                        
59 “The OECD has shown that countries which give the most autonomy to head teachers and 
teachers are the ones that do best. Finland and South Korea – the highest performing countries 
in PISA – have clearly defined and challenging universal standards, along with individual 
school autonomy” (The Schools White Paper, 2010).   
 
60  The first schools converted to academy status in September, 2010.  The majority of 
converters (59%) were secondary schools.  The 772 primary academy converters in January 





include Academy schools, Trust schools and Free schools61. These schools are 
state-funded, non-fee paying schools, free from local authority control.  
Academies and maintained schools, currently, constitute the majority of 
schools in England, with the former having more freedom and control over 
their finances, the curriculum and over staff recruitment and pay compared to 
maintained schools.  
The redesign of the educational landscape through the introduction of 
alternative school structures diversifies the system of state schooling in the 
country and broadens the spectrum of schooling choices.  Where schools 
previously fell under local authority control, following the national curriculum 
and national teacher pay and conditions, there is now greater heterogeneity.  
The decisive power that schools converting to academy status have over their 
finances, curriculum, staff recruitment and admission policy enables a range 
of organisational options best suited to individual schools and to meeting the 
needs of students.  While such differences are more vivid in the secondary 
school sector mainly through subject specialisation, there are a growing 
number of primary academies offering a varied curriculum and catering to the 
needs of a wide range of pupils, which are gaining in popularity (Brundett et 
al, 2010). This de facto variation in institutional arrangements provides a rich 
context for analysing the effects of school restructuring and forms the focus of 
the current paper.    
Autonomy coupled with greater accountability, choice and competition 
further expands the scope of the quasi-market in the provision of schooling.  
In line with other market-oriented reforms in the education sector, greater 
school autonomy is envisaged to improve efficacy in the system of state 
schooling. The rationale here is that schools granted with more decision-
making power would be incentivised to better performance and raise overall 
standards. Under the principal-agent relationship that characterises 
                                                        
61  An Academy school is a publicly funded independent school offering free education to 
pupils of all abilities, established by sponsors from business, faith or voluntary groups 
working in partnership with the Central Government and local education partners 
(www.education.gov.uk).  Free schools and Trust schools, on the other hand, are newly 
established schools set up by groups of parents, teachers, charities, trusts, religious and 




maintained schools, voters (principals) have little control over the activities 
of school boards (agents), as a result of which school boards may be captured 
by vested interests62. This may result in sub-optimal outcomes, owing to the 
inefficient operation of the educational marketplace.  The academy model, 
being offered as a panacea for the ills of the conventional school model, 
operates differently in that it realigns authority between the primary stake 
holders in the state school sector and emphasises up on more effective 
management practices at the school-level.  As to whether such restructuring 
effectively works in practice, however, remains a contested issue (Fiske et al, 
2000; Hoxby et al, 2004; Eyles et al, 2015; Eyles et al, 2016; Wilson, 2011; 
Machin et al, 2013).  
The academy model introduced in the UK secondary school sector in 2002 is 
largely shaped after the free school model introduced in Sweden in the early 
nineties.  Other similar initiatives in school restructuring include the 
introduction of Charter schools in the US and the Tomorrow’s School Reforms 
in New Zealand 63 .  These attempts at revamping the state school sector 
involves the creation of new schools or the conversion of existing schools into 
semi-autonomous institutions – a central aim being to decentralise authority 
to individual schools.  These institutional changes in conjunction with other 
market oriented policies promoting greater choice and competition in the 
state school sector were intended to:  1) raise attainment levels in state 
schools  2) enable more effective ways of delivering the curriculum by 
encouraging greater diversity and innovative approaches to learning 3) lead 
to better matching between pupils and schools, mainly by widening the range 
of choices in the state school sector 4)  support schools in serving the 
educational needs of the local student population by harnessing the local 
knowledge that schools have to more effectively meet the needs of the local 
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63 Another dimension to the school restructuring experience of these countries is the voucher 
scheme.  This provision entails the distribution of vouchers to pupils from disadvantaged 





education market 5) act as “a tide that lifts all boats” 64  by improving the 
performance of low-performing schools and raising attainments levels of 
pupils at the lower tail of the student distribution and 6)  improve efficiency 
in the state school sector by enabling the more effective utilisation of school 
resources.    
The underlying objectives in the school restructuring programme 
encompasses three broad areas in economic decision-making:  performance, 
equity and efficiency.  As to whether the new school model has been effective 
in delivering these broad goals is, however, a contended issue.  The 
experiences of nations partaking in the reform process have been varied and 
the empirical evidence provides a mixed picture on the effectiveness of the 
reforms.  Sandstorm et al (2005) find large positive gains on educational 
attainment following the free school reforms in the Swedish education sector.  
However, the study relies on a weak instrument in estimating the effect of the 
reforms and fails to control for most social factors that influence the 
educational decisions of households in the municipalities covered in the study, 
limiting the scope for generalisation.  In a more recent study, Bohlmark and 
Lindahl (2007) consistently estimate positive test gains associated with the 
growth of free schools in Sweden using a long panel of data from 1988/89 to 
2002/03. Bjorklund et al (2004), on the other hand, show no positive gains 
associated with the share of free schools in the Swedish context in their study, 
which is confined to a short period of time with little variation in the 
parameter of interest.   In the US context, Hoxby et al, 2004 show positive 
effects on attainment for pupils who join a Charter school from the lower 
elementary grades. Eyles et al (2016) focusing on primary school academies 
in England between 2010 and 2012, show a zero-effect of autonomy on pupil 
performance.  Other studies based on the UK and New Zealand experiment in 
school restructuring (Machin et al, 2013; Wilson, 2011; Fiske et al, 2000) 
indicate improvement in test score results for students, which is confined to 
the top-half of the ability distribution.  The lack of percolation of any 
performance gains to the persistent lower tail of the ability distribution, as 
                                                        




observed in the UK and New Zealand, is a pertinent issue that prods closer 
examination.  
In most, if not all cases, school restructuring reforms were targeted at 
bettering low performing schools and addressing inequalities within the 
system.  In the UK, especially, the first schools to be granted academy status 
were, in fact, low performing schools within the secondary school sector 
(Wilson, 2011).  The idea of rejuvenating schools by delegating authority to 
private sponsors receives credence from the US experiment with Charter 
schools where it is seen that ‘in some situations, autonomous schools can 
improve the performance of disadvantaged students, and narrow some of the 
most persistent educational disparities65” (Hoxby et al, 2009; Dobbie et al, 
2011).  Eyles et al (2016) observe these gains in performance to be most 
pronounced for charter schools located in urban areas, serving less-privileged 
pupils.    
The effectiveness of US Charter schools in narrowing educational disparities, 
however, doesn’t, seem to hold in other similar settings where ‘school 
autonomy’ became the norm.  In New Zealand, the lowest decile schools that 
catered largely to the education of students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
experienced a downward spiralling effect following the reforms (Fiske et al, 
2000).  The country also experienced an ethnic divide in student-school 
sorting, after the implementation of the Tomorrow’s School Programme, not 
explained by changes in ethnic or demographic residential patterns (Fiske et 
al, 2000). In the UK, too, there’s been little evidence that the ‘academy model’ 
introduced in the secondary school sector of the country in 2002 has had any 
positive impact on the bottom tail of the student population (Machin et al, 
2013).   Wilson (2011), examining the effectiveness of institutional 
transformation on school performance, concludes that “education inequalities 
and schooling stratification along the lines of ability and social background 
have increased” owing to the “compositional changes that Academy schools 
have made” – an aspect further examined later in this paper.  
                                                        




Machin (2013) explains the differential impact of UK academies vis-à-vis that 
of US charters on the lower tail of the student distribution in terms of 
differences in the institutional setting.  Charter schools operate on a charter 
or contract and are held accountable to their sponsor, unlike UK schools.   This 
“generates sharp incentives for the schools to perform and achieve their 
contractual aims” (Machin, 2013).  English academy schools, on the other 
hand, cater to a mix of students of different abilities and are held accountable 
with publicly available performance tables.  Educational ‘equity’ within the 
academy model in the UK context may, thus, be a ‘constrained’ choice for 
schools, requiring remedial policy interventions.   
Another aspect of the school restructuring exercise, recognised in the 
Academies Act 2010, concerns the efficiency gains that may be attained 
through the provision of greater school autonomy.  This argument receives 
validity from “the inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of resource-
based interventions (Hanushek, 2003)” in economics literature. 66   The 
interplay of greater choice, competition and autonomy, together with the 
establishment of a quasi-market in the education sector, is perceived as 
conducive to school performance.  The Academies Act 2010 specifically spells 
out the aim of reaping efficiency gains through ‘the more judicious allocation 
of resources’ and ‘learning from best practice’.  Besides this are quality 
improvements that may accrue from the adoption of more innovative and 
diverse curriculums when schools cater to the needs of a wider range of 
pupils.  Fiske et al (2000) note that schools in New Zealand began to offer a 
very diverse choice of subjects and adopt innovative teaching practices, better 
suited to the needs of its students, following the Tomorrow’s Schools 
initiative.  On the downside, however, these benefits offered by the new 
educational marketplace also appear to have been lopsided.  The New Zealand 
experience also shows that better performing schools often had an advantage, 
under the new system, and at the expense of the lowest decile of schools.  For 
example, the successful operation of an autonomous school, largely depended 
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education, as observed in Jackson et al (2016), are, however, greatly limited by the simplicity 




on managerial expertise 67  at the school-level, which all schools could not 
afford to have (Fiske et al, 2000).  Failure to balance the interest of the various 
stake holders eventually led to the polarisation of schools and of the student 
population in the country, accompanied by associated ‘efficiency’ loses.      
The aforementioned review on the nature of school restructuring reforms and 
its implementation highlights the opportunities and challenges facing schools 
in the new educational marketplace. It is against this setting that the current 
research documents the changes brought about by the Academy Act 2010 on 
the English primary school sector.  The analysis that follows provides a logical 
examination of the effects of academisation on schools that convert to 
academy status.  Such an analysis is best undertaken within a standard 
difference-in-differences framework.  The methodology adopted allows for a 
yearly and event history analysis, comparing between academy schools and 
maintained schools over the two distinct periods of interest, that is, the pre-
conversion (pre-treatment) period and the post conversion (post-treatment) 
period.  The key identifying assumption, here, is that in the absence of 
treatment, there exists no difference in trends (parallel trends) between to-
be-academies and maintained schools.  The identifying strategy involves 
defining a control group of schools, from among the pooled sample of 
maintained schools, which best resemble academy schools pre-conversion.  
This is determined, here, using the propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique.  The propensity score is estimated through a probit regression of 
the binary variable, that identifies ‘to-be-academies’ (1) and ‘non-academies’ 
(0), on a set of school and pupil characteristics, aggregated over the pre-policy 
time period.  The propensity score exhibits the likelihood of conversion for all 
schools in the sample - a higher propensity score implying a higher chance 
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empirically investigated by Neri et al (2018) in the UK context.  Their findings show schools 
run by Multi Academy Trusts (MAT), with pooled resources and expertise, to have improved 
performance to a greater extent, following academisation, compared to schools run by Single 
Academy Trusts (SAT) or Stand-Alone Academies.  The authors explain for the differential 
effects on performance on both sets of schools in terms of more efficient managerial practices 





that a school becomes an academy. The difference-in-differences estimator or 
‘academy effect’ is then obtained as the deviation from the secular trend for 
treated schools in the post-treatment period vis-à-vis the selected group of 
control schools.  The empirical model and selection procedure used are more 
elaborately discussed in section 3.5 below.  The rest of the paper is organised 
as follows:  Section 3.2 spells out the motivation for undertaking the research, 
outlining its key objectives; Section 3.3 provides an overview on the features 
of the Academy Act 2010 and of English primary schools; Section 3.4 presents 
the data and the ocular statistics; Section 3.5 elaborates on the research 
methodology while the empirical results are discussed in section 3.6; Section 
3.7 concludes on the findings of the study and its policy implications.  
 
 
3.2 Motivation and Aim of the Study  
 
This research is motivated by the radical change brought about on the 
institutional setting of English primary schools following the implementation 
of the Academies Act 2010.  The Act, which heralded the establishment of 
academies in the primary school sector of the country, oversees a process of 
transition whereby schools converting to academy status gain more 
autonomy over their decision-making in matters, such as, school finance, 
admissions, staff recruitment and curriculum.  The autonomous status and 
decision-making power opted for by some schools alters the existent 
trajectory of schools in a major way.  The current study exploits this 
exogenous variation in the institutional setting to study about the 
performance effects and compositional changes associated with the school 
restructuring exercise.    
A study of this nature gains added relevance following the accelerated roll-out 
of the 2010 reform across English primary schools in recent years.  Academies, 
currently, constitute over a third (37%68) of all maintained primary schools in 
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the country.  Evidence on the impact this school reform has had on already 
existing academies is crucial to making informed policy decisions on the same.  
Whether academisation acts as a panacea for the ills of a hitherto largely state-
controlled school system or, on the other hand, exacerbates already existing 
inequities in state schools may be ascertained through an analysis on the 
observed effects of academisation.  
 The analysis, undertaken in this study, centres on the estimation of the 
academy effect across state primary schools in England, using observational 
data at the school level.  A period and event analysis model is applied within a 
difference-in-differences framework, differentiating between treatment 
(academy) and control (maintained) schools and between the pre-treatment 
and post-treatment period.  While the aggregated effect following 
academisation is obtained through the period analysis, associated time 
trajectories, prior to and accompanying academisation, are accounted for in 
the event analysis model. This latter model also allows for heterogeneity in 
treatment timing as is the case in the sample of academy schools studied, 
where the timing of academy conversion differs. 
Economic analysis of the academy model in the primary school sector of 
England remains an under researched area.  The sector accounts for the 
largest proportion of the student population in the country and of schools.  
Pupil outcomes at this phase of education are important for the spill-over 
effects it has on later years of education.  Policy reforms in this sector also 
carry far reaching implications on overall educational outcomes.  The paucity 
of studies in the economic literature on primary education in the UK is another 
motivational factor that has necessitated the current research.  The study, 
thereby, makes an important contribution, particularly with its focus on the 
Academy Act 2010, empirical evidence on which is again scanty for the 
primary school sector.   
The only two other existent studies, that evaluate the impact of academisation 
in the same context, are worth mention here.   Eyles et al (2017) and Neri et al 
(2018) examine the causal relationship between academisation and pupil 
performance.  Both studies use a combined difference-in-differences and 




on primary school pupils’ performance.  Eyles et al (2017) estimate an overall 
zero-effect on pupil performance, following academisation with the observed 
lack of effects hypothetically assigned to the nature of governance,   Neri et al 
(2018) examine the heterogeneous performance effects of academisation, 
dstingushing between two main governance-models in academy schools:  
Multi Academy Trusts and Single Academy Trusts. The study establishes that 
schools run by Multi Academy Trusts (MATs), where multiple schools are 
governed under the same academy trust, experience performance gains, 
following academisation.  The effects, on the other hand, are negative in Stand-
alone Academies/Single Academy Trust (SATs) schools where individual 
schools are governed by their own trust.   The authors explain for the positive 
differential effect on MAT schools by the more efficient management practices 
in these schools where resources and skills are pooled together and shared by 
all schools under the trust,  
This research differs with its examination of the aggregated effects of 
academisation at the school level, considering both school performance and 
school compositional changes.  The analysis that follows is broadly defined by 
the following set of objectives:  
 
1. To estimate the ‘academy’ effect on English primary schools, following the 
introduction of the academy model in 2010.  
 
2. To examine the period and yearly event trends on pupil performance and 
school composition associated with the academisation process.  
 
3. To draw out the policy implications of the academisation programme from the 








3.3 The Academies Act 2010 & Primary Schools in 
England   
 
 The Academies Act, passed by the UK Parliament in July 2010, has paved the 
way for the establishment of autonomous state primary schools in the 
country.  These schools are publicly funded and fall outside local authority 
control with the majority of their funds coming directly from the central 
government through the Educational Funding Agency (EFA).  Being 
autonomous means that ‘academy’ schools enjoy greater discretion, compared 
to mainstream schools, on how they chose to spend their funds as well as in 
matters of school governance.  Some of the ways this discretion is applied have 
to do with the delivery of the curriculum, staff recruitment and pay and 
decisions on the structure and length of the school day as well as school 
admissions.    
Schools converting to academy status are broadly classified as Converter 
Academies and Sponsor-led-Academies. Converter academies initially 
comprised those schools deemed as Outstanding by Ofsted69 and were among 
the early stream of converters.   This group of schools voluntarily opt to 
convert.  Sponsor led academies, on the other hand, are generally constituted 
by underperforming schools that were mandatorily made to convert under a 
sponsor.  Academy sponsors hold the responsibility for improving the 
performance of their respective schools and come from a wide range of 
backgrounds that include successful schools, businesses, universities, 
charities and faith bodies.   
Both converter academies and sponsor-led-academies are managed by a trust, 
comprised of governors/trustees/directors with the head teacher as the chief 
executive.  However, the nature of governance may differ.  Converter 
academies can choose to function as either Stand-Alone-Academies (SAT) or 
be part of a Multi-Academy Trust (MAT).  Sponsor-led-academies have to 
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convert as part of chains or partnerships.  Academies that convert as part of 
chains or partnerships can opt to work as a multi-academy trust (MAT) with 
all schools governed by one trust and board of directors; as an umbrella trust, 
in which schools work together, but also retain a certain level of 
independence; or, as a collaborative partnership with no shared trust or 
formalised governance structure (Eyles et al, 2016).  Schools, in general, are 
encouraged to convert in a chain or partnership to reap the benefits of the 
economies of scale from pooling resources, skills and ideas.    
The process of academisation as it occurs in the English primary school sector 
has been different from that of the secondary school sector that saw the 
inception of the reforms in early 2000.  The Department of Education adopted 
a phased and staggered approach to the programme in the primary school 
sector, gradually relaxing the criteria by which primary schools could convert, 
so as to minimise risks.  Better performing schools that were ranked as 
Outstanding by Ofsted initially received priority for conversion 70 .  Two 
months later, in November 2010, the criteria was extended to include all good 
schools, with outstanding features.  In this latter phase, provision was also 
made for any school to convert, regardless of their Ofsted grade, as long as it 
either joined an academy trust with an excellent school or entered into an 
educational partnership with a school having a proven record of 
improvement. In April 2011, schools considered as performing well, based on 
most recent test results, Ofsted rankings and financial management, were also 
included in the process (Eyles et al, 2016).  The number of primary schools 
becoming academies, thus, gradually increased over time with the largest 
spurt in numbers occurring in 2013 among early period converters and 
subsequently in 2017 in more recent years (see table 2.1).  
Prior to the enactment of the Academies Bill, 2010, schools in the UK were 
mainly categorised as – Community schools, Voluntary Controlled Schools, 
Foundation Schools and Voluntary Aided Schools.  Community schools 
accounted for 60% of all state schools, followed by Voluntary Aided schools 
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(23%), Voluntary Controlled schools (15%) and Foundation schools (2%).  
The implementation of the 2010 reform has altered the existing educational 
landscape in a major way. Academies now constitute over a third of primary 
schools in England with the numbers deemed to increase in the foreseeable 
future71.  
A common yardstick of school performance in the two notably different 
institutional settings of an academy school and maintained school is pupil 
assessment.  Pupils enrolled at academy schools are also registered for the 
national curriculum tests and assessed along with pupils from mainstream 
schools72.  A more vivid examination of the nature of school assessment, in 
English primary schools is, therefore, provided in this context.  
 
3.3.1 National Assessments and Test Score based Measures 
of Performance 
 
Schooling in the UK comprises of four ‘key stages’.   Key Stage 1 (KS1) and Key 
Stage 2 (KS2) complete the phase of primary schooling.  At the end of KS1 and 
KS2, pupils take Standard Assessment Tests (SATs) in core subjects.  Children 
sit for KS 1 tests in english and mathematics normally at the age of 7.  These 
tests are externally set, but internally assessed by teachers. National 
curriculum levels, ranging between the values of 1 and 3, with an unrestricted 
upper limit, are assigned to pupils, based on performance.   This classification 
is normally taken as an indicator of a pupil’s ability as opposed to 
achievement.  Key Stage 2 tests are at the end of primary schooling (Year 6) 
when pupils are aged around 11.  These assessments are also standardised, 
but, are marked externally.  In order to sit the tests, students are expected to 
                                                        
71 The former Education Secretary, George Osborne has proposed a forced academisation plan 
for all schools in England to convert by 2020 or be committed to converting by 2022.  This 
policy proposal was later withdrawn following large outcry against its implementation 
(Adams, 2016; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-13274090).  
72 This includes pupils working below the standard of the tests and ultimately don’t take them 
and pupils working at the standard but can’t access the tests. Pupils in their final year of KS2 
attending a pupil referral unit (PRU) or hospital school while still on the register of a 




be working at level 3 and above.  Until recently, the expected level of 
achievement at the end of KS2 has been a level 4c 73  with the maximum 
obtainable level being a 6a.  Recent revisions to the assessment procedure in 
2014 replace the levels with scores74 .  Students are now expected to attain a 
score of at least 100 in the SAT assessments on english grammar, punctuation 
and spelling, english reading tests and maths tests.  The attainable scores are 
between 100 and 120 with a score below 100 meaning a fail.    
School performance measures, as noted above, can be on levels of pupil 
performance and are, commonly, referred to as “status” measures (Figlio et al, 
2011).  Alternatively, there are “growth or “progress” measures, also called 
“gain scores” or “value-added” measures (Plewis, 1997; Figlio et al, 2010).  The 
latter is an economic measure of performance and shows the extent of 
improvement in pupils’ performance between different stages or years.  The 
value-added measure is a useful tool in determining a school’s contribution to 
pupils’ achievement. The input measure for each pupil, in the computation of 
the value-added score, is the average point score (APS) achieved in the 
reading, writing and mathematics tests at KS1.  The output measure for each 
pupil is the average point score achieved in the english, mathematics and 
science KS2 tests.  A pupil's value added score is calculated as the difference 
between a pupil’s APS at the KS2 SAT tests (actual) and the median value of 
KS2 results of other pupils with the same, or similar, prior attainment at KS1 
(expected), nationally75.  The school's value added score is given as the simple 
average (arithmetic mean) of the value added measures for all pupils in the 
school and is a measure centred on 100.  A value above 100 for a school’s 
value-added score indicates a positive contribution by a school to pupils’ 
progress.  The value-added score allows for differences in intake composition 
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74 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-36682743  
75 http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/archive/primary_04/p8.shtml.  
The referred technical note on the calculation of value-added score, mentioned here, doesn’t 
include major changes that have since been introduced in its calculation.  Among these 





and captures the ‘school effect’ in attainment/performance net of other effects 
that include innate ability and family background. It is, therefore, used as a 
standard measure of comparison for schools and accounts for non-
randomness in the process of school allocation and pupil admissions. 
Educational progress between ages 6-7 (end of Key Stage1) and 10-11 (end of 
Key Stage2) are among the school performance indicators annually published 
in the school league tables in the UK.   
Test-score based measures of performance are currently, the most widely 
used and commonly accepted indicator of school performance.    Gibbons 
(2011c) shows that test-score based measures of school quality tend to 
dominate parental satisfaction with the learning environment.   Test based 
performance indicators are also at the core of school accountability systems 
in the UK and elsewhere.   The school league tables, published in the UK since 
1992, hold schools publicly accountable through the publication of school 
performance tables that display pupils’ academic outcomes based on standard 
assessment tests (SATs).  An overwhelming majority of empirical studies on 
schools rely on test-score outcomes as a measure of school performance since 
these are readily available and in the absence of other alternative indicators.  
Standardised test results provide common ground for comparing between 
academy schools and mainstream schools.  This feature has been exploited 
here to study the school-level effects of school restructuring.    
  
 
3.4 Data Preparation and Summary Statistics  
  
 Data covering all primary schools in England over the period 2002 – 2014 is 
used in the analysis that follows.  This data has been compiled from different 
sources.  The main source of data is the National Pupil Database (NPD) of the 
Department for Education.  The NPD data is a collation of both pupil-level and 
school-level administrative data from the Pupil-level Annual School Census 




merged with publicly available School Census data that contains school-level 
information on various school-specific characteristics.  
Schools in the dataset are identified by their respective local education 
authority and establishment number. General information on schools include 
the school address and type of school.  Schools are classified as one of the 
following school types: Voluntary Aided Schools, Voluntary Controlled 
Schools, Community Schools, Foundation Schools, City Technology Colleges 
(CTCs), City Academies, Independent Schools, Special Schools, Pupil Referral 
Units, Free Schools, Converter Academies and Sponsored Academies.  Other 
basic school-specific information available are the number of pupils (school 
size), cohort-size of the school leaving age group, the opening date of a school 
and, where relevant, the closing date for both maintained and academy 
schools.  
The pupil-level data covers information on the socio-economic characteristics 
of pupils and pupil assessments.  Information on the gender, ethnicity and 
mother tongue of pupils as well as indicators on free school meal (FSM) status 
and special educational needs (SEN) are provided in the data.  Pupils in the 
data set are assigned a Unique Reference Number (URN) that remains the 
same throughout their school years.  Pupils can, therefore, be identified across 
school years and tracked on a number of time-variant factors as well, such as, 
their record on exclusions, mobility and progress.    
Pupil performance data is drawn from the attainment tables on teacher 
assessments and SAT test results. The information content here includes 
pupils’ test scores and the national curriculum levels attained in teacher 
assessments and SATs in core subjects at both KS1 and KS2.  The availability 
of this data at both phases of primary schooling is useful in keeping track of 
the progress a pupil makes through their years of schooling.    
The pupil-level data for each school has been aggregated/collapsed to the 
school level for the current analysis.  The original dataset consists of 222, 570 
school year observations on all ‘open’ state primary schools located in 154 
local authorities.  The panel data runs from 2002 to 2014. City Technology 
Colleges, Pupil Referral Units, Special Schools, City Academies and 




from mainstream schools, constitute about 16.73 per cent of the schools and 
these are dropped from the dataset.  Very large schools, that is, schools that 
form the top 1 per cent of the distribution on school size (number of pupils), 
and very small schools, at the bottom 1 per cent of the school-size distribution, 
are also dropped from the original dataset.  This is done to eliminate the effect 
of outlier observations that could potentially distort the data analysis.  About 
2 per cent of the observations (2, 549) have been thus dropped.     
A further issue encountered in the data preparation has to do with missing 
and implausible values on some of the variables.  This is remedied by replacing 
missing and implausible values with the mean values for these variables.  The 
mean replacement value used is the average of the non-missing values in the 
preceding and succeeding years for a school.  Observations with 
missing/implausible values for the top and bottom observations of a school, 
sorted by year, which are not sandwiched between non-missing values, have 
been replaced with the data available in the immediate preceding and 
succeeding years of the same school.  Overall, 3 per cent of the observations 
have been so replaced.  Observations that are still left with missing values on 
any of the variables, relevant to the data analysis, have been dropped and 
these constitute about 2.1 per cent of the data.   
Finally, the data set was prepared to avoid possible attrition bias arising from 
missing school year observations in the unbalanced panel data.  This is done 
by including only schools that are observed throughout the 13 year period.  
This process also ensures that the same set of schools are observed in 
the pre-reform and post-reform period in the analysis that follows.  The 
dataset is also further narrowed down to a comparable sample of maintained 
schools and academy schools after dropping all local authorities that do not 
contain any academy schools.  There are 30 local authorities in total that do 
not have even one academy school.  Dropping these local authorities leaves a 
strongly balanced panel dataset of 139,867 school year observations with data 
from 2002 – 2014, of which 128, 661 are on maintained schools and the rest, 
11, 206, on academies.     
Table 3.1 presents the preliminary statistics that summarises the data on 
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Table 3.1:  Summary Statistics on Primary Schools in England (2002 – 2014)  








Test Scores      
Reading Test 
(%)  
60.64 7.933 12 96 
Maths Test (%)  66.65 8.63 11 97.5 
APS (KS2)  18.02 2.80 5 27 
APS (KS1)  15.33 1.34 3 21 
School 
Characteristics  
    
Cohort Size  36.30 22.88 1 223 
% of Girls  49.14 10.88 0 100 
% of FSM 
Eligible  
15.37 15.44 0 100 
% Whites  84.78 23.31 0 100 
% African 
Origin  
3.28 9.69 0 100 
% Asian Origin  6.32 15.92 0 100 
% EAL Pupils  9.04 19.23 0 100 
% SEN Pupils  22. 
66 
13.06 0 100 











Starting with the average cohort size, it is observed that the mean number of 
pupils in a cohort is around 36 with an almost equal proportion of boys 
(50.86%) and girls (49.14%).  A very low minimum value of one on the 
number of pupils, after having cleaned the data of outliers on school size, is 
explained for by very few observations in the dataset that have records for just 
one pupil for a single year in the school.  These, in other words, are outliers on 
cohort-size within a school and may be examples of suppressed data, when 
the number of pupils in any given year in a school is very low, data records on 
which can compromise the anonymity of pupils in the respective schools.  
Since there are only 5 school year observations, where information on cohort 
size is far from the average for the school and this is unlikely to have a major 
effect on the main data analysis, these observations have not been removed or 
the figures altered.  White pupils constitute the majority and form around 85 
per cent of a cohort, followed by pupils of Asian origin (6.4%), while pupils of 
African origin account for around 4 per cent of the average cohort size.     
The performance statistics show that pupils score relatively more marks on 
average in mathematics tests compared to reading tests76 .  The table also 
shows the average point scores (APS) obtained at Key Stage 1 (15.33) and Key 
Stage 2 (18.02), respectively.  As mentioned earlier, these scores at KS1 exhibit 
the ability level of pupils as opposed to achievement.   The APS at both phases 
of primary education are scores assigned to pupils that broadly classifies them 
on the basis of their tests performance.  The variance for these indicators is, 
therefore, noticeably low compared to other test score measures of 
performance. 
The APS at KS1 and the indicators on free school meal (FSM), special 
educational needs (SEN) and mother tongue (EAL), define the intake quality 
of a school.  It is seen that about 15 per cent of pupils on average come from 
poor economic backgrounds, being eligible for free school meals, and over a 
fifth have special educational needs, with or without a statement.  On average, 
9 per cent of pupils have english as an additional language. 
                                                        
76 Reading tests are marked out of 50 and have been converted to percentages for purposes 





The information above is further disaggregated by school type and the period 
of interest.  The figures presented in table 3.2 below provide a general profile 
for both maintained schools and academies in the pre-policy and post-policy 
years.    
There is noticeable difference between both school types in the pre-reform as 
well as post-reform periods, at the ocular level.  Pupils in academy schools on 
average earn higher grades in english and maths compared to their 
counterparts in maintained schools.  The relatively low APS at KS2 for 
academy schools and higher APS at KS1 suggests that the excess scores these 
schools display in english and maths over that of maintained schools may have 
to do with higher ability levels among pupils attending academy schools.  It 
could also imply that pupils in academy schools may be performing below 
their potential, despite the relatively higher average grades they attain in 
english and maths.  
On school size, academies appear to be considerably larger schools than 
maintained schools.  The proportion of white pupils in academies is also 
relatively higher, corresponding to which are lower numbers of ethnic 
minorities and pupils with english as an additional language.  This difference 
is seen to hold in both time periods.  Further, academies seem to have a higher 
intake quality both before and after conversion, with lower proportions of 
















Table 3.2:  School and Pupil Profile: Pre and Post Academisation (2002 – 2014) 
 
The above noted differences between academies and maintained schools are 
further tested for statistical significance.  The results of the two tailed t-tests 
are shown in the last two columns of the above table (Table 3.2).  The mean 
values on almost all selected variables, except that on the number of girl 
pupils, are seen to be statistically different for both groups of schools.  The null 
hypothesis that there exists no significant difference in the mean values 
between both groups of schools is, therefore, rejected, in each of these cases.  
The statistical significance of the difference-in-means tests, in the pre-policy 
period, carries implications for the empirical estimation that is to be 
undertaken.  It indicates non-randomness in selection into academy status, as 
is the case with the academisation process taking place in the English primary 
school sector, which could potentially yield biased estimates in the difference-
in-differences analysis.   
In light of the above, correcting for non-random selection and possible 
endogeneous effects, associated with the academy conversion process, is a 
fundamental part of the estimation procedure.  The earlier mentioned studies 
in the same context have approached these issues in different ways.  Eyles et 
al (2017) and Neri et al (2018), studying the effects of academisation on pupil 




studies, only pupils who are already enrolled in the school prior to 
academisation, referred to as Intent to Treat (ITT) or grandfathered pupils, 
are included in the data analysis.  This is done to isolate the pure academy 
effects, considering that pupils acting up on the knowledge of a school 
becoming an academy may select in or out of schools.  As a result, any effects 
identified, post-reform could be endogenous and not independent of the 
outcome measure.  Eyles et al (2017), further, circumvent the issue of 
selection bias by focusing only on schools that convert to academy status.  For 
each group of schools that are treated (become academies) in a given year, the 
control group of schools (comparison group) is defined by the set of to-be-
academies of the following year, so as to ensure comparison between similar 
sets of schools.  The method adopted in this study, it may be noted, is for 
analysis at the school-level.  The study proceeds, making use of the 
procedure of propensity score matching, to avert the implications of the 
non-random nature of academy conversion and of endogeneity, in the 
estimation process.  This is done by specifying a control group (comparison) 
of schools from among the sample of maintained schools that are most similar 
to academy schools in pre-reform characteristics.  The identification strategy 
and selection process adopted is examined in greater detail in the following 
section, where the empirical models are presented.   
 
 
3.5 The Difference-in-Differences Methodology and 
Empirical Models 
 
The difference-in-differences methodology is commonly used for comparative 
analysis in observational studies, using longitudinal data.  It is used for the 
estimation of the effect of a treatment (intervention) and may involve 
comparison overtime of the same set of observations that are treated or two 
different groups of observations, that is, the treated and not treated (control 
group).   The methodology is widely used in different fields of study and for 




experimental design of the difference-in-differences model is particularly 
suitable for observational studies where treatment or policy-interventions do 
not take place under controlled settings (as in experimental studies) and 
selection into treatment is not randomized.  
 The academisation process in the English primary school sector is a typical 
example of a quasi-experimental policy study.  Conversion into academy 
status has been a selective (non-random) exercise, where the criteria 
governing conversion also changed over time. Comparison of the outcome 
trajectories for treated schools (academies) with schools that are not treated 
(maintained schools) is possible within the difference-in-differences 
framework with the employment of an appropriate identification strategy that 
allows for comparison between similar groups of observations.   Similarity in 
time invariant and time varying (due to other causes of the outcome, other 
than the treatment) observables between the treated and control group of 
schools is needed in order to obtain unbiased estimates on the causal effects, 
as provided by the difference-in-differences estimator.  Known as the common 
trends/parallel trends assumption, it implies that in the absence of treatment 
both treated and control schools have similar outcome trajectories.  Any 
differences/deviation from the ‘common trend’ in the post-reform period will, 
therefore, capture the effect of the treatment.   
The difference-in-differences analysis is undertaken by specifying a model 
that correlates the policy change to the outcome variable of interest.  Two 
specifications of the model are estimated, here, for a period and yearly event 
analysis.  The former approach estimates the ‘academy effect’ that is the 
aggregated effect over the post-reform period while the latter traces the 
associated time trajectories over the pre-policy and post-policy years.  
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 below specify the linear reduced form model for the 
period analysis, where Yit depicts the outcome variable of interest for school i 
in period t, with t taking the value of 1 in the pre-reform period and 0 in the 
post-reform period.  The output measure (Yit) has been specified to determine 
the causal effects of academy conversion on school performance and intake 
quality.  School performance measures used are the average test scores in 




quality/compositional changes for the school are measured using the 
indicators on free school meal status (FSM), special educational needs (SEN), 
innate ability of pupils as determined by the average point scores at Key Stage 
1 and the proportion of pupils with english as an additional language (EAL) as 
well as the cohort size.   
 
   Yit = it + 1ACDit + 2TIME + 3ACDit*TIME + it                             (3.1) 
 
 Equation 3.1 models the causal effect of academisation on each of the above 
mentioned indicators on the outcome variable (Yit).  ACDit in the above 
equation is a dummy variable, indicating ‘academy stauts’ and takes the value 
of ‘1’ for schools that become academies 
 and ‘0’, otherwise.  The adjacent co-efficient 1 is interpreted as the estimated 
mean difference in the outcome variable (Yit) between the treated group and 
the control group prior to the 2010 policy intervention.  In other words, 1 
shows the baseline differences between both groups of schools, prior to 
academisation.               
The TIME variable represents the two distinct periods of interest: the pre-
policy (pre-reform) period and the post-policy (post-reform) period.  Since 
the academy reforms were initiated in the primary school sector in 2010, with 
the first primary schools converting as academies the same year, the post-
policy period is specified from 2010 onwards in this analysis. The TIME 
dummy, accordingly, assumes the value of 1 for the post-reform period (post-
2010) and 0, otherwise.  The co-efficient on this variable, 2, captures the 
expected mean change in the outcome variable (Yit) for the control group 
between the pre and post-treatment periods.       
The main co-efficient of interest in the above equation is, 3, referred to as the 
difference-in-differences estimator.   3 indicates whether the expected mean 
change in the outcome between the pre (0) and post-policy (1) periods is 
significantly different for both groups of schools (treated and control).  Any 
difference in outcomes is the average treatment effect (ATE) and is more 




indicates the status of the school as an academy converter (Gi=1) or non-
converter (Gi=0):   
 
 ATE = { E[Yi1|Gi = 1] − E[Yi1|Gi = 0] } – { E[Yi0|Gi = 1] − E[Yi0|Gi = 0] }      (3.1.1) 
 
Where the common trend assumption holds, the mean difference in the 
outcome variable between the treatment and control group for the post-
intervention period can be obtained from the sum of the estimates 1 + 3.  it 
in equation 3.1 is the random error component that captures unexplained 
variation in the outcome variable. 
The period analysis model in equation 3.1 is further extended to control for 
school-specific observables and other confounders in the data as in equation 
3.2 below:    
 
Yit = it + 1ACDit + 2TIME + 3ACDit*TIME + 4Xit + d +Υt + it                               (3.2) 
 
The right hand side (RHS) of the above equation (3.2) includes the covariates 
(Xit), the dummies denoting academy status (ACDit) and the time period 
(TIME), the coefficients on local authority fixed effects (δd) and time fixed 
effects (Υt) and an error term (it) to capture random variation, assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d).  
Xit is the set of orthogonal variables that control for both time varying and 
time-invariant observables independent of the outcome.  These are the 
number of pupils of school leaving age, the ability level of the pupils given by 
the average point scores at Key Stage 1, the percentage of pupils on free school 
meals, the percentage of pupils with special educational needs, the percentage 
of white pupils and the cohort size of the school leaving age group.   
Time invariant unobservables that may affect the outcome variable are 
controlled for with fixed effects at the local authority level (d).  The model 
also controls for time-varying year-specific (cross-sectional) factors, which 




The difference-in-differences estimation on the ‘academy effect’ also includes 
a yearly event analysis that examines the linear time trends on the policy 
change as modelled in equation 3.3: 
  
Yit = it + 1ACDit + 2Year + ∑ 𝛽𝑡=𝑡+𝑘𝑡=𝑡−𝑘 3ACDit*Year + 4Xit + d + it                              (3.3) 
 
In the above equation, 1 provides the mean estimate of the outcome variable 
for the treated group of schools in the absence of treatment and 2 the change 
in outcome overtime.   ∑ 𝛽𝑡=𝑡+𝑘𝑡=𝑡−𝑘 3 summarises the difference in the mean 
estimates of the outcome variable between the pre-reform period (t=t-k) and 
the post-reform period (t=t+k).  The reference period, here, is t=0 - the year 
when the policy intervention takes place.  The conversion year (t=0), not being 
observed for the control group of schools, has to be randomly assigned.  The 
random assignment of the reference period (intervention year) among 
schools in the control group has been done so as to replicate the observed 
distribution pattern of the conversion year among treated schools.  The model 
also conditions for time-invariant exogenous factors (Xit) likely to affect 
output and includes local authority fixed effects to control for time invariant 
unobservables that are common for schools within the same local education 
authority (d) and random variation (it).  The event analysis model is 
particularly useful to detect the presence of endogeneity associated with 
academy conversion.  It enables comparison of pre-trends in the outcome 
variable with trends in the post–policy (post-trends) years.  The absence of 
noticeable pre-trends validates the model for the estimation of the 
exogenous effects of academisation on the outcome variables of interest. 
The results from the estimation of the period and event analysis models are 
presented in Section 3.6.   The identification strategy that precedes the 






3.5 .1 Identification Strategy: Propensity Score Matching 
and the Common Trends Assumption 
 
The identification strategy adopted here has been designed to address the 
issue of non-randomness in the selection process of academisation.  A 
peculiarity of the ‘bespoke’ reforms in the English primary school sector is the 
staggered manner in which they have been implemented.  The criteria by 
which schools could convert to academy status changed and was relaxed over 
time.  The first schools that gained eligibility to convert were the better 
performing schools, deemed as outstanding by Ofsted.  This was followed by 
all good schools, with outstanding features, regardless of their Ofsted grade.  
Later, schools considered as performing well, on the basis of recent test 
results, Ofsted rankings and financial management, were eligible to convert.  
Besides this, are schools funded by the local authority, judged as ‘inadequate’ 
by Ofsted, which are mandatorily made to convert.  The non-random and 
varied nature of selection into academy status poses issues in the data 
analysis, mainly to do with selection bias.  The problem is circumvented, here, 
by adopting an appropriate identification strategy to enable comparison of 
like-with-like, called the propensity score matching technique.   
Propensity score matching involves selection of a control group of maintained 
schools, which best resemble academy converters (treated schools) in their 
pre-treatment characteristics.  The assumption is that in the absence of 
treatment there exist no significant difference between academy schools and 
maintained schools, in both observable and unobservable features.  The 
assumption of common-trends or parallel trends is more clearly illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.    Satisfaction of the criteria enables comparison between similar 
sets of observations for academy schools and maintained schools and is an 
essential condition in obtaining unbiased estimates of the treatment 







Figure 3.1:  Difference-in-Differences Estimation and the Common Trends Assumption 
 
Source:  Mailman School of Public Health, Colombia University (2017) 
 
Figure 3.1 above depicts the common trends assumption within the 
framework of the difference-in-differences model.  The trend lines on the 
outcome measure for the control (comparison) and treatment (intervention) 
groups, on the left side of the panel, display parallel trends, in the pre-
intervention (pre-treatment) period.  Any deviation from this trend for the 
treated group in the post-reform period is the effect of the treatment 
(intervention) on the treated group.  The magnitude of the deviation is derived 
from the difference-in-differences estimator.  Here, the assumption of 
common trends, as illustrated in figure 3.1, is vital for the internal validity of 
the difference-in-differences model. 
In order to select the control group of maintained schools for the difference-
in-differences analysis, on the basis of similarity in pre-treatment trends, the 
panel data, running from 2002-2014, is collapsed on key variables for the pre-
reform period.  Data for this period (2002-2010) has been aggregated to an 
individual observation for all schools in the dataset so as to obtain a single 
estimate of the propensity score for each school (10,759 observations or 
schools).  The estimation of the propensity score is done through a non-linear 
probit regression of the binary dependent variable depicting treatment 




including local authority fixed effects.  The probit analysis maps the likelihood 
of academy conversion to the incremental effects of time-invariant 
observables and unobservables that are common to both treated and 
untreated schools (Table 3.3).  All covariates included in the model are seen 
to have a significant effect on the likelihood of academy conversion.   
Propensity scores are calculated on the basis of the incremental effects that 
the selected school-specific factors have on the likelihood of academy 
conversion.  A higher propensity score implies a higher chance/probability of 
a school becoming an academy and likewise the lower the propensity score 
the less likely a school converts to academy status.  The range of the 
propensity scores estimated to be above 0, vary between 0.004 and 0.8 with a 
long tail of school observations at the higher end of the propensity score 
distribution (see table A3.1).  Most school observations are clustered within 
the range where the likelihood of academy conversion varies between 5 per 
cent and 20 percent (see figure 3.2).  Within the different blocks of the 
estimated propensity score, it is important to note, the distribution of 
covariates included in the probit model is the same (balanced) for treated 
schools and control schools.  Satisfaction of the balancing property, in other 
words, ensures common trends between the schools within the same block of 
estimated propensity scores. 
Given the distributions on propensity scores for ‘treated schools’ and ‘schools-
not-treated’, the common support region (CSR) may be defined.  This is the 
area of overlap between the distributions of both sets of schools as can be seen 
in figure 3.3 below.  The final step involves selecting schools within the CSR 
for the difference-in-differences analysis.  Any schools that fall outside this 
region is discarded from the analysis.  478 maintained schools that fall outside 
the Common Support Region have, thus, been discarded bringing down the 
total number of schools in the final data set from 10,759 to 10,281.  It is 
noteworthy that the discarded set of schools doesn’t contain any academy 
schools meaning that the model specified correctly predicts the probability of 






Table 3.3:  Marginal and Percentage Effects (2002 – 2010:  Averages) 
 
  






































3.6 Empirical Analysis & Falsification Test 
 
The results from the estimation of the aggregated effects (period model) and 
dynamic effects (yearly event model) of academy conversion pertaining to 
school performance outcomes and intake quality are analysed here.    Table 
3.4 presents the estimates from the period analysis on school performance 
outcomes as in maths test results, reading test results and the Average Point 
Score at Key Stage 2.  The difference-in-differences estimate, 3, is the average 
treatment effect (ATE) and indicates whether the expected mean change in 
the outcome between the pre (0) and post-policy (1) periods is significantly 
different for both groups of schools (treated and control).   
Comparison of the performance indicators on english reading and maths show 
a positive and significant change in test results in both subjects in the post-
policy period for academy schools compared to the counterfactual outcome.  
The estimates are significant and positive even when controlling for time 
invariant observables and unobservables and year- specific factors that could 
potentially affect the outcome variables.   The average increase in reading and 
maths test results over the post-policy period for academy schools is higher 
by almost a unit compared to maintained schools.  The ATE is, however, seen 
to be moving in the opposite direction on Average Point Scores at Key Stage 2.  
The Average Point Score (KS2) is a combination of the average test results in 
Standard Assessment Tests (SAT) in reading, maths and grammar, 
punctuation and spelling and of teacher assessments in writing and science.  
The discrepancy with the observed effect on standardised test results in 
reading and maths, taken separately, may have to do with differences in the 
assessment procedure or may be due to the effects of aggregating test scores 
across different subjects and different assessment procedures - considering 
the possibility that teacher assessments could be subjective in nature 
(Burgess, 2009).  The APS (KS2) falls by 0.3 for academy schools relative to 
maintained schools in the post-reform period.   
School intake quality is examined through the indicators on innate 




special educational needs and with English as an additional language and the 
cohort size.  The results presented in Tables 3.5a and 3.5b provide a mixed 
picture.  The difference-in-differences estimator is not significant in each of 
these cases except on cohort size.  With respect to this latter variable, 
academisation is seen to have a positive impact, with the average size of the 
school leaving cohort increasing by 0.5 to 0.6 for academy schools over that of 
maintained schools.  The estimate on this indicator is significant at the ten per 
cent level.  The baseline indicator, 1, for the outcome variable on cohort size 
is significant and positive for academy schools, indicating that academisation 
generally involved bigger sized schools.   The baseline indicator on innate 
ability is also positive and significant and retains the positive sign in the post-
policy period, though not showing a significant increase over maintained 
schools in admitting pupils of higher ability.  Intake quality with respect to 
socially, economically and educationally disadvantaged pupils (FSM, SEN and 
EAL pupils) are all observed to be higher in the baseline period for academy 
schools – the baseline indicator coefficient is significant and negative for 
academy schools on each of these variables.  The academy effect is, however, 
not significant in the post-policy period, but indicates continued lower intake 
of pupils from these three categories of disadvantaged pupils.  The 
counterfactual mean outcome on each of these indicators on intake quality is, 
interestingly, seen to be moving in the opposite direction in all cases.   
Examination of the dynamic effects of academisation (see figure 3.4), reveal a 
positive effect on maths test scores and reading test scores for the later and 
early group of academy converters combined.  The effect is significant at the 
10 per cent level and wanes off in later lags as well as turning negative.  This 
may be explained by the very low numbers of academy schools in the data set 
among the early period converters.  There are no noteworthy differences in 
school intake quality with respect to most indicators between the pre-policy 
and post-policy period.  The cohort size, on the other hand, shows significant 
systematic variation in the pre-reform and post-reform period suggesting that 






Table 3.4:  The Academy Effect on School Performance Outcomes 
 
 


















Table 3.5a:  The Academy Effect on School Intake Quality  
 

















Table 3.5b:  The Academy Effect on School Intake Quality  
 



























Robustness Checks: Falsification Test 
The validity of the results from the period and event analysis is further 
checked through a falsification test (results are not presented here).  In order 
to verify that the estimated effect from both models is the true ‘academy 
effect’, the analysis has been undertaken on a selected sample from within the 
dataset within which school observations have been randomly grouped as 
academy schools and maintained schools.  The post-reform period remains 
the same and is defined from 2010 onwards.   
The results from both the period and event analysis models show no 
significant observable difference between the so classified academy schools 
and maintained schools on any of the outcome indicators following the policy 
change, except on the average point score at key stage 2 in the specification 
using full controls.  The effect observed on the latter outcome is negative with 
a 10 per cent level of significance. Overall, the results from the falsification test 
validates the findings of this research and it can, thus, be concluded that the 




3.7 Conclusion  
 
The implementation of the 2010 reform in the English primary school sector 
has been a large scale experimental exercise linking institutional restructuring 
to educational outcomes.  The analysis undertaken in this chapter examines 
this association at the school level with respect to its effect on school 
performance and school composition.  In line with previous studies (Machin 
et al, 2009; Neri et al, 2018), the findings from this research indicate a 
significant positive policy-effect on schools that become academies for 
standardised test results in reading and maths.  This is supported by the 
observed trends in standardised test outcomes over the post-policy period for 
academy schools in the event study model.  The results on intake composition 




baseline estimates indicating the same trend to have been prevalent in these 
schools even prior to academisation.  These compositional changes are 
observed to be accompanied by systematic increases in pupil numbers for the 
school leaving age group.  The higher intake quality observed in academy 
schools in the post-reform period may, therefore, not be at the expense of 
pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds.  The findings from this study are 
particularly useful from a policy perspective in designing measures for 
inclusive education and understanding the performance enhancing 























This thesis is an analytical study on the economics of state primary schools in 
England.  It examines the aspect of efficiency in English primary schools, in terms 
of maximising school/pupil outcomes through the judicious employment of school 
resources.  School-level estimates of efficiency are obtained using a time-varying 
fixed effects frontier production function model, as developed by Cornwell et al 
(1990), in the econometric measurement of efficiency.  The analysis is undertaken 
both with respect to test-score measures on pupil attainment and progress and 
on intra-school variation in test-scores as well as progress.  There is observed to 
be wide variation in efficiency levels across schools, with efficiency scores ranging 
from 0.5 to 0.95.  There is, thus, considerable scope for improving efficiency in the 
state school sector through the more judicious allocation of resources and by 
emulating the best-practice schools, which constitute the frontier.  The frontier 
schools are evidently able to translate every net addition to key factor inputs, such 
as, total real resources, teaching assistants and school size, more effectively into 
improvements in test results and pupil progress.  There is also seen to be greater 
scope for improving/reducing intra-school variation in marks and progress 
measures through the more efficient utilisation of resources.  The estimated 
model shows factor inputs to be responding differently with regard to tests scores 
and progress measures compared to the variance in these measures.  There seems 
to be a trade-off between efficiency improvements involving tests-scores/pupils 
progress and reducing intra-school variations in tests performance/pupil progress.  
The trend analysis also shows technical efficiency to be gradually rising after mid-
2000 on the attainment/progress measures, but declining over almost the same 
time period on the variance in these measures.  The study highlights the 
importance of measures based on efficiency in judging school performance.  It 
calls for greater recognition of efficiency indicators in informing policy and, for 




The study also undertakes a policy-evaluation on the Academy Act 2010.  The 
legislation heralded the onset of the academisation process in the English 
state primary school sector.  The process oversaw the institutional 
restructuring of schools that convert into academies among state schools.  
Academy schools were given greater freedom over the school curriculum, 
deciding the length of the school day and term, governance, school finance, 
staff pay and employment and in setting their own admissions policy.  The 
review undertaken on the nature of the reforms and its implementation 
portray the strengths and weaknesses in the programme.  The review 
elaborates on the policy implications of the academisation process, which in 
recent years, has been proceeding at an accelerated rate.  The empirical 
analysis that follows, estimates the ‘academy effect’ in the primary school 
sector of the country, through a period and yearly event difference-in-
differences analysis.  Academisation is seen to raise pupil performance in 
standardised test results in english and maths by almost a unit in excess of 
pupil performance in local authority maintained schools.  Differences in 
school intake quality of a performance enhancing nature is also observed in 
academy schools as compared to maintained schools.   
The findings from this study are particularly useful from a policy point of view 
as well as academically.  It draws attention to the scope of applying efficiency 
models in determining school performance and informing policy.  The 
research puts into perspective the association between pupil performance 
and efficiency in resource-use, while accounting for differences in how schools 
utilise the resources at its disposal for maximising (minimising) the 
educational output.  The empirical evidence on the ‘academy effect’ among 
state primary schools is another noteworthy contribution of this research.  
The observations made with regards to changes in intake quality and on the 
different outcome trajectories of academy and maintained schools both prior 
to and following academisation are particularly informative and contributes 
to the discourse on school effectiveness.  Understanding the performance 
enhancing mechanisms that work within the academy school model and the 




the system of state schooling and especially, in the context of academisation 
































 A1.1:  Eligibility Criteria for Free School Meals
 
Note:  A pupil is only eligible to receive a free school meal when a claim for the meal has been made on their behalf, 
and their eligibility has been verified by the school where they are enrolled or by the local authority. 













Table A1.2:   F-Test on Constant Returns to Scale 
F(8, 93099)  3304.05  
Prob > F  0.00  
 
 
Table A1.3:  Wu Hausman Test on Fixed or Random Effects & Test on Time Fixed-Effects 
Outcome Variable  Wu-Hausman  
Test Statistic  
Time Fixed Effect 
Test Statistic  
Value-Added Score  𝜒2 (12)= 424  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97880) = 
371.81 𝜌 > F = 0  
English Test Results  𝜒2 (13)= 5595.24  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97879) = 
7264.35 𝜌 > F = 0  
Maths Test Results  𝜒2 (13)= 4479.05  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97879) = 
4816.09 𝜌 > F = 0  
APS – KS2  𝜒2 (13)= 1306.94  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97879) = 
694.74 𝜌 > F = 0  
Variance in Value-
Added Score  
𝜒2 (12)= 993.84  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 978870) = 
148.78 𝜌 > F = 0  
Variance in English 
Test Marks  
𝜒2 (13)= 421.46  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97879) = 
107.32 𝜌 > F = 0  
Variance in Maths 
Test Marks  
𝜒2 (13)= 957.76  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97879) = 
555.92 𝜌 > F = 0  
Variance in APS – KS2  𝜒2 (13)= 753.94  
𝜌 > 𝜒2 = 0  
F (8, 97879) = 

















Table A1.4:  Summary Statistics of Log-transformed Variables 
 Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  
Number of Pupils  3.44  0.60  
Total Resources in 
real terms  
10.05  0.72  
Average Point Score 
(APS) at KS1  
2.80  0.08  
APS at KS2  3.33  0.11  
School Value-Added 
Score  
4.62  0.03  
Average Total 
Marks in English 
Test  
4.11  0.14  
Average Total 
Marks in Maths Test  
4.20  0.15  
Technical Efficiency 
(Value-Added)  
0.67  0.01  
Technical Efficiency 
(English Test)  
0.50  0.04  
Technical Efficiency 
(Maths Test) 
0.50  0.05  
Technical Efficiency 
(APS KS2) 
0.84  0.05  
Total  1 07,587 
 
 



























Figure A1.1:  Distinction between OLS, the Deterministic and Stochastic Production Functions  
 
  
Deterministic frontier:  where, any deviation from the frontier 
determined by the input-output mapping of the most productive units 
is attributed to technical efficiency alone.  
SFA (Stochastic Frontier Approach):  where, the frontier is 
determined by a deterministic component mapping inputs and output 
and a random error component to account for statistical noise.  Any 
unit that lies below the thus determined frontier is technically 
inefficient with the extent of deviation from the frontier capturing the 
degree of inefficiency.  
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares):  This is the average production 
function mapping inputs and outputs for the average unit after 
















































Table A2.1:  Autonomy in the English School System  
  
  






Figure A2.1:  Academies in England, 2002/03 to 2017/18 
                                                                                                         
 
  
Notes:    
  
1. Percentages are calculated using data collected in the January of each academic year.  
Percentages for 2002/03 to 2016/17 are based on published national statistics.  The 
percentage for 2017/18 is an estimate based on our analysis of the Department’s 
published database of schools.  
2. In total, 21, 538 state-funded schools were open at January 2018.  Of these, 14, 066 (65%) 
were maintained schools and 7, 472 (35%) were academies.  The number of academies 
comprised 6, 996 converted academies, and 476 free schools, including university 
technical colleges and studio schools.  
3. In addition to 16, 768 primary and 3, 434 secondary schools, ‘all schools’ includes 984 
special schools and 352 alternative providers.  At January 2018, 29% of statefunded 
special schools and 34% of alternative providers were academies.  
  
  








Figure A2.2:  Proportion of Primary Schools that are Academies & Primary  
School Performance in England’s Local Authorities  
 
Source:  National Audit Office Analysis of Department for Education data, 2018  
  
  








Figure A2.3:  What is the primary reason for becoming an academy?  






Source:  Bassett et al, 2012  
  
  
     













Source:  Eyles et al, 2017 
 
Table A3.1:  Table of Inferior Bound (Showing the number of treated and the 











A Handbook for New School Governors 2009-2010. 2010. United Kingdom. 
ADAMS, RICHARD, 2016, May 6. Government Drops Plan to Make All Schools in England 
Academies.  The Guardian.  Government drops plan to make all schools in England academies 
| Academies | The Guardian 
AFRIAT, S.N., 1972. Efficiency Estimation of Production Function. International Economic 
Review, 13(3), pp. 568-98.  econpapers.repec.org. 
AIGNER, D.J. and S. F. CHU, 1968. On Estimating the Industry Production Function. The 
American Economic Review, 8(4), pp. 826-839.  https://www.jstor.org/stable/1815535. 
AIGNER, D., C.A.K. LOVELL and P. SCHMIDT, 1977. Formulation and estimation of 
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6(1), pp. 21-37.  
ISSN:  03044076. 
BALL, S.J., 2011. Academies, Policy Networks and Governance.  In: HELEN M. GUNTER 
(ed): The State and Education Policy: The Academies Programme. 1st edn. United Kingdom: 
Bloomsbury Publishing.  ISBN:  9781441150172. 
BASSETT, D., GARETH LYON, WILL TANNER and BILL WATKIN, 2012. Plan A+ 
Unleashing the potential of academies. United Kingdom: The Schools Network; Reform.   
BATES, J.M., 1997. Measuring Predetermined Socioeconomic 'Inputs' when Assessing the 
Efficiency of Educational Outputs. Applied Economics, 29(1), pp. 85-93.  ISSN: 0003-6846. 
BATTESON, C.H., 1999. The 1944 Education Act Reconsidered. Educational Review, 51(1), 
pp. 5-15.  ISSN:  0013-1911. 
BBC NEWS, 2016, May 7.  What does it mean to be an academy school?  What does it mean 
to be an academy school? - BBC News. 
BEAUVALLET, A., 2015. Thatcherism and Education in England: A One-way 
Street? Observatoire de la société britannique, (17), pp. 97-114.  ISSN:  1775-4135. 
BJÖRKLUND, ANDERS, PER-ANDERS EDIN, PETER FREDRIKSSON AND ALAN 
KRUEGER, 2004. Education, equality, and efficiency – An analysis of Swedish school reforms 
during the 1990s. SNS Welfare Policy Group.  ISBN:  978-0-8715-4140-6. 
BLACK, A., A. BESSUDNOV, Y. LIU and B. NORWICH, 2019. Academisation of Schools 
in England and Placements of Pupils With Special Educational Needs: An Analysis of Trends, 
2011–2017. Frontiers in Education, 4, pp. 1-14.  ISSN:  2504-284X. 
BLATCHFORD, R., 2021, May 28. What is the legacy of the Education Act, 70 years on?. 
Available: http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/apr/22/1944-education-act-butler-
policy-today. 
BÖHLMARK, ANDERS AND MIKAEL LINDAHL, 2007. The Impact of School Choice on 
Pupil Achievement, Segregation and Costs: Swedish Evidence. Institute for the Study of Labor, 




BOLTON, P., 2015. Converter academies:  Statistics. United Kingdom: House of Commons 
Library.  https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06233/. 
BRITTON, JACK, CHRISTINE FARQUHARSON, LUKE SIBIETA, IMRAN TAHIR AND 
BEN WALTMANN, 2020. 2020 annual report on education spending in England. London, 
United Kingdom: The Institute for Fiscal Studies.  ISBN:  978-1-80103-012-0. 
BRUNDRETT, MARK, DIANE DUNCAN AND CHRISTOPHER RHODES, 2010. Leading 
curriculum innovation in primary schools project: an interim report on school leaders' roles in 
curriculum development in England. Education 3-13: International Journal of Primary, 
Elementary and Early Years Education, 38(4), pp. 403-419.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/03004271003771067. 
BURGESS, SIMON AND ELLEN GREAVES, 2009. Test Scores, Subjective Assessment and 
Stereotyping of Ethnic Minorities.  Working Paper No. 09/221.  The Centre for Market and 
Public Organisation, Bristol Institute of Public Affairs, University of Bristol, Bristol, United 
Kingdom.https://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-ibrary/sites/cmpo/migrated/documents/wp221.pdf. 
CHEVALIER, ARNAUD, PETER DOLTON AND ROS LEVACIC, 2005. School and 
Teacher Effectiveness, IN: Stephen Machin and Anna Vignoles (ed):  What's the Good of 
Education? The Economics of Education. Oxfordshire, United Kingdom: Princeton University 
Press, ISBN:  9780691117348. 
CHOWDRY, HAROON AND LUKE SIBIETA, 2011. School funding reform: an empirical 
analysis of options for a national funding formula, London, United Kingdom: Institute for 
Fiscal Studies.  https://ifs.org.uk/publications/5754. 
CIRIN, R., 2014. Do academies make use of their autonomy?, United Kingdom: Department 
for Education.RR366_-_research_report_academy_autonomy.pdf (publishing.service.gov.uk). 
COBB-CLARK, D.A. and N. JHA, 2013. Educational Achievement and the Allocation of 
School Resources.  NY: Rochester. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.12159. 
COLDRON, JOHN, MEGAN CRAWFORD, STEVE JONES AND TIM SIMKINS, 2014. 
The restructuring of schooling in England: The responses of well-positioned 
headteachers. Educational Management Administration & Leadership, 42(3), pp. 387-403.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/1741143214521592. 
COLEMAN, J.S., 1966. Equality of Educational Opportunity. U.S. GOVERNMENT 
PRINTING OFFICE, Washington, United States of America: NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS.  ed012275.tif.pdf. 
CORNWELL, C., PETER SCHMIDT AND and ROBIN C. SICKLES, 1990. Production 
frontiers with cross-sectional and time-series variation in efficiency levels. Journal of 
econometrics, 46(1), pp. 185-200, ISSN:  0304-4076. 
COUGHLAN, S., 2017, April 4. Free school meals is 'unreliable poverty measure'. BBC News.  
Free school meals is 'unreliable poverty measure' - BBC News. 
COUGHLAN, S., 2007, May 14. 'Education, education, education', news.bbc.co.uk. 
CURTIS, A., SONIA EXLEY, AMANDA SASIA, SARAH TOUGH and GEOFF WHITTY, 
2008. The Academies programme: Progress, problems and possibilities A report for the Sutton 
Trust. United Kingdom: The Sutton Trust.  http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/id/eprint/30364. 
DAS, J., S. DERCON, J. HABYARIMANA, P. KRISHNAN, K. MURALIDHARAN, V. 
SUNDARARAMAN, W. THANK, J. CULLEN, G. DAHL, R. GORDON, G. HANSON and 
H. JACOBY, 2011. NBER Working Paper Series, School Inputs, Household Substitution, and 




DELLER, S.C. and E. RUDNICKI, 1993. Production efficiency in elementary education: The 
case of Maine public schools. Economics of education review, 12(1), pp. 45-57. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0272-7757(93)90042-F. 
DENNIS, AIGNER, C.A. KNOX LOVELL AND PETER SCHMIDT, 1977. Formulation and 
estimation of stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6(1), 
pp. 21-37. ISSN:  0304-4076. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION AND SKILLS, 2001, September 5.  Schools Achieving 
Success.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/schools-achieving-success. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2010. The Importance of Teaching: The Schools White 
Paper 2010.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-importance-of-teaching-the-
schools-white-paper-2010. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2011. Class Size and Education in England: Evidence 
Report.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/class-size-and-education-in-england-
evidence-report. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2013a. The Key Stage 1 (KS1) to Key Stage 2 (KS2) 
Value Added Measure.  
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20130104024959/http://www.education.g
ov.uk/schools/performance/archive/primary_04/p3.shtml. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2013b. Value-Added Technical Information. 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20130104025001/http://www.education.g
ov.uk/schools/performance/archive/primary_04/p8.shtml. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2014.  Statistical First Release, National Pupil 
Projections – Future Trends in Pupil 
Numbers.https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/330261/SFR23_2014_Main_Text.pdf. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2016. Educational Excellence Everywhere.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/educational-excellence-everywhere. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2018a. Free School Meals 
Guidance for Local Authorities, Maintained Schools, Academies and Free 
Schools.https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/700139/Free_school_meals_guidance_Apr18.pdf. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2018b. Open academies, free schools, studio schools 
and UTCs.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-academies-and-academy-
projects-in-development. 
DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION, 2019. Schools, Pupils and Their Characteristics: 
January 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-
characteristics-january-2019. 
DOBBIE, WILL AND ROLAND G. FRYER, JR., 2011. Are High-Quality Schools Enough to 
Increase Achievement Among the Poor? Evidence from the Harlem Children's 
Zone.  American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(3), pp. 158-187.  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41288642?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021, May 1.  
Education.  https://www.britannica.com/topic/education. 
EMMERSON, C., S. MCNALLY AND C. MEGHIR, 2005. Chapter Ten: Economic 
Evaluation of Education Initiatives. In: STEPHEN MACHIN AND ANNA VIGNOLES, 
(ed.), What's the Good of Education? Princeton, United States of America: Princeton 




EYLES, ANDREW AND STEPHEN MACHIN, 2015, Autumn.  Academy schools 
and pupil outcomes.  CentrePiece.  https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp452.pdf. 
EYLES, ANDREW, CLAUDIA HUPKAU AND STEPHEN MACHIN, 2016. Academies, 
charter and free schools: do new school types deliver better outcomes? Economic 
Policy, 31(87), pp. 453-501. https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecpoli/v31y2016i87p453-501. 
EYLES, A., S. MACHIN, AND S. MCNALLY, 2017. Unexpected school reform: 
Academisation of primary schools in England. Journal of public economics, 155, pp. 108-121.  
ISSN:  0047-2727. 
EYLES, A. AND STEPHEN MACHIN, 2018. The introduction of academy schools to 
England’s education. Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(4), pp. 1107–1146.  
ISSN:  1542-4766. 
EXPLORE EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2021.  Schools, Pupils and Their Characteristics.  
https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-
characteristics. 
FARRELL, M.J., 1957. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Series A (General), Vol. 120(No. 3), pp. 253-290.  ISSN:  2397-2327. 
FIGLIO, DAVID AND SUSANNA LOEB (ed.), 2011. Handbooks in economics:  Economics 
of Education. United States of America: North Holland.  ISBN:  978-0-4445-3429-3.   
FØRSUND, F.R., C. A. K. LOVELL and P. SCHMIDT, 1980. A survey of frontier production 
functions and of their relationship to efficiency measurement. Journal of Econometrics, 13(1), 
pp. 5-25.  https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(80)90040-8. 
GIBBONS, S. and S. TELHAJ, 2007. Mobility and school disruption. London: CEE.  
www.fachportal-paedagogik.de. 
GIBBONS, S., S. MACHIN, and O. SILVA, 2008. Choice, Competition, and Pupil 
Achievement. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(4), pp. 912-947.  ISSN:  
1542-4766. 
GIBBONS, STEPHEN, SANDRA MCNALLY AND MARTINA VIARENGO, 2011a.  ‘Does 
Additional Spending Help Urban Schools? An Evaluation Using Boundary 
Discontinuities’. Discussion Paper 128.  London, United Kingdom: Centre for the Economics 
of Education.  http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84213/7/additional_spending.pdf.   
GIBBONS, S. and O. SILVA, 2011b. Faith Primary Schools: Better Schools or Better 
Pupils? Journal of Labor Economics, 29(3), pp. 589-635.  ISSN:  0734-306X. 
GIBBONS, S. and O. SILVA, 2011c. School Quality, Child Wellbeing and Parents' 
Satisfaction. Economics of Education Review, 30(2), pp. 312-331.  ISSN:  0272-7757. 
GILLARD, D., 2018, May. Education in England: A History. 
Available: http://www.educationengland.org.uk/history/. 
GLENNERSTER, H., 1991. Quasi-markets for Education? Economic Journal, 101(408), pp. 
1268-76.  econpapers.repec.org. 
GORARD, S., 2005. Academies as the ‘Future of Schooling: Is This an Evidence‐Based 
Policy? Journal of Education Policy, 20(3), pp. 369-377.  ISSN:  0268-0939. 
GOV.UK, 2021.  Types of school. https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/academies. 
GRISSMER, DAVID W., SHEILA NATARAJ KIRBY, MARK BERENDS AND 
STEPHANIE WILLIAMSON, 1994. Student Achievement and the Changing American 




GUNTER, H.M. and G. FORRESTER, 2009. School leadership and education policy-making 
in England. Policy studies, 30(5), pp. 495-511.  https://doi.org/10.1080/01442870902899947. 
GUNTER, H.M., 2011.  Introduction: Contested Educational Reform. IN:  Gunter, M. Helen 
(ed.), The State and Education Policy: The Academies Programme. London, United Kingdom: 
Continuum International Publishing Group.  ISBN:  9781441150172. 
HÆGELAND, T., ODDBJØRN RAAUM AND AND KJELL G.SALVANES, 2005. Pupil 
Achievement, School Resources and Family Background. Bonn, Germany: Institute of Labor 
Economics (IZA).  http://ftp.iza.org/dp1459.pdf. 
HAEGELAND, T., O. RAAUM and K. G. SALVANES, 2008. Pennies from heaven? Using 
exogeneous tax variation to identify effects of school resources on pupil 
achievements. Discussion Paper No. 3561.  Bonn, Germany:  Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA) Bonn.  10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.03.004. 
HANUSHEK, E.A., 1971. Teacher Characteristics and Gains in Student Achievement: 
Estimation Using Micro-Data. The American Economic Review, 61(2), pp. 280-288.  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1817003. 
HANUSHEK, E.A., 1979. Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Estimation of Educational 
Production Functions. The Journal of Human Resources, 14(3), pp. 351-388.  
hanushek.stanford.edu. 
HANUSHEK, E.A., 1981. Throwing Money at Schools. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 1(1), pp.19-41. Hanushek 1981 JPAM 1(1).pdf (stanford.edu). 
HANUSHEK, E.A., 1986. The Economics of Schooling:  Production and Efficiency in Public 
Schools. Journal of Economic Literature, 24(3), pp. 1141-1177.  ISSN:  0022-0515 , 2328-
8175. 
HANUSHEK, E.A., 1997. Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student Performance: 
An Update. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 19(2), pp. 141-164.  ISSN:  0162-
3737. 
HANUSHEK, E.A., 2003. The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies. The Economic 
Journal, 113(485), pp. F64-F98.  hanushek.stanford.edu. 
HEDGES, L.V., LAINE, R.D. AND GREENWALD, R., 1994. An Exchange: Part I: Does 
Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of Differential School Inputs on 
Student Outcomes. Educational Researcher, 23(3), pp. 5-14.  ISSN:  0013-189X. 
HOGAN, A., 2014. NAPLAN and the role of edu-business: New governance, new 
privatisations and new partnerships in Australian education policy. Australian Educational 
Researcher, 43.  ISSN:  0311-6999. 
How fair is Britain? Equality, Human Rights and Good Relations in 2010, 2011. Essex, United 
Kingdom: Equality and Human Rights Commission.  how-fair-is-britain.pdf 
(equalityhumanrights.com). 
HOXBY, CAROLINE M., 2003.  School Choice and School Productivity:  Could School 
Choice Be a Tide that Lifts All Boats?, IN:  Caroline M. Hoxby (ed.):  The Economics of School 
Choice.  Illinois, United States of America:  University of Chicago Press.  ISBN:  0-226-35533-
0. 
HOXBY, CAROLINE M. AND JONAH E. ROCKOFF, 2004. The Impact of Charter Schools 






HOXBY, CAROLINE M., SONALI MURARKA AND JENNY KANG, 2009. How New York 
City’s Charter Schools Affect Achievement. Stanford, California: The New York City Charter 
Schools Evaluation Project.  
D:\charter_nyc\cmh\charter_school_report_summer2009\reformat\aggregate_cover_page_sep
tember2009.wpg (nber.org). 
HSIEH, C. AND MIGUEL URQUIOLA, 2003. When Schools Compete, How do They 
Compete? An Assessment of Chile’s Nationwide School Voucher Program. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.  w10008.pdf (nber.org). 
JACKSON, KIRABO C., RUCKER C. JOHNSON AND CLAUDIA PERSICO, 2016. The 
Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes:  Evidence from School 
Finance Reforms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 157-218.  gsppi.berkeley.edu. 
JOHNSON, P., 2004. Education Policy in England. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20(2), 
pp. 173-197.  ISSN:  0266-903X. 
JONDROW, J., LOVELL, C., MATEROV, I.S. AND SCHMIDT, P., 1982. On the Estimation 
of Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model. Journal of 
Econometrics, 19(2-3), pp. 233-238.  ISSN:  0304-4076. 
KALIRAJAN, K. P. AND R. T. SHAND, 1994. Economics in Disequilibrium: An Approach 
from the Frontier. New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited. 
KAUKO, JAAKKO AND MAIJA SALOKANGAS, 2015. The Evaluation and Steering of 
English Academy Schools through Inspection and Examinations: National Visions and Local 
Practices. British Educational Research Journal, 41(6), pp. 1108-1124.  ISSN: 01411926. 
KEDDIE, A., 2017. Context Matters: Primary Schools and Academies Reform in 
England. Journal of Education Policy, 34, pp. 1-16.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2017.1402959. 
KOUNALI, DAPHNE, TONY ROBINSON, HARVEY GOLDSTEIN AND HUGH 
LAUDER, 2008. The Probity of Free School Meals as a Proxy Measure for 
Disadvantage. Bristol, United Kingdom: Centre for Multilevel Modelling.  Microsoft Word - 
FSMJEDPolAuthors.doc (bristol.ac.uk). 
LEVACIC, R., STEPHEN MACHIN, DAVID REYNOLDS, ANNA VIGNOLES and JAMES 
WALKER, 2000. The Relationship between Resource Allocation and Pupil Attainment: A 
Review. London, United Kingdom: Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.  ISSN 2045-
6557 
LEVAČIĆ, R. AND A. VIGNOLES, 2002. Researching the Links between School Resources 
and Student Outcomes in the UK: A Review of Issues and Evidence. Education 
economics, 10(3), pp. 313-331.  ISSN:  2045-6557. 
LONG, R., 2015. Academies under the Labour Government.  House of Commons Library, 
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/22717/1/SN05544.pdf. 
LONG, ROBERT AND PAUL BOLTON, 2016. Every School an 
Academy: The White Paper Proposals. House of Commons Library.  
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7549/CBP-7549.pdf. 
London Councils, 2011. ‘The Changing Role of Local Education Authorities in Education’, A 







MACHIN, STEPHEN AND SANDRA MCNALLY, 2004. The Literacy Hour. London, 
United Kingdom: Centre for the Economics of Education.  ISSN:  2045-6557. 
MACHIN, STEPHEN AND ANNA VIGNOLES, 2005. What's the Good of 
Education? Oxfordshire, United Kingdom: Princeton University Press. ISBN:  
9780691117348. 
MACHIN, STEPHEN AND ANNA VIGNOLES, 2006. Education Policy in the UK. London, 
Discussion Paper 57.  London, United Kingdom: Centre for the Economics of Education.  
ISBN-0-7530-1853-5. 
MACHIN, STEPHEN AND OLMO SILVA, 2013. School Structure, School Autonomy 
and the Tail. Special Paper No. 29, Centre for Economic Performance.  cep.lse.ac.uk 
MACHIN, STEPHEN AND SANDRA MCNALLY, 2016. Unexpected School Reform: 
Academisation of Primary Schools in England. London, United Kingdom: Centre for 
Economic Performance.  ISSN:  0047-2727. 
MAGUIRE, M. AND S. PRATT-ADAMS, 2009. Improving the English Urban Primary 
School: Questions of Policy. Improving Schools, 12(1), pp. 59-70. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1365480208101722. 
MAISURIA, A., 2014. The Neo-liberalisation Policy Agenda and its Consequences for 
Education in England: a Focus on Resistance Now and Possibilities for the Future. Policy 
Futures in Education, 12(2), pp. 286-296.  dx.doi.org. 
MARSHALL, B., 1997. Education: The Great Education Debate? Critical Quarterly, 39(1), 
pp. 111-118.  ISSN:  0011-1562,14678705. 
NERI, L. AND ELISABETTA PASINI, 2018. Heterogeneous Effects of Mass Academisation 
in England. London, United Kingdom: Queen Mary, University of London.  
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/184798 
NICOLETTI, C. AND BIRGITTA RABE, 2012. The effect of school resources on test scores 
in England. 2012-13. Colchester: ISER.  www.econstor.eu. 
OECD, 2004. Education at a Glance.   https://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-
school/educationataglance2004-home.htm. 
OECD, 2011, October 9. School Autonomy and Accountability: Are They Related to Student 
Performance? https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisainfocus/48910490.pdf. 
PARKINSON, JUSTIN, 2005, March 17.  Why the fuss over city academies?, BBC News.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/4357383.stm. 
PATON, G., 2013, April 10. Nine-in-10 of the Coalition's free schools 'oversubscribed'. The 
Telegraph.  https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/9985028/Nine-in-10-of-
the-Coalitions-free-schools-oversubscribed.html. 
PLEWIS, I., 1997. Statistics in Education (Arnold Applications of Statistics Series). United 
Kingdom: Hodder Education.  ISBN:  9780340646281. 
RAY, S.C., 1991. Resource-Use Efficiency in Public Schools: A Study of Connecticut 
Data. Management Science, 37(12), pp. 1620-1628.  ISSN:  0025-1909. 
SANDSTROM, MIKAEL F. AND FREDRIK BERGSTROM, 2005. School Vouchers in 





SCHEERENS, J. AND B. P. M. CREEMERS, 1989. Conceptualizing School 
Effectiveness. International Journal of Educational Research, 13(7), pp. 691-706.  ISSN:  
0883-0355. 
SIBIETA, LUKE, HAROON CHOWDRY AND ALASTAIR MURIE, 2008. Level playing 
field? The implications of school funding. Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom: CfBT 
Education Trust.  https://ifs.org.uk/publications/4252 
SIMKINS, T., 2015. School restructuring in England: New school configurations and new 
challenges. Management in Education, 29(1), pp. 4-8.  ISSN:  0892-0206. 
TAYLOR, C., 2018. The Reliability of Free School Meal Eligibility as a Measure of Socio-
Economic Disadvantage: Evidence from the Millennium Cohort Study in Wales. British 
journal of educational studies, 66(1), pp. 29-51.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2017.1330464 
THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL, 2018. Converting maintained schools 
to academies - National Audit Office (NAO) Press release. United Kingdom: National Audit 
Office.  https://www.nao.org.uk/report/converting-maintained-schools-to-academies/ 
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 2010. Academies Act 2010, 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/32/section/1A. 
The UNESCO Salamanca Statement, 2020. Bristol, United Kingdom: Centre for Studies in 
Inclusive Education. The UNESCO Salamanca Statement (csie.org.uk) 
THORNTON, L., 2018. An investigation of the implementation of the Academies Act 2010 in 
English Schools: Stakeholders’ lived experiences regarding policies and practices in English 
Academies.  Doctoral Thesis, Staffordshire University. 
TINCANI, M. M., 2017. Heterogeneous Peer Effects and Rank Concerns: Theory and 
Evidence. CESifo Working Paper No. 6331.  London, United Kingdom: CESifo.  ISSN:  2364-
142. 
UK PARLIAMENT, 2020. Free Schools Policy.  
https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2010-
0621/debates/1006219000004/FreeSchoolsPolicy. 
VIGNOLES, A., R. LEVACIC, J. WALKER, S. MACHIN AND D. REYNOLDS, 2000. The 
Relationship Between Resource Allocation and Pupil Attainment: A Review, pp. 1-86. Centre 
for Economic Performance.  ISBN 0753014335 
WALFORD, G., 2014. From City Technology Colleges to Free Schools: Sponsoring New 
Schools in England. Research Papers in Education, 29(3), pp. 315-329.  ISSN:  0267-1522. 
WALKER, PETER, 2013, January 15. Teachers' Pay Rises to be Based on Performance, 
Michael Gove Confirms. http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jan/15/teachers-pay-
performance-michael-gove. 
WEST, A. and ELIZABETH BAILEY, 2013. The Development of the Academies Programme: 
‘Privatising’ School-Based Education in England 1986–2013. British Journal of Educational 
Studies, 61(2), pp. 137-159.  ISSN:  0007-1005. 
WEST, A. and DAVID WOLFE, 2018. Academies, autonomy, equality and democratic 
accountability: Reforming the fragmented publicly funded school system in England. London 
Review of Education, 17.  ISSN:  1474-8460, 14748479. 
WEST, A., 2019. The Creation of Academies in England: Expected Effects, Evolution, 





WHITTY, G. and IAN MENTER, 1989. Lessons of Thatcherism: Education Policy in England 
and Wales 1979-88. Journal of Law and Society, 16(1), pp. 42-64.  ISSN:  0263-323X. 
WILSON, J., 2011. Are England's Academies More Inclusive or More 'Exclusive'? The Impact 
of Institutional Change on the Pupil Profile of Schools. London, United Kingdom: Centre for 
Economics of Education.  cee.lse.ac.uk 
WOLFE, D., (ed.), 2011. Academies and the Law, IN:  Helen M. Gunter (ed.), The State and 
Education Policy: The Academies Programme. 1st edn. Great Britain: British Library 
Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.  ISBN:  978-1-4411-4311-2. 
